Mightier than the Sword:

Peace Agreement Design and the Law by Carolan, Gene
 
 
MIGHTIER THAN THE SWORD 
PEACE AGREEMENT DESIGN AND THE LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gene Carolan 
NUI EJ Phelan Fellow in International Law 
 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of PhD 
Maynooth University 
Department of Law 
October 2017 
 
Head of Department: Professor Michael Doherty 
Supervisor: Dr. John Reynolds 
 i  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i 
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................. 1 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................................ 2 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................... 5 
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 8 
1. I. The Role that Law might play in Agreement Stability ........................................... 9 
1. II. The Gap in the Literature .................................................................................... 12 
1. III. The Aims of the Thesis ...................................................................................... 15 
1. IV. The Relevance of the Thesis .............................................................................. 19 
1. V. Structure of the Thesis......................................................................................... 21 
2. THE STATUS OF PEACE AGREEMENTS UNDER THE LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER...................................................................................... 23 
2. I.  Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ........................................ 24 
2. II. Before International Courts ................................................................................. 27 
2. II. A. The Lusaka Agreement ....................................................................... 28 
2. II. B. The Lomé Accord Amnesty ................................................................ 31 
2. III. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 35 
3. BENDING THE LAW, KEEPING THE PEACE .......................................................................... 37 
3. I.  Overview .............................................................................................................. 37 
3. I. A. The Supreme National Council of Cambodia ...................................... 41 
3. I. B. The Abyei Award ................................................................................. 42 
3. I. C. The Dayton Agreement ........................................................................ 44 
3. II. The Square Peg & The Round Hole: ‘Making Them Fit’ ................................... 46 
4. LAW, LEGALIZATION AND THE LEX PACIFICATORIA ........................................................ 50 
4. I. Legalization Theory .............................................................................................. 50 
4. II. The Lex Pacificatoria .......................................................................................... 56 
5. ‘THE MORO PROBLEM’ – CONFLICT IN MINDANAO .......................................................... 63 
5. I. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 63 
5. II. Historical Context ................................................................................................ 69 
5. II. A. The Colonial Period ............................................................................ 69 
5. II. B. Philippine Independence & Moro Revival ......................................... 71 
5. II. C. The Rise of the MNLF ........................................................................ 73 
5. III. The Agreements ................................................................................................. 75 
 ii  
5. III. A. The Tripoli Agreement (1976) .......................................................... 75 
5. III. B. The Final Agreement (1996) ............................................................. 82 
5. III. C. The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2014) ............ 92 
5. IV. Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 107 
6. ‘A BETTER DESTINY’: THE PURSUIT OF PEACE IN SIERRA LEONE ................................. 113 
6. I.  Introduction ........................................................................................................ 113 
6. II. Historical Context .............................................................................................. 118 
6. II. A. Colonization & Independence .......................................................... 118 
6. II. B. The RUF: Pedagogy and Practice ..................................................... 120 
6. II. C. The Sierra Leonean Civil War .......................................................... 122 
6. III. The Agreements ............................................................................................... 124 
6. III. A. The Abidjan Peace Accord (1996) .................................................. 124 
6. III. B. The Conakry Peace Plan (1997) ...................................................... 135 
6. III. C. The Lomé Peace Accord (1999) ...................................................... 143 
6. IV. Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 159 
7. A ‘PEACE-MEAL’ APPROACH TO PEACE-MAKING IN SUDAN ............................................ 166 
7.  I. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 166 
7. II. Historical Context .............................................................................................. 171 
7. II. A. Colonization & The Road to Independence ..................................... 171 
7. II. B. The First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972) ...................................... 174 
7. III. The Agreements ............................................................................................... 177 
7. III. A. The Addis Ababa Agreement (1972) .............................................. 177 
7. III. B. The Sudan Peace Agreement (1997) ............................................... 186 
7. III. C. Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) ....................................... 197 
7. IV. Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 213 
8. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................... 219 
8. I.  Overview ............................................................................................................ 219 
8. II. The Role of Legalization in the Short-Term ..................................................... 220 
8. III. Transitioning to Long-Term Commitments ..................................................... 227 
8. IV. How the Law Shapes Devolution .................................................................... 231 
8. V. Inclusion and The Key Compliance Community .............................................. 237 
8. VI. The Economics of Peace Agreements.............................................................. 242 
8. VII. The Lengths and Limits of Legalization......................................................... 246 
8. VIII. The Consequences of Legalization ............................................................... 249 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................... 255 
 1  
SUMMARY 
In the last 30 years, peace agreements have proliferated as conflict resolution 
instruments. Yet quantity has not reflected quality: peace agreements continue to 
collapse at an alarming rate, and civil wars terminated by negotiated settlement 
remain twice as likely to reignite. By examining the myriad ways in which peace 
agreements give effect to legal processes and institutions, peace agreements can be 
optimised to the point that the signatories’ pen can be mightier than the sword. 
This thesis employs a legalization framework advanced by Kenneth Abbott, 
Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal to 
identify the legal mechanisms that are central to sustainable peace processes. The 
research focuses on the protracted peace processes in the Philippines, Sierra Leone 
and Sudan, resulting in a sample of 9 agreements that reflect success and failure, and 
span 90 years of conflict resolution efforts collectively. These case studies provide 
insight into various geographic regions and cultural contexts, but remain linked by 
commonalities concerning the nature of their conflicts, their origins in the inequitable 
distribution of power and wealth, and the nature of their peace agreements as 
legalized documents tied to Constitutional processes. These commonalities reveal a 
strong correlation between the design of certain legal mechanisms (autonomous 
arrangements, inclusive measures, and forums for dispute resolution), and the 
sustainability of peace in various political contexts. 
The thesis concludes with a comparative analysis of the provisions common 
to each of the case studies, and offers valuable, but generally applicable lessons on 
the specific role that law plays in shaping short-term bodies for conflict management, 
and the long-term processes that influence the transition to sustainable peace. The 
thesis’ contribution thus lies in the advancement of theoretical frameworks for 
agreement design that can inform conflict resolution efforts in difficult contemporary 
and future contexts. 
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To Mam and Dad who, as parents to three boys, are blessed as peacekeepers, 
and in memory of Jim Mooney, who showed us the road less travelled. 
 
 
 
Across wide lawns and cultured flowers drifted  
The conversation of the highly trained... 
Far off, no matter what good they intended,  
The armies waited for a verbal error  
With all the instruments for causing pain:  
And on the issue of their charm depended 
A land laid waste, with all its young men slain, 
Its women weeping, and its towns in terror. 
– Embassy, W H Auden 
 
 
 
On some table, a document is signed by some people that none of us knows, 
and for years our main aim in life is the one thing that usually draws the 
condemnation of the whole world and incurs its severest punishment in 
law…. An order has turned these silent figures into our enemies; an order 
could turn them into friends again.  
– Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front 
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1. 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the decades following the end of the Cold War, the international 
community grew “accustomed to peace as the normal state of affairs.”1 Significant 
improvements in the “technology of peace”2 during the 1990s led to a proliferation of 
internationally-driven peace agreements in the post-Cold War period, and affected a 
long-term decline in the number of conflicts suffered globally.3 But this era has since 
passed. After a time during which the number of conflicts decreased, the five-year 
period from 2011-2016 has seen the growth of increasingly internationalized conflict, 
and clashes have become more deadly.4 Indeed, in 2014, battle deaths hit a 25-year 
high.5  
Yet peace agreements have continued to grow as a means of terminating 
conflict, and negotiated settlements remain a marked feature of modern conflict.6 
Between 1989 and 2014, as many as 212 documents that could be classified as peace 
agreements were signeda figure which averages 8 agreements per year.7 While the 
quantity of agreements being promulgated before the international community 
suggests a positive development, the data suggests that agreement quality (and, 
therefore, sustainability) is in fact severely lacking. In 2011, only one peace 
agreement was concluded, and fighting resumed after just three days.8 In 2013, peace 
                                                          
1 Margaret MacMillan, ‘The Rhyme of History: Lessons of the Great War’ (2013) The Brookings 
Essay <http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2013/rhyme-of-history> accessed 6 January 2014. 
2 Virginia Page Fortna, ‘Where Have All the Victories Gone? Peacekeeping and War Outcomes’ 
(2009) Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Toronto, 
6 September 2009 <http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/victories%20Sept%202009.pdf> accessed 14 
July 2016, 40. 
3 Lotta Themnér & Peter Wallensteen, ‘Armed Conflicts, 1946-2011’ (2012) 49(4) Journal of Peace 
Research 565, 571 [original citations omitted]. 
4 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, ‘Conflict is Key to Understanding Migration,’ Carnegie Europe (13 May 
2016) <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=63578> accessed 17 May 2016. 
5 Institute for Economics and Peace, ‘Global Peace Index 2016’ (June 2016) 
<http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/GPI%202016%20Report_2.pdf> accessed 14 
July 2016, 34. 
6 Lotta Harbom & Peter Wallensteen, ‘Armed Conflicts, 1946-2009’ (2010) 47(4) Journal of Peace 
Research 501, 503. 
7 See Therese Pettersson & Peter Wallensteen, ‘Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014’ (2015) 52(4) Journal of 
Peace Research 536. The datasets for 2011-2014 are set out in the fourth issue of that publication for 
each of those years. 
8 Themnér and Wallensteen (n 3) 571. The agreement in question was the Addis Ababa Agreement 
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agreements in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
collapsed within months of their conclusion.9 Despite an upward in trend in the 
number of peace agreements signed since 2011, empirical evidence continues to 
suggest that negotiated settlements collapse at an alarming rate. Barbara Walter has 
found that almost half of all negotiated settlements will collapse,10 while civil wars 
terminated through negotiated settlement are twice as likely to reignite.11 
Alarmingly, those conflicts are 50% more deadly than conflicts terminated by a 
decisive victory, meaning the evidence no longer supports the normative argument 
that peace agreements save lives.12 So what should researchers focus in on when we 
consider “why some settlements work and others do not”?13 This thesis set outs to 
address that question with particular reference to the role of law and ‘legalization’ in 
peace agreement stability. 
 
1. I. THE ROLE THAT LAW MIGHT PLAY IN AGREEMENT STABILITY 
Agreement stability is intricately linked to agreement design: the extent to 
which the agreement maps out political structures and empowers those structures to 
react to unanticipated developments.14 Peace agreements are thus highly legal 
documents, often linking ceasefire commitments “to new constitutional arrangements 
for how power will be held and exercised” in territories divided by conflict.15 In the 
tenuous peace that follows the conclusion of open hostilities, the law can serve as a 
neutral vehicle for post-conflict reconciliation. Many peace agreements entail 
demobilization and disarmament provisions that require the parties to form a single 
army under a single government,16 creating what the literature refers to as ‘a security 
                                                                                                                                                                    
signed by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A North. 
9 Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, ‘Armed Conflict, 1946-2013,’ (2014) 51(4) Journal of Peace 
Research 541, 549. 
10 Barbara Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and 
Commitments to Peace” (1999) 24(1) International Security 27 in Evan Hoffman and Jacob 
Bercovitch, ‘Examining Structural Components of Peace Agreements and Their Durability’ (2011) 
28(4) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 399, 400. 
11 Monica Duffy Toft, ‘Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?’ (2010) 34(4) International 
Security 7, 20 [original citations omitted]. 
12 ibid. 
13 Stina Högbladh, ‘Patterns of Peace Agreements - presenting new data on Peace Processes and Peace 
Agreements’ (Annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, 22 March 2006), 
4. 
14 Hoffman and Bercovitch (n 10) 404. 
15 Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace – Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (OUP 2008) 6. 
16 Luca Renda, ‘Ending Civil War: the Case of Liberia,’ (1999) 23(2) The Fletcher Forum of World 
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dilemma.’17 Combatants can be reluctant to disarm, “because doing so renders them 
vulnerable to physical retaliation by enemies.”18 By founding the agreement on 
strong legal guarantees, combatants can signal their intentions clearly and overcome 
this dilemma.19 The precise delineation of ceasefire lines and demilitarized zones can 
prevent a military build-up around contested territory. The provision of joint 
commissions comprised of representatives from both sides “can provide a 
communication channel and forum for discussion of problems”.20 Peceny and 
Stanley cite “timetables for implementation, and provisions for UN verification” as 
further examples of legal measures that can build trust and “lock in repeated 
nonbellicose interactions” between parties.21 The presence of legal language can thus 
provide “a very effective mechanism to prevent breaches of peace agreements … by 
channeling and structuring state conduct in situations of deep mistrust in the 
aftermath of a conflict.”22  
 Principles of law can also be utilized to rehabilitate domestic systems where 
the rule of law has been compromised, and where existing legal structures have been 
“partly constitutive of the conflict itself.”23 In circumstances where an agreement 
must “address the illegitimacy of the pre-agreement legal and political order,”24 
international law can provide “a host of international and comparative” external 
reference points,25 and a “basic lexicon of generally agreed terms and concepts.”26 
Normative considerations such as human rights, gender equality and political 
participation find expression in peace agreements, not because of the parties’ 
bargaining power alone, but because negotiations take place in ‘the shadow of the 
law’—the law’s normative and equalizing influence. The law is thus particularly 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Affairs 59, 59-60. 
17 ibid. 
18 Mark Peceny & William Stanley, ‘Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars 
in Central America’ (2001) 55(1) International Organization 149. 
19 Virginia Page Fortna ‘Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace’ (2003) 57(2) 
International Organization 337, 344. 
20 Virigina Page Fortna, Peace Time – Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton 
University Press 2004) 28. 
21 Peceny and Stanley (n 18) 156-157. 
22 Andrej Lang, ‘‘Modus Operandi’ and the ICJ's Appraisal of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in the 
Armed Activities Case: The Role of Peace Agreements in International Conflict Resolution’ (2008) 40 
New York University Journal of International Law & Politics 107, 110. 
23 Colm Campbell, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Colin Harvey, ‘The Frontiers of Legal Analysis: 
Reframing the Transition in Northern Ireland’ (2003) 66(3) The Modern Law Review 317, 334. 
24 Christine Bell, ‘Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status’ (2006) 100(2) The American 
Journal of International Law 373, 406. 
25 Campbell, Ní Aoláin and Harvey (n 23) 334. 
26 Rob McLaughlin and Hitoshi Nasuy, ‘The Law’s Potential to Break—Rather Than Entrench—the 
South China Sea Deadlock?’ (2016) 21(2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 305, 309. 
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useful in a conflict resolution context because it provides what appears to be “a legal 
order that is ‘neutral’ as between the parties,”27 and the ability to project “mere 
opinions onto a status of what is (universally) right.”28 
However, international law is not always a neutral vehicle, and can be subject 
to various political, cultural and historical interpretations. Indeed, Shahshahani 
contends that international law merely provides a “non-political veneer” for 
“enhanced politicking” between the parties.29 Contested perceptions of 
unprecedented legal arrangements can lead to “unilateral, interest-laden 
interpretations of a single concept”,30 such as autonomy, territory, citizenship, and so 
on. The law can correct interpretive bias by providing for courts and dispute 
resolution forums capable of clarifying any ambiguities and determining any 
competing interpretations.31 Some argue that legally binding agreements are thus to 
be preferred over those of a predominantly political nature, “because they trigger a 
constitutional process with deliberative fora and interpretative tribunals that have to 
be involved at different stages.”32 However, these processes are not always immune 
to subjective influence. Interpretative bodies themselves can be incoherent in 
practice,33 and can be subject to dominant or unilateral control in intrastate processes. 
As such, law and politics should not be seen as competitive spheres of influence in a 
peace process, but rather as mutually constitutive elements of that process. Indeed, 
the objective cover provided by law often makes ground-breaking compromise 
possible where reasons of domestic and international politics had frustrated previous 
attempts.34 
 Peace agreements that adopt consciously legal language and appear to impose 
substantive obligations can also exert considerable normative influence on the parties 
thereto. Actors tend to conduct their relations within the legal framework prescribed 
by the agreement in order to justify their actions—attacks and provocations are much 
harder to justify when explicitly prohibited by a clearly worded ceasefire, for 
example. As this social phenomenon encourages legal compliance, it is known as 
                                                          
27 Bell (n 24) 406. 
28 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The mystery of legal obligation,’ (2011) 3(2) International theory 319, 324. 
29 Sepehr Shahshahani, ‘Politics Under the Cover of Law: Can International Law Help Resolve the 
Iran Nuclear Crisis?’ (2007) 25(2) Boston University International Law Journal 369, 398. 
30 McLaughlin and Nasuy (n 26) 311. 
31 ibid at 312. 
32 Sandeep Gopalan, ‘India-Pakistan Relations: Legalization and Agreement Design’ (2007) 40 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 687, 717. 
33 McLaughlin and Nasuy (n 26) 311. 
34 Shahshahani (n 29). 
 12 
‘compliance-pull.’ Parties may also promulgate their peace agreements 
internationally, in order to signify the sincerity of their commitments, and appeal to 
principles of international law. While these agreements can still be breached, doing 
so incurs significant ‘audience costs,’ i.e., loss of political, military and economic 
support from domestic constituencies and the international community.35 Even where 
established norms cannot effect total compliance, Morriss argues that they constitute 
a useful barometer “for differentiating good faith efforts at compliance … from 
willful and knowing violations properly subject to international condemnation and 
collective resistance” from the international community.36 
 
1. II. THE GAP IN THE LITERATURE 
 Despite the central role that law plays in influencing party behavior, 
rehabilitating post-conflict systems, and maintaining ceasefire mechanisms in the 
interim, scholarly focus on the pivotal role of law in shaping peace processes is 
severely lacking. An ample body of work in the social sciences has explored the 
factors that bring parties to the negotiating table, and the countless variables that 
contribute to agreement stability,37 yet very little has been written about the specific 
role played by law in these core tenets of peacebuilding.38 As Kittrie argues, 
“International law’s potential contributions… are just that, potential. They must be 
consciously harnessed.”39 Scholars have flagged the lack of inquiry into the effects of 
different kinds of legal input on the durability of peace,40 despite the fact that its 
                                                          
35 Fortna (n 20) 28. 
36 David Morriss, ‘From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire Agreements and the Evolving Role of 
the United Nations’ (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 801, 817. 
37 See generally, Caroline A Hartzell, ‘Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate 
Wars’ (1999) 43(1) Journal of Conflict Resolution 3, Caroline A Hartzell, Matthew Hoodie and 
Donald Rothchild, ‘Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables’ 
(2001) 55(1) International Organization 183, Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth 
Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder 2002), Barbara 
Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’ (1997) 51 International Organization 335, 
Barbara F Walter, Committing to Peace: Successful Settlements of Civil Wars (Princeton University 
Press 2002) 3. 
38 Orde F Kittrie, ‘More Process than Peace: Legitimacy, Compliance, and the Oslo Accords’ (2003) 
101 Michigan Law Review 1661, 1662. Notable exceptions include Christine Bell’s landmark 
monograph (n 15), and Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Towards a law of transition from conflict to 
peace’ (Cambridge University Press 2008). 
39 Kittrie (n 38) 1666.  
40 Inger Österdahl, ‘Just War, Just Peace and the Jus post Bellum’ (2012) 81(3) Nordic Journal of 
International Law 271, 276. See also, Fortna (n 19) 339. 
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crucial role in stemming the recurrence of conflict has been well documented.41  
Certain provisions of a peace agreement may maximize signatory-compliance and 
enhance stability, while structural flaws within a peace agreement’s text that can lead 
to peace processes bringing about “more process than peace.”42 Kittrie, for example, 
refers to the Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestine and puts their failure down to 
key elements of their design, such as their open-ended and ambiguously drafted 
provisions, which “clearly had a corrosive effect in and of themselves.”43 Kittrie duly 
concludes that there are lessons to be learned from the failure of such agreements 
“that are generally applicable to designing peace negotiations and peace agreement 
texts to maximize compliance with their terms.”44  
 The lack of attention given to this issue is not just a matter of academic 
oversight, but a question of diplomatic culpability and scholarly ethics. Just as the 
law plays a central role in achieving and maintaining peace, so too does it shape 
“new trajectories of political violence” if the peace agreements collapses.45 This 
causative link demands that greater attention be paid to the policy decisions that 
affect how domestic actors deploy violence.46 The law plays a significant role in 
phrasing and giving effect to these policy decisions, particularly in the context of 
power-sharing provisions and autonomous arrangements, which uproot existing 
Constitutional structures in order to achieve a more equitable distribution of power. 
To date, political scientists have tended to dominate the debate on the legitimacy of 
these arrangements, much to the detriment of any legal contributions.47 While the 
lack of legal focus can be somewhat attributed to the difficulty of finding answers to 
the complex question of peace within a single discipline,48 the unique role that law 
plays in these processes demands further attention. Law is not just a means of 
legitimating post-conflict structures of law, politics, and inequality, but is often a 
unique end in itself. Some combatants fight solely for the cultural and political 
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recognition that legal language grants and peace agreements provide. As Bell has 
noted, “we never imagine that people kill and die for textual recognition. But in fact 
often they do, and so it is important to take law’s performative potential seriously.”49 
 The obvious advantage of research in this area is that we may yet learn from 
previous failings in this field, and apply that knowledge elsewhere to prevent 
negative outcomes or even achieve unprecedented compromises. This idea of 
knowledge transfer is not particularly novel in the field of political diplomacy. 
Delegations from conflict-affected regions frequently visit locations where landmark 
agreements were reached, in the hope of learning something that might apply to their 
own circumstances. Indeed, the success of the Good Friday Agreement on Northern 
Ireland has brought delegations from from Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Liberia, Pakistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Timor Leste, Colombia, Israel, and 
Palestine to Ireland over the last 20 years.50 The European Union has more recently 
cited its experience in Northern Ireland as an example to the peace process in 
Mindanao,51 and the influence of the Good Friday Agreement is readily observable in 
the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro’s provisions on policing 
and decommissioning. The innovative approach to peace-making employed in South 
Africa had a significant influence on the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement in Burundi, which prescribed similar provisions on human rights, gender 
equality, and a vehicle for future negotiations that was tied to the Constitution.52 
More recently, the 2016 peace agreement in Colombia featured transitional justice 
mechanisms that were influenced by the international tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa.53 From a 
practical point of view, the commonality of peace agreement content across various 
peace process is thus a matter of common sense.54 
 From the analytic point of view, however, the story is of course not a 
straightforward one of transferable templates and knowledge. Any sustainable 
solution to conflict must be tailored “to the historical realities of the conflict in 
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question”,55 to “its drivers, its protagonists, their motives and interests.”56 But this 
does not mean that the search for general guidelines, universal standards, or proven 
peacebuilding practices is a futile or naïve mission.57 Just as conflicts play out to 
distinct patterns that can often seem invisible to their contemporaries,58 so too do 
peace agreements replicate successful and unsuccessful mechanisms, with similar 
results. Indeed, Bell has noted that academic analysis of the structural aspects of 
agreements can inform the ‘borrowing’ of provisions that consistently support 
peace,59 as evidenced by the Good Friday Agreement’s enduring influence 
elsewhere. Of course, no single agreement can provide a one-size-fits-all approach to 
peacebuilding. A prototypical agreement would fail to address the peculiarities of 
any given conflict, and a theoretical study will have limited application on the 
ground.60 However, a critical review of commonly adopted peacebuilding practices 
can provide a template that fills a recognized gap in the literature, and presents a 
more informed approach to legal peace-making. 
 
1. III. THE AIMS OF THE THESIS 
 
“Could we simply not formalise these sorts of arrangements, instead of 
always starting from scratch, recognising that of course each case will have 
its own intricacies.”61 
 
This thesis aims to identify legal mechanisms and provisions that are central 
to sustainable peace processes, in order to advance a broad theoretical framework for 
sustainable peace agreements that can be employed and adapted in addressing the 
particularities of a given conflict. The research critically evaluates protracted peace 
processes that had a prolific peace agreement output in order to highlight the features 
that were central to the stability of successful agreements, and those features that 
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were detrimental to their predecessors. A subsequent comparative analysis of the 
provisions common to each of the case studies will identify provisions that are 
consistently attributable to agreement stability. This will allow for the development 
of theoretical frameworks for agreement design that can inform conflict resolution 
efforts in difficult contemporary and future contexts. 
Accordingly, the research centers on a detailed desk study of peace processes 
in the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Sudan. The conflicts therein have collectively 
entailed over 90 years of negotiations, resulting in a sample of 9 agreements that 
reflect success and failure. These case studies provide insight into various geographic 
regions and cultural contexts, but remain linked by commonalities with regards to the 
nature of their conflicts (the central state versus constituents from its neglected 
peripheries), issues regarding the distribution of power (addressed through autonomy 
and power-sharing arrangements) and wealth (land, diamonds, and oil), and the 
nature of their peace agreements as legalized documents tied to Constitutional 
processes. Sierra Leone also serves as an interesting counterpoint to the main aims of 
this thesis, highlighting the difficulties of relying on a solely legal analysis to 
illustrate the intricacies of building peace; and bearing important lessons for 
contemporary issues such as the internationalization of internal conflict and the 
growth of non-state actors with little regard for the rule of law. There is thus much to 
learn from a detailed analysis of these conflicts, their successes and shortcomings, 
and the contexts that informed them. 
Analyzing the peace processes as a series of peace agreements is central to 
this thesis and the broader goal of understanding why some agreements succeed 
while others fail. Structural flaws in an agreement’s text may fell a negotiated 
settlement at an early stage in the peace process, but subsequent agreements can 
build upon the failures of their predecessors,62 as the analysis herein illustrates. The 
peace process can thus be seen as a vehicle for progress and learning, and examining 
the links between agreements in a process is central to understanding variation in 
agreement stability. Studying unsuccessful agreements is also central to advancing a 
nuanced understanding of peacebuilding processes. Existing studies have focused on 
the variables that make peace easier to maintain, much to the detriment of our 
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knowledge of the variables that damage the prospects for peace.63 This oversight is 
particularly damaging in a legal context, where the law can inadvertently legitimize 
structures that undermine peace. Focusing on the process as a whole, and the factors 
that both increase and decrease the sustainability of peace, is thus central to our 
wider goal of furthering “sustainable processes and mechanisms capable of helping 
transform conflict into peace and reconciliation.”64 
When considering whether an agreement or peace process has been 
successful or not, the thesis is not informed by an advanced discussion of what 
constitutes a successful peace. There is debate amongst the literature as to whether 
success should be gauged by the absence of hostilities and lack of civilian casualties; 
or more positive indicators of peace, such as quality of democracy, quality of life, 
reductions in inequality, and so on.65 This thesis adopts a concept of ‘success’ that is 
closer to the former: the conclusion of a negotiated settlement giving rise to new 
political structures/relationships, and the resolution of the overarching conflict-dyad 
marked by the cessation of hostilities between the signatories. The thesis does not 
regard positive or negative peace as a determinant of success, but the research does 
provide insight as to how legal provisions affect such outcomes and influence 
agreement sustainability. 
Defining a peace agreement for the purposes of the thesis is important, given 
the amount of documents that claim the label the ‘peace agreement.’66 The term is 
largely descriptive and is usually attached to formalized agreements, “either between 
two States or a State and an armed belligerent group (sub-state or non-state)—that 
formally ends a war or armed conflict and sets forth terms that all parties are obliged 
to obey in the future.”67 However, there is significant variation among agreements 
with regard to their formal legal status and their substantive obligations.68 Some 
‘agreements’ represent pre-negotiation documents, where the parties agree on a set of 
principles that will inform or guide subsequent talks. Such agreements are merely 
political, and are not justiciable before national or international courts. Bell labels 
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these pre-negotiation agreements as merely “agreements to agree.”69 Other 
agreements, such as ceasefire arrangements, are concluded to provide “a breathing 
space for the negotiation of more lasting agreements.”70 Neither of these types of 
agreement are appropriate for the purposes of this thesis. Instead, the research focus 
on agreements conceived of in a more ‘lasting’ sense – those that “extend to the 
political, cultural, economic, and ethnic differences at the heart of the conflict in a 
way that is intended to produce a lasting peace.”71 Bell labels these types of 
agreement as substantive or framework agreements, and describes how they typically 
envision procedures for ceasefire, demobilization and disarmament, as linked to new 
Constitutional structures addressing governance and legal institutions.72 This is the 
definition that informs this thesis. Significant variation remains among the peace 
agreements that fall within this definition. Framework agreements may provide a 
basic roadmap for new political structures, but they are often lacking the legal 
procedures and level of detail necessary to make them so. Substantive agreements, 
on the other hand, provide detailed instructions as to how these institutions will be 
established, comprised, and mandated; with timetables for implementation, and 
dispute resolution procedures if the agreement does not proceed to plan. The case 
studies examined herein provide interesting examples of the variation among the 9 
peace agreements that attempted to resolve the respective conflicts to which they 
were addressed. 
A few inevitable limitations in this thesis’ design diminish the extent to 
which the research can be applied across certain contexts. For example, though 
dividing the agreements into their constituent legal parts allows us to identify the 
features that do and do not support peace,73 the causative link between certain 
provisions and agreement (in)stability is not always clear. As Virginia Page Fortna 
notes, even if strong legal mechanisms are incorporated into a peace agreement, it 
remains much easier to blame those mechanisms when peace collapses than it is to 
attribute success to them if the peace holds.74 As such, the extent to which the law 
contributes to agreement stability is not always calculable, and is often dependent on 
a host of other factors. We must also be mindful that when studying peace processes, 
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we do not equate ‘process’ with progress.75 Peace processes do not always proceed 
along a path to peace, with each failed agreement marking a stepping stone to peace. 
Negotiations often proceed along ‘a knife edge,’ and can necessitate two steps back 
before the parties take a single step forward along the fine line between success and 
failure.76 The benefit of hindsight further inhibits our ability to understand the 
difficult and demanding conditions that produce peace agreements. As retrospective 
observers, we are freed from the burdens and pressures of compromise.77 This makes 
it easier for me to criticize unpalatable accommodations and flawed arrangements, 
despite the fact that such compromises are often necessary to achieve peace. While 
these shortcomings are noted, they serve to remind us that peace agreements are only 
one aspect of “the complex and prolonged process of war-termination,”78 and the law 
is but one lens through which we view only part of the picture. Nevertheless, efforts 
to resolve conflict without the formalizing influence of the law are substantially 
complicated by its absence.79 While some accounts argue that it is unlikely that 
formal agreements are superior to their less precise counterparts,80 this thesis 
suggests that the opposite is in fact true, and reasserts the role of law in conflicts 
characterized by its absence. 
 
1. IV. THE RELEVANCE OF THE THESIS 
 The need for attention to agreement design is particularly acute because 
agreement quantity continues to outweigh agreement quality. Indeed, speaking in the 
context of the conflict in Ukraine, Ivan Sukhov noted how legal values have become 
so inflated that the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement is now more important than 
the ceasefire itself.81 A ceasefire in Syria in February 2016 was the subject of much 
acclaim, despite the fact that it had no enforcement mechanisms in a conflict zone 
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where the need for such mechanisms was obvious.82 The disparity between the 
political praise heaped on these agreements and the legal standard they are held to is 
“practically schizophrenic,”83 and has served to undermine existing structures for 
managing conflict. The duration of the conflict in Syria, and the lack of a unified 
response to conflicts in Mali and the Central African Republic among others, 
underscore the increasing fragmentation of international crisis management 
systems,84 of which peace agreements can be key components. Unilateral state 
interventions—such as Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of 
Crimea, or the United States-supported Saudi Arabian intervention in Yemen—also 
highlight the fading relevancy of the existing legal framework for the legitimate use 
of force, and suggest that the improvements to Fortna’s ‘technologies of peace’ have 
been steadily rolled back in recent years.  
Closer attention to agreement design is just one way of recalibrating these 
technologies of peace, and putting them to work in a world that is increasingly in 
need of them. In 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
recorded the highest number of persons forcibly displaced by conflict in its history.85 
Of the contributory factors that have created this contemporarily unprecedented 
displacement crisis, two stand out in particular: the conflicts that are driving large 
numbers of people from their homes are generally lasting longer, and particularly 
complicated conflicts are erupting or recurring more frequently.86 The migration 
crisis itself has eroded elements of the international legal order, diminishing human 
rights norms in parts of the European Union, and inspiring deeply unsettling 
arrangements with increasingly repressive regimes in states such as Sudan and 
Turkey. However, as Jean-Marie Guéhenno—CEO of the International Crisis 
Group—has noted, the crisis is one borne of war.87 Combatting the factors that have 
created this situation is central to mounting any sustainable response, and reaffirming 
                                                          
82 Roy Gutman, ‘Syria Cease-Fire Brings Turkey Closer to War,’ Foreign Policy (16 February 2016) 
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/16/syria-ceasefire-brings-turkey-closer-to-war> accessed 17 
February 2016. 
83 Levitt (n 47) 531. 
84 Richard Gowan, ‘Nigeria, Yemen Wars Mark New Era of Ad Hoc Crisis Management,’ World 
Politics Review (30 March 2015) <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15406/nigeria-
yemen-wars-mark-new-era-of-ad-hoc-crisis-management> accessed 30 March 2015. 
85 UNHCR Press Release, ‘With 1 human in every 113 affected, forced displacement hits record high’ 
(20 June 2016) <http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2016/6/5763ace54/1-human-113-affected-forced-
displacement-hits-record-high.html> accessed 21 June 2016. 
86 ibid. 
87 Guéhenno (n 4). 
 21 
the normative values upon which the international legal framework was founded. 
 Such is the decline of the international order that in 2015, the US National 
Military Strategy identified other states as a greater threat to US security than 
terrorism for the first time since the end of the Cold War.88 Indeed, increasing 
provocations between the US and Russia – and tensions in the South China Sea 
between China, Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia and others – suggest that the 
likelihood of interstate conflict persists today in a way that it has not done since the 
Cold War. In such an environment, diplomats, mediators, and scholars alike must be 
experts in crafting the agreements that will prevent and resolve such conflicts. The 
need to understand agreement design in the context of interstate conflict has been 
more recently advocated by as unlikely a figure as US President Donald Trump, who 
has referred to a potential settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict as “the ultimate 
deal.”89 Though such a label belies the historical intricacies of one of the world’s 
longest running conflicts—and the difficulties of peace-making generally—even the 
academic literature is guided by the pursuit of the “win-win,”90 the ground-breaking 
compromise that appeases both sides and brings an end to violence. While 
combatants generally perceive military victory or peace on their terms as the 
optimum outcome in a conflict, war is a costly endeavour, and there is always the 
chance that one party may lose.91 The law can provide pacific alternatives to war by 
providing mechanisms that overcome the security dilemma and address key issues 
through redesigned political structures. By focusing on how these agreements are 
designed and drafted, we can optimise these legal mechanisms to the point that peace 
becomes the parties’ mutual number one preference—to the point that the 
signatories’ pen can be mightier, or at least more efficient, than the sword.  
 
1. V. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 This thesis begins by laying out the legal framework, the normative context, 
and the methodology that informs the research, before examining each of the case 
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studies in detail. Chapter 2 examines the formal legal status of peace agreements 
under some of the principle instruments and structures of the international legal 
order: the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the International Court of 
Justice. Chapter 3 addresses the consequences of peace agreements’ ambiguous 
status. It explores the argument that denying formal legal status to these documents 
complicates peace-making efforts generally, and infringes upon the normative values 
upon which the international order was originally founded. It concludes by 
advocating an alternative conceptualisation of peace agreements that better reflects 
their nature as pragmatic political instruments that trigger deeply legal processes 
(negotiation, interpretation, dispute resolution) and structures (constitutions, organs 
of governance, socio-economic and political rights). Chapter 4 introduces a theory of 
legalization as a method of visualising peace agreements in this manner. It explains 
how legalization theory accounts for the most common features of peace agreements, 
and how the theory further highlights what Bell refers to as a ‘law of the 
peacekeepers,’ or a formative jus post bellum.  
Chapters 5-7 utilise this methodology to analyse the substantive/framework 
agreements resulting from the Moro campaign in the Philippines, the civil war in 
Sierra Leone, and the North/South conflict in Sudan. These examples, despite their 
distinct geographic, political, and cultural contexts, are linked by commonalities that 
suggest a strong correlation between the design of certain legal provisions 
(autonomous arrangements, inclusive measures, and forums for dispute resolution) 
and the sustainability of peace. These chapters each conclude with a comment on the 
legal structures or features that had a major impact on how those respective peace 
processes were (or were not) implemented, before Chapter 8 examines the features 
common to each of the case studies. By applying a legalization framework to these 
case studies, the research offers original insight into the peace agreement patterns 
that recur in vastly different contexts, with particular regard to autonomous and 
economic arrangements. The thesis concludes with valuable, but generally applicable 
lessons on the specific role that law plays in shaping short-term bodies for conflict 
management, and the long-term processes that influence the transition to sustainable 
peace, thereby advancing a more nuanced framework for legalized peacebuilding. 
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2. 
THE STATUS OF PEACE AGREEMENTS UNDER THE 
LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDER 
Chapter 1 introduced the central role that the law can play in building and 
maintaining peace. But is formal legal status an imperative to achieving goals in 
these key areas? How does an agreement benefit from being interpreted not as a 
political document, but as a legal instrument?  
By invoking the ‘rules, practices, and institutions’ of the international legal 
order,1 signatories to peace agreements that take the form of international treaties 
bind themselves to established principles of international law. These principles 
contribute to the law’s normative influence and compliance-pull, channeling state 
conduct in such a manner as to provide an element of certainty with regard to how 
the signatories might behave.2 The agreement can thus be advanced on this basis of 
certainty, with international courts providing recourse where state behavior diverges 
from the agreement’s provisions.  
However, legal status and party behavior is less certain in situations of 
internal (or non-international) conflict. Agreements aimed at terminating these 
conflicts can involve a mix of state, non-state, and international actors in an 
environment where the state’s capacity to govern, or legitimacy to represent, is no 
longer certain. This asks difficult questions of a legal order built upon the 
sovereignty of state actors: questions that existing legal instruments do not answer 
adequately. As such, many peace agreements float in what Bell calls “a Hartian 
penumbra with regard to positive law categories.”3 We will now examine the status 
of peace agreements under two of the principle instruments of the positivist legal 
system: the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), and internationally 
mandated Courts. 
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2. I.  UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties serves as the “leading 
contemporary source of treaty law,” and “sets out the law and procedure for the 
making, operation and termination of legal treaties between states.”4 Under Article 2, 
an international agreement is only granted the status of a treaty where it is concluded 
by two or more states.5 Furthermore, Article 3 explicitly states “that the present 
Convention does not apply to international agreements concluded between States and 
other subjects of international law.”6 This represents a significant obstacle for 
intrastate peace processes that necessitate the involvement of rebel groups, militias 
and political actors who are without legal standing comparable to that of the state.7 It 
effectively means that these actors cannot be a direct party to an agreement if they 
wish to attain international treaty-status for that accord, “even though the non-state 
actor’s compliance lies at the heart of the agreement’s implementation.”8 Thus, 
intrastate conflicts involving non-state actorswhich are arguably in greater need of 
recourse to the ‘rules, practices and institutions’ of the international legal orderare 
deprived of the advantages associated with formal legal status. Such a conclusion 
seems counterproductive to processes of peace and to the utility that the law may 
bring to bear in that regard. The failure to acknowledge the legal standing of these 
key actors undermines the potential compliance-pull of the law, “by offering those 
who would later renege an opportunity to dismiss the agreement as not binding.”9 
This, in turn, greatly undermines “the utility of internationally brokered settlements 
as a device for ending civil strife.”10 The formal inapplicability of the VCLT to 
intrastate peace agreements involving non-state actors thus limits its impact as an 
appropriate model of legal definition for the purposes of this thesis.  
The difficulties in categorizing many peace agreements under traditional 
concepts of international legal agreement do not deny such agreements legal force 
                                                          
4 Seth Benjamin Orkand, ‘Coming Apart at the Seamline - The Oslo Accords and Israel's Security 
Barrier: A Missed Opportunity at the International Court of Justice and the Israeli Supreme Court’ 
(2007) 10 Gonzaga Journal of International Law 390, 419. 
5 Christine Bell, ‘Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status’ (2006) 100(2) The American 
Journal of International Law 373, 375. 
6 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS, Article 3. 
7 Scott P Sheeran, ‘International Law, Peace Agreements and Self Determination: The Case of the 
Sudan’ (2011) 60(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 423, 433. 
8 Bell (n 5) 390. 
9 ibid at 486. 
10 David Wippman, ‘Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?’ (1995) 62(2) The University of 
Chicago Law Review 607, 642. 
 25 
altogether, however. The VCLT’s preamble states “that the rules of customary 
international law will continue to govern questions not regulated by the provisions of 
the present Convention.”11 Indeed, Orkand argues that recourse to modern customary 
treaty law is to be preferred, as it is “broader in its definition of what parties may 
conclude binding treaties.”12 As an instrument that codifies and clarifies several 
principles of international customary law, Antonio Cassese argues that the VCLT 
may be utilized to inform the adoption of general principles in the interpretation of 
non-treaty agreements.13 The VCLT confirms as much, stating that an agreement 
between a State and a non-state actor will not preclude the application “of any of the 
rules set forth in the present Convention to which they would be subject under 
international law independently of the Convention.”14 Thus, Article 26—the 
principle that every agreement in force is binding upon the parties thereto and must 
be performed by them in good faith15—is presumed to apply to the signatories of 
peace agreements between state and non-state actors.16   
While many peace agreements may not meet the definition of a binding treaty 
under narrow conceptions of statehood and the law, a peace agreement remains an 
agreement between two subjects of international law.17 As such, their lack of treaty 
status does not preclude them from giving rise to legally binding obligations.18 
Cassese maintains that states can enter into negotiations with rebel groups in the 
same way that “they do with other states or with international organizations, or such 
sui generis categories as the International Committee of the Red Cross.”19 Indeed, 
the denial of treaty status to agreements between States and non-state actors does not 
deprive those agreements of their legal effect under the VLCT.20 A growing body of 
work suggests that human rights conventions, the Geneva protocols, and prohibitions 
against the use of certain weapons may also apply to non-state actors, without 
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compromising their legal status.21  
Non-state actors may incur legal responsibility following their categorization 
as rebels, insurgents, or belligerents, respectively.22 Rebels are unrecognized 
insurgents with few established legal obligations under international law. However, 
rebels can graduate to insurgency and acquire international rights and obligations, 
provided they exercise control over some part of a nation’s territory and the conflict 
passes a certain threshold of intensity and duration.23 At that point, it is a matter for 
individual states to assess whether the rebel group has satisfied the criteria for 
recognition.24 Traditionally, insurgents that were recognized by the state against 
which they were fighting as not just insurgents, but belligerents, acquired the rights 
and duties that accrue to states under the laws of armed conflict.25 However, 
governments against which the rebellion is directed are often loath to grant rebel 
groups such recognition in practice, as to do so implies that the state has lost the 
capacity to govern, whereas the status of the rebels has been elevated.26 The position 
of non-state actors vis-à-vis treaty obligations thus remains subjective and indefinite. 
Yet the mounting scholarship on the importance of binding non-state actors to certain 
normative obligations suggests a tentative desire to grant such groups a degree of 
treaty-making capacity or legal standing. Illegal acts by insurrectionist movements 
that become the new government of a state—or that establish a new state within the 
territory of the former state—are deemed acts of state at international law. Should 
peace agreements that share power with the same actors not be conferred with a 
similar status? 
 Despite the law’s power to compel under these alternating bodies of 
international law, intrastate peace agreements remain disadvantaged “because of a 
non-state’s incapacity to resort to international mechanisms available to a state to 
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secure compliance by an errant treaty partner.”27 Formal legal status presents further 
difficulties with regard to the eligibility of peace agreements as sources of law before 
international courts, including the International Court of Justice (ICJ).28 The ICJ’s 
authority as an interpreter of international law is likely to influence how the parties 
perceive peace agreements as legally binding documents,29 and denying them as a 
source of law is thus hugely detrimental to the goal of ensuring compliance with 
these agreements. Indeed, Lang argues that the ICJ could play a crucial role in giving 
legal effect to “an emerging type of peace agreement that includes state and non-state 
actors.”30 But as we shall see below, the ICJ has found such a role to be unworkable 
within the confines of the present legal system.  
 
2. II. BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
  The decisions of adjudication bodies such as the ICJ and other specialized 
courts further evidence the theoretical difficulties in categorizing peace agreements 
under traditional concepts of legal agreement. Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice limits the sources of law it may invoke to “international 
conventions, international custom, the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations,” and “the judicial teachings of the most highly qualified 
international legal scholars.”31 It can be difficult to accommodate peace agreements 
and their many variants under these headings. While the ICJ has often generated the 
political inertia necessary to conclude negotiated settlements outside of the 
courtroom,32 it has been reluctant to develop a definitive jurisprudence on peace 
agreements. This reluctance is best exemplified by the ICJ’s interpretation of the 
Lusaka Agreement in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v Uganda).33 
 
                                                          
27 John Quigley, ‘The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are They Treaties?’ (1997) 30 Cornell 
International Law Journal 717, 734. 
28 Orkand (n 4) 418. 
29 Lang (n 1) 110. 
30 ibid. 
31 Ratner (n 16) 26. 
32 Aloysius P Llamzon, ‘Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court 
of Justice,’ (2008) 18(5) European Journal of International Law 815, 848-849. 
33 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) 
(2005) ICJ Reports, 168. 
 28 
2. II. A. THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT 
In the Armed Activities case, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
claimed that Uganda had perpetrated several acts of armed aggression within the 
territory of the DRC in violation of the international legal principle of non-
intervention. In its defence, Uganda relied upon certain provisions of the Lusaka 
Agreement. The Lusaka Agreement was a conflict resolution instrument involving a 
number of state and non-state actors, and was a landmark agreement in the Second 
Congolese War.34 The agreement provided for a ceasefire between the parties, 
processes of disarmament and demobilization, and the deployment of a UN observer 
mission to the area. The agreement also set out a framework for the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from the DRC within 180 days of its adoptiona provision upon 
which this case turned.  
 In responding to the allegations that it had violated the legal principle of non-
intervention, Uganda argued that the DRC had failed to demobilize and disarm 
armed groups within its borders (particularly anti-Ugandan insurgents who were 
active within the Congolese territory), in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement. 
Uganda claimed that the threat to its security legitimized its military activities on 
Congolese territory. Uganda argued that the Lusaka Agreement’s timeframe for the 
withdrawal of all foreign troops had “implicitly legalized the Ugandan presence on 
Congolese territory”35 for 180 days. However, the Court could not find anything in 
the terms of the Lusaka Agreement that could be deemed “an affirmation that the 
security interests of Uganda required its presence on Congolese territory on a 
continuing basis.”36 The Court held that the agreement merely reflected the reality 
that Ugandan units were active on Congolese territory at the time that it was 
concluded; it did not attempt to qualify the Ugandan presence in any legal terms.37 
The Court thus proceeded to interpret the Lusaka Agreement not as a legally binding 
agreement, but as a modus operandi: a set of terms that defined how the Ugandan 
withdrawal was to operate.38  
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the Ugandan counterclaim on the grounds 
that there was a factual distinction between the claims advanced by the parties. The 
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Court reasoned that where the DRC sought to establish Uganda’s responsibility 
based on violations of the international legal prohibitions on the use of force, Uganda 
sought “to establish the Congo’s responsibility based on the violation of specific 
provisions of the Lusaka Agreement.”39 In dismissing the Ugandan counterclaim on 
this basis, the ICJ inferred that it was not possible to establish a justiciable claim on 
the basis of the Lusaka Agreement.40 The Court regarded the agreement as a practical 
framework for “progress towards withdrawal of foreign forces and an eventual 
peace, with security for all concerned,”41 but it did not view these objectives as 
justiciable or legally binding.  
In demoting the Lusaka Agreement to a modus operandi, the ICJ significantly 
underestimated the influence that formal legal status can have on the parties to a 
conflict.42 Such a decision begs the question as to whether the Court had considered 
the effect that depriving the agreement of its legal force would have on that particular 
conflict. Indeed, Okawa notes that the Court’s decision was unlikely “to contribute to 
the settlement of the dispute in any meaningful way,” and may have ultimately 
caused “untold damage” to the already fragile peace process that was taking place in 
the Great Lakes region at the time.43 
However, the Armed Activities case presented a number of legal challenges 
that necessitated imperfect solutions. Had the ICJ interpreted the Lusaka Agreement 
as permitting a Ugandan military presence on Congolese territory, Uganda would not 
have been liable for its subsequent breaches of international law.44 This would have 
been a dangerous precedent to set, as it may have promoted similar conflict 
resolution instruments as a means of excluding state responsibility for internationally 
wrongful acts.45 Alternatively, had the Court attempted to uphold the Lusaka 
Agreement as a legally binding agreement, it might have encouraged states “to avoid 
their international responsibility through the conclusion of peace agreements that 
include explicit liability-excluding provisions.”46 By relegating the legal status of the 
Lusaka Agreement to that of a modus operandi, it would not be possible for that 
peace agreement to prescribe liability-excluding provisions, irrespective of what the 
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parties agreed.47  
The Court was faced with a similarly “impossible dilemma” with regard to 
Uganda.48 As Judge Parra Aranguren reasoned in his dissenting opinion, had Uganda 
complied with the framework for withdrawal envisioned under the Lusaka 
Agreement, the continuing presence of its military forces in the DRC within the 180-
day timetable would have been seen as a violation of international law.49 Conversely, 
had Uganda attempted to withdraw its military from Congolese territory in a manner 
that contravened the Lusaka Agreement, it would have violated its treaty obligations, 
and duly violated international law.50 By defining the Lusaka Agreement as a modus 
operandi, the agreement did not possess the formal legal status necessary to create 
such a conflict of laws, and this impasse was avoided. Accordingly, the Court 
deigned to interpret the agreement not as a legal document, but as “a political 
instrument whose consequences had to be confined in that field.”51 
The Armed Activities case highlights the difficulties in defining peace 
agreements under existing systems of international law.52 While labelling the Lusaka 
Agreement a modus operandi may have assuaged the volatile political and military 
factors that necessitated that agreement, it failed to promote the role that the law 
played in that particular context: prescribing ceasefire mechanisms, and negotiating 
state-sovereignty in light of the deployment of UN monitors and the withdrawal of 
external military actors. While the implications of the Armed Activities decision 
should be considered in light of its particular political and legal context, the likening 
of the highly-technical Lusaka Agreement to a modus operandi poses significant 
interpretive challenges for peace agreements that routinely fail to meet a similar 
technical standard.  The ICJ did not take this opportunity to elaborate on the 
differences between a modus operandi and a legally enforceable peace agreement, 
thus confining instruments similar to the Lusaka Agreement to an ambiguous legal 
status “that renders them largely irrelevant in the realm of international law.”53 
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2. II. B. THE LOMÉ ACCORD AMNESTY 
 A decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) further obscures our 
understanding of peace agreements as international legal documents. The Decision 
on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty54 turned on Article IX of the 
Lomé Agreement, which was signed by the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) and 
the Government of Sierra Leone on July 7, 1999. “In order to bring lasting peace to 
Sierra Leone,” and “to consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national 
reconciliation,”55 Article IX granted all members of the RUF an amnesty from 
judicial action “in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives” 
between March 1991 and July 1999.56 However, in June 2000, following repeated 
violations of the agreement by the RUF, President Kabbah petitioned the United 
Nations for the establishment of a Special Court that would try members of the RUF 
and their accomplices for the ongoing atrocities that were being continually 
committed against the civilian population of Sierra Leone. Upon conducting its own 
independent assessment of the situation, the UN granted this request and adopted 
Resolution 1315 (2000), which mandated the Secretary-General “to negotiate an 
agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special 
court.”57 On January 16, 2002, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was established 
“for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons who bear the greatest responsibility for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law.”58 Morris Kallon, a former 
leader of the RUF, was brought before the Special Court on July 5, 2004, facing 17 
counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and several other violations of 
international humanitarian law. 
 In his defence, counsel for Kallon submitted that the Lomé Agreement was a 
legally binding instrument of international law “because it was signed by six states 
and a number of international organizations.”59 As such, Article IX of the agreement 
legally obligated the State “not to prosecute beneficiaries of the amnesty under the 
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Agreement.”60 Counsel for the defence further noted that because the Lomé 
Agreement significantly altered the law of the State, the Parliament of Sierra Leone 
was obligated to formally ratify it under Section 40(4) of the Constitution of Sierra 
Leone 1991. Ratification was necessary where “the President has entered a ‘Treaty, 
Agreement or Convention’ in the name of Sierra Leone.”61 Accordingly, counsel for 
the defence submitted that the ratification of the Lomé Agreement inferred its status 
as a Treaty.  
 In considering the points raised by the defence, the Court believed it would 
be appropriate to first consider the legal nature of the Lomé Agreement. While the 
Court accepted that the signatures of six non-contracting states and several 
international organizations could internationalize an agreement and create legal 
obligations at international law, that had not occurred in this instance. The Court held 
that these non-contracting signatories were merely “moral guarantors of the principle 
that… ‘this peace agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both 
parties.’”62 According to the Court, the Lomé Accord necessitated moral guarantors 
because the RUF had no legal or stately status and was essentially a criminal military 
faction within Sierra Leone.63 The moral guarantors did not assume any legal 
obligation by virtue of their role, and thus, could not be found to have 
internationalized the agreement.64  
 The Court held that internationalization is only possible where an agreement 
creates rights and obligations that are regulated and enforced by international law. 
The Lomé Agreement did not create these rights and obligations. The Court accepted 
that a breach of the provisions of the Lomé Agreement could have caused the UN to 
mandate military action pursuant to Chapter VII in order to address the situation, but 
such an ‘enforcement’ process would have stemmed from the factual merits of the 
situation: from the fact that a threat to international peace and regional security 
existed, not from the legal obligations prescribed by the Lomé Agreement.65 Because 
such an intervention could not be regarded “as a remedy for the breach” of the 
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provisions of the agreement,66 it could not be said that the Lomé Agreement created 
rights and obligations at international law.  
 The Court further distinguished the Lomé Accord on the basis that it was an 
intrastate agreement between the Sierra Leonean state and the RUF (a non-state 
actor). As such, it could not be characterized “as an international instrument.”67 Such 
a narrow interpretation overlooked the role that the law could play in maintaining the 
Lomé Accord’s stability in favour of affecting peace through justice, or prosecution. 
The resulting decision thus reflects competing approaches to legalized peacebuilding. 
Indeed, as the analysis in chapter 6 suggests, the decision to nullify the Lomé 
Accord’s amnesty was partly precipitated by structural flaws in the Lomé Accord’s 
design – that is, the provision of an amnesty in the particular context of the Sierra 
Leonean conflict, the omission of punitive measures for non-compliance with the 
agreement, and other features further detailed in chapter 6. Such an adverse 
conclusion highlights the unsuitability of purely legal perspectives and traditional 
legal concepts in the systematic analysis of peace agreements. This is particularly 
true of the SCSL, whose mandate as a criminal court renders it predisposed to 
neglect the broader aims of conflict resolution in pursuit of accountability.68 One 
study found that the SCSL’s sentencing procedure was primarily informed by 
retribution and deterrence, much to the detriment of restorative ideologies such as 
rehabilitation and reconciliation, and mitigating factors such as family circumstance 
and age.69 An arbiter of criminal law was thus ill-suited to determining the legal 
status of a peace agreement with a rebel group, and perhaps removed from the 
consequences such a finding would have in the long-term. 
 The Court then proceeded to address the extent to which insurgent parties are 
endowed with treaty-making capacity, a question that “no longer arose, given that the 
Court had already held that the Agreement was not an international treaty.”70 While 
the Court acknowledged that the Sierra Leonean state recognized the RUF as an 
entity with which it could enter into negotiations, it also noted that no other State had 
recognized the RUF as a legal entity with which it could do the same, nor had the 
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Government of Sierra Leone regarded the RUF as anything other than a rebel group 
within its borders.71 As such, it was not regarded as an entity with treaty-making 
capacity. However, Cassese contests that this view is much too narrow. He argues 
that insurgents may acquire the capacity to enter into treaty negotiations “if they 
show effective control over some part of the territory and the armed conflict is large-
scale and protracted.”72 The civil war in Sierra Leone arguably satisfied these 
criteria, leaving few areas of the country unscathed and necessitating the 
involvement of British, UN and ECOMOG (the Economic Community of West 
African States Monitoring Group) units by its eventual end. However, the Court 
distinguished the factual question as to whether the insurgents demonstrated control 
and organization, from the legal question as to whether international law regarded the 
RUF and the legitimate government as having treaty-making capacity.73 As the 
answer to the legal question was negative, the Court duly concluded that the Lomé 
Agreement was not a treaty and did not establish binding obligations on the parties at 
international law. The Court did note, however, that this did not prevent the 
agreement from creating rights and obligations between the parties in domestic law. 
Yet this finding is of little use in other intrastate conflicts where the rule of law has 
been implicated and is in need of rehabilitation and recourse to principles of 
international law. The Court’s disregard for the role of law in such processes further 
underscores its unsuitability to make a determination of this nature. While criminal 
prosecution may have played a role in cementing “short-term peace” in Sierra 
Leone,74 criminal law does not provide a suitable yardstick against which one can 
measure the intricacies of peace agreement design. It has been noted that the SCSL 
displayed a conviction bias against the RUF, and tended to be more lenient in its 
sentencing of state forces who were responsible for human rights abuses.75 It was 
highly unlikely that the same court was going to confer some sort of legitimacy on 
the RUF by granting it a degree of treaty-making capacity. 
 It is also questionable whether this conclusion represents the most faithful 
application of international legal doctrine. Bell, for one, notes that rejection of the 
international legal status of the Lomé Agreement was not entirely necessary in order 
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to nullify the contentious amnesty provision at the heart of the Lomé Accord Amnesty 
proceedings.76 She contends that the same result could have been achieved by 
applying traditional concepts of treaty breach, as the RUF had blatantly violated their 
ceasefire commitments by continuing to commit acts of violence.77 Cassese shares a 
similar opinion, arguing that the agreement became void “following repeated 
material breaches of the treaty by one party, the rebels (the other party, the 
Government, also contravening the treaty, although less blatantly).”78 Bell further 
posits that the amnesty provision could have been invalidated by recourse to 
preemptory norms of international law, which prohibit crimes against humanity, 
serious war crimes and torture.79 Provisions that violate these norms are considered 
void at international law, so the amnesty provision could have been nullified for 
contravening international law. However, denying international legal status to the 
Lomé agreement was in keeping with the views of the (then) Attorney-General, 
Solomon Berewa, who was outspoken in his perception of the agreement as a purely 
political document, and was “less concerned with the ‘fine niceties of the law.’”80 
The Court’s narrow legalistic approach to the problem at hand thus disregarded the 
practical objectives that peace agreements seek to achieve and the pivotal role that 
international law can play in achieving them. 
 
2. III. CONCLUSION 
 As shown above, traditional concepts of international law do not accurately 
account for the variation in peace agreement form and substance. This is because 
“the different forms of legalization in international law are mostly framed as a binary 
option between hard international law and pure politics.”81 Such a perspective is 
overly black and white and displays a stubborn inflexibility in the face of a 
multidisciplinary challenge that requires versatility and tact. By overly prescribing 
the rules of international law as they apply to peace agreements,”82 lawyers and 
judges of international law alike may overlook the effect that legal status has on 
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“whether peace lasts or war resumes,”83 much as the ICJ had done in the Armed 
Activities case. In order to resituate the role of law in such processes, Sheeran calls 
for a “dynamic but coherent international legal order,”84 through which the power of 
law can be harnessed to provide practical solutions to high-stakes problems such as 
peace agreements. The law has proven flexible in this regard on previous occasions, 
and it is arguable that in the interest of peace, the international community is 
beginning to accept compromises within the legal discipline. The current Colombian 
peace process illustrates how absolute standards of accountability and justice must be 
reconsidered in light of what is politically pragmatic. Unpalatable political transitions 
that envision a role for criminally culpable heads of state—as suggested in Sudan 
with Omar al-Bashir, and Syria with Bashar al-Assad—further highlight the need to 
advance a reconciliatory, rather than adversarial peace/justice framework. Elsewhere, 
diplomatic figures have advocated sustained engagement with non-state actors of 
dubious legitimacy.85 Indeed, where such engagement takes place, it often highlights 
how legal concepts of legitimacy are indeterminate and subject to change. In the next 
chapter, we will look at the legal basis for pragmatic conflict resolution efforts, and 
explore some notable examples from the international sphere. 
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3. 
BENDING THE LAW, KEEPING THE PEACE 
 
[T]he formation, transformation and dismemberment of States as a result of 
revolutions and wars creates situations of fact which, to a large extent, cannot 
be met by the application of the normal rules of positive law.1 
 
3. I.  OVERVIEW 
 The positivist legal order regards only the incumbent government of a 
‘legitimate’ state actor as having “the exclusive authority to represent the state in its 
treaty and other international relations.”2 Yet internal conflicts are often fought over 
the legitimacy of the state apparatus, and peace agreements often inform notions of 
post-conflict legitimacy, particularly where non-state actors have been promoted to 
positions of public office in redesigned political structures. Any legally informed 
approach to conflict resolution must duly confront the “legal fiction” that the state is 
wholly a legitimate representative of its people,3 and account for non-state actors’ 
ability to articulate genuine political grievance and contribute to pluralistic 
governance.4 
The state-centric view that dominates international relations and international 
law “served the interests alike of third world governing elites and of superpowers” 
throughout the Cold War.5 However, that position became legally untenable in the 
1990s, as neo-liberal norms guaranteed by US hegemony ushered in “[d]emands for 
democratization, and respect for basic human rights” that challenged the state’s 
previously unfettered ‘sovereignty’ over their own domestic affairs.6 Advancements 
in human rights machinery meant that human rights abuses by both state and non-
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state actors could be aired before the international community.7 “[T]he balance of 
moral advantage” shifted to non-state actors and armed groups,8 who could invoke 
“the state’s violations of the rights of the group concerned” by way of justification 
for their actions.9 Civil conflicts thus came to be perceived not as struggles between 
legitimate governments and morally-bereft insurrectionists, but as “inevitable and 
indeed justifiable resistance to state oppression.”10 The international legal order was 
forced to adjust to the practical implications of this paradigm-shift, as it became 
evident that “any opposition group that could muster evident support now had to be 
admitted to that process on terms of broad equality with existing regimes.”11 
The legitimacy of state and non-state actors alike is determined at 
international law by their capacity to govern effectively.12 Accordingly, non-state 
actors are often granted limited legal standing where a conflict has been fought to a 
stalemate, where a non-state actor exercises de facto control over territory, or where 
the incumbent government has disappeared altogether.13 Wippman argues that at this 
point, the leaders of armed opposition groups are accepted as the political leaders of 
those groups, for the purpose of negotiations and processes of peace: “As a practical 
matter, no other solution is possible.”14 Indeed, the political necessity of such 
recognition is evidenced by the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) participation in the 
Good Friday Agreement, the African National Congress’s (ANC) participation in the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa, and more recently, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC) participation in the Colombian peace deal of 
2016.15 However, ‘effectiveness’ remains indeterminate as a criterion of 
legitimacy.16 Applying it to extremist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) in 
Iraq/Syria, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and al-Shabab in Somalia/Ethiopia, one could 
argue that they have deprived those states of significant portions of their territory so 
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much so as to qualify as legitimate actors. While diplomatic engagement with these 
actors remains unlikely, it cannot be ruled out entirely.17 Legitimacy remains subject 
to political whims, as evidenced by FARC and the IRA’s erstwhile status as terrorist 
organizations, and their current legacy as peacemakers. Existing positivist legal 
structures have failed to control the debate as to how non-state actors transition from 
illegitimate to legitimate, and have neglected the role that legal structures plays in 
(de)legitimizing them as a result. 
In an international system where the sovereignty of states remains paramount, 
peace and order cannot be maintained “if some states are too weak to assert their 
sovereignty and be the trusted custodians of their own people.”18 Some scholars duly 
argue that states that violate human rights or commit atrocities against the civilian 
population rights forfeit their domestic and international legitimacy.19 This reasoning 
has informed concepts of legitimacy in the Syrian and Libyan contexts, and 
continues to deny legitimacy to non-state actors with little regard for the rule of law. 
Bashar al-Assad’s increasingly forceful repression of legitimate political dissent in 
Syria led to the United States and 100 other countries recognizing the Syrian 
National Council (a non-state actor comprised of ‘moderate’ militant groups) as the 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people.20 In the vacuum created by the 
downfall of Muammar Gaddafi, a number of countries moved to recognize the 
National Transitional Council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people, 
amid the myriad armed groups that dotted the political landscape. The tendency to 
bestow a degree of legal capacity on these previously restricted actors as a matter of 
political necessity reflects how “the divide between insurgents and the legal 
government has reached such a point that the former have a standing, albeit limited, 
in the international community.”21  
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Somalia and Liberia provide particularly interesting examples in a conflict 
resolution context. Following the demise of Mohammed Siad Barre’s government to 
a coup in January 1991, “only the collective will” of the parties to the Somali Civil 
War could be accepted as the will of the state.22 Consequentially, these groups were 
accepted as parties to the major agreements that attempted to secure peace in the 
Somali Civil War.23 A similar arrangement was necessary in Liberia, where the 
deposal of Samuel Doe’s government left the expression of the state’s collective will 
in the hands of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy, and the 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia. As a result, both groups were the key political 
parties to the Abuja Agreement of August 1995, which attempted to implement a 
ceasefire between the major parties to the conflict, and the Abuja Accord of August 
1996, which eventually brought an end to the First Liberian Civil War.  
Peace agreements have thus been a vehicle for these changing notions of 
legitimacy. Peacebuilding mechanisms, such as autonomy and power sharing, have 
advanced a theory of legitimacy that does not automatically attach to the state, but is 
dependent on the state’s ability to provide pluralistic participation and equality.24 
Secession—previously prohibited in all but the most exceptional circumstances—
became a permissible form of conflict resolution in the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia,25 as legal norms on territorial integrity gave way to the rights to self-
determination owed to distinct peoples and claimed on their behalf by non-state 
actors. State sovereignty—generally sacrosanct in international law—was qualified 
in the context of conflicts in Cambodia, Kosovo, and East Timor, in order to 
facilitate international trusteeship of those states’ executive functions, and a similar 
solution has more recently been proposed in the context of South Sudan.26 These 
complex legal frameworks—and the extent to which non-state actors participate in 
them—are not unprecedented in international practice. We will now explore some 
notable examples in detail. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Armed Conflicts’ (1981) 30(2) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 416, 416-417. 
22 Wippman (n 1) 627. 
23 See The General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa, 8 January 1993, and the Agreement on 
Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament (Supplement to the General 
Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993), to which the principle actors are parties. 
24 Bell (n 4) 114-115. 
25 Clapham (n 5) 194. 
26 Kate Almquist Knopf, ‘Savaging South Sudan’s Sovereignty (and Ending its Civil War)’, Council 
on Foreign Relations (26 April 2017) <http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2017/04/24/salvaging-south-
sudans-sovereignty-and-ending-its-civil-war> accessed 29 June 2017. 
 41 
3. I. A. THE SUPREME NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CAMBODIA 
 One particularly striking example of a legal anomaly being accepted in 
international relations is the Supreme National Council (SNC) of Cambodia in 
1990an “unprecedented” entity, that was created solely to serve the peace process 
in that country.27 The concept of the SNC arose as a response to the United States 
and Australian delegations’ suggestions that Cambodia should be placed under UN 
administration. In the absence of a “single government accepted by all states as 
politically legitimate and legally able to… delegate power to the Organization or 
otherwise indicate Cambodia’s consent to the operation,” this was not possible under 
the UN Charter.28 The practical solution to this problem was thus to create such an 
entity, that would include representatives of all the parties to the conflict and would 
be perceived internationally as the legitimate political and legal authority of 
Cambodia.29  
As a result, the SNC was created as “the unique legitimate body and source of 
authority in Cambodia,” in which national sovereignty and the ability to represent 
Cambodia internationally, were enshrined.30 Article 5 of the comprehensive 
settlement to the Cambodia conflict also provided that the SNC would take the 
Cambodian seat at the UN.31 Thus, the SNC—which was essentially a band of non-
state actors who possessed no legal standing individually—was granted legal 
standing and control of the major organs of state. The UN Security Council and all of 
the parties to the Cambodian peace process recognized the authority of the SNC to 
express the collective will of the state, despite the fact that none of these parties 
recognized it as the government of Cambodia. Indeed, as Ratner notes, the 
recognition of this entity was not in line “with traditional notions of recognition of 
governments based on effective control and prospect of permanence.”32  
As such, the SNC remains “sui generis as a matter of international law,” 
insofar as its unprecedented creation is independent of any established principles or 
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procedures in international legal doctrine.33 Ratner posits that it is perhaps best 
understood “as an entity created by the Cambodian factions and later given a special 
statusa type of international recognitionby the community of nations,” through a 
UN Security Council resolution and the comprehensive settlement agreement itself.34 
Though it served solely as a means through which the UN could assume trusteeship 
of Cambodia, the SNC remains a perfect example of the flexibility of the law in 
circumstances where its strict application would frustrate the objectives of a dearly 
bought peace process.  
 
3.B. THE ABYEI AWARD 
 Similar legal dilemmas characterized the dispute over the Abyei region of 
Sudan, following the conclusion of the civil war between the Sudanese government 
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Abyei is an oil-rich 
region that straddles the border between Sudan and South Sudan. Politically and 
ethnically, it remains divided between the two polities, thus making it an extremely 
contentious issue during the negotiation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA). The CPA provided that an Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) 
would demarcate the territory of the region.35 However, when the ABC presented its 
report, its findings were immediately rejected by the government. Following renewed 
violence in the Abyei region, parties mutually agreed to refer the dispute to the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. The political situation at the time 
prompted the International Crisis Group to comment that “[w]hat happens in Abyei 
is likely to determine whether Sudan consolidates the peace or returns to war.”36 
 In its pleadings before the Court, the Government submitted that the ABC 
had exceeded its mandate by consulting post-1905 sources that did not reflect the 
territory of Abyei as it originally existed.37 While the Tribunal held that the ABC had 
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indeed exceeded its mandate, it argued that the ABC had done so only partially, “by 
failing to state reasons for some of their findings.”38 In establishing that the ABC had 
only partially exceeded their mandate, the Court did not disregard the border 
proposed by the ABC in its entirety, but annulled the specific parts of the border that 
were affected by the ABC’s ultra vires breach.39 As such, the Tribunal’s judgments 
represented “a sophisticated piece of diplomatic and political pragmatism,”40 insofar 
as it considered the political realties on the ground and “made ‘everyone a winner’ 
by pulling Sudan back from the brink of war along parts of its north–south border.”41  
 However, concessions in legal doctrine were necessitated by the Tribunal’s 
flexible application of the law. Böckenförde likens the decision to that of a 
reconciliation committee, rather than that of a judicial body,42 and concedes that 
“legal scholars might argue that the award was rendered at the expense of legal 
accuracy.”43 He maintains that it is doubtful whether the Commission’s mandate ever 
required the explicit statement of reasons in its report, and points out that no 
provisions of the Abyei Protocol explicitly obligated the Commission in this 
regard.44 Similarly, the Court’s determination of partial nullity lacks decisive 
authority. Dissenting arbiter, Judge Awn Al-Khasawneh, pointed out that no 
provision of the Arbitration Agreement that referred the dispute to the Court 
permitted a finding of partial nullity.45 Under Article 2 of the Agreement, “the 
Tribunal could only provide a binary answer” to the dispute.46 In ruling that the ABC 
had exceeded its mandate only partially, the Court had thus exceeded its own 
mandate. As a result, the Abyei award remains littered with legal uncertainties and, 
as Judge Awn Al-Khasawneh maintained, “self-contradicting and result oriented” 
conclusions.47  
However, Böckenförde argues that the Court’s judgment displays an 
awareness of the pragmatism necessitated by the situation: “On the one hand, it had 
to find a solution both parties could live with. On the other hand, it was expected to 
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base its judgment on legal grounds. In the end, it neglected the latter for the benefit 
of the former.”48 While some argue that the pragmatism of the court was to the 
detriment of the refined technicalities of the law, it was much to the benefit of the 
CPA that ended “the longest civil war in Africa.”49 The decision of the Tribunal “was 
accepted by both sides and saved the CPA from collapse,”50 thus evidencing the 
extent to which the law can bend before it allows a peace agreement to break.  
 
3. I. C. THE DAYTON AGREEMENT 
 The Dayton Agreement is another notable example of how the law can be 
flexible where the situation warrants maneuverability. The Dayton Agreement 
brought an end to three and a half years of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which had been a federal republic within the former Yugoslavia. The Agreement 
constituted “an intricate legal web” that wove ethnic, religious, political and military 
elements closely together.51 Its detailed provisions established “an international 
ceasefire,” and provided for “peacekeeping and international boundaries, as well as 
for elections and a constitution for the new State of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”52  
 Yet the Dayton Agreement represented another legal anomaly, insofar as 
some of its signatories were non-state entities. The Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska, were merely constituent parts of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, and were thus lacking in international legal personality.53 
Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—the other principle signatories to 
the Dayton Agreement—appear to have assumed that these non-state entities were 
endowed with international legal personality, “albeit an extremely limited one,” 
based on their de facto control of specific territory.54 This assumption of legal 
personality allowed these non-state entities “to conclude all the agreements annexed 
to the General Framework Agreement,” and “to undertake international obligations 
by means of unilateral declarations.”55  
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 However, this assumption may well be rebutted. A positivist legal framework 
does not explain how two sub-state federal entities had the legal standing to establish 
a single independent state on the basis of the Dayton agreement.56 The Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina did not actually exist as a political entity, nor a geographic 
territory, prior to the conclusion of the Dayton Agreement, but was merely “created 
in 1994 at the instigation of the United States for political reasons.”57 Furthermore, it 
is debatable whether Bosnia and Herzegovina possessed effective control over 
enough territory to qualify as a de facto government deserving limited legal 
personality.58 A significant portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory fell under 
direct control of the Croatian military. As much was confirmed by the unilateral 
declarations undertaken by Croatia, which referred to “‘personnel and organizations 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina... under its control.’”59  
Nevertheless, the Dayton Agreement was internationally recognized as an 
agreement that was legally binding upon the parties. The non-state entities, having 
been endowed with limited international legal personality, became willing parties to 
a number of agreements that subsequently deprived them of that status.60 Under the 
provisions of the new Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which was annexed to the General Framework Agreement, both the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska accepted that they were federal states 
within the Republic, and as such, were “not endowed with international legal rights 
and powers.”61 Gaeta thus submits that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was a non-state entity that was regarded as having legal personality “only as long as 
it participated in the peace negotiations.”62 The Republika Srpska, on the other hand, 
was a non-state actor which, “having acquired international status on account of its 
effective control over a part of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” effectively 
used that status to terminate itself.63  
 The flexibility of the law in this regard was central to the attainment of a 
stable peace in the former Yugoslavia. The Dayton Agreement is thus another 
example of how the law may be flexible in application and in theoryproviding a 
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practical solution to the conflict where the strict application of traditional concepts of 
law would have been counterproductive to objectives of the agreement itself. 
 
3. II. THE SQUARE PEG & THE ROUND HOLE: ‘MAKING THEM FIT’64 
 The examples above all support a claim purported by Sheeran: that the 
international community “has clearly manifested a desire” to accept legal 
arrangements entered into by non-state entities as binding upon “the communities in 
whose name they enter into political settlements.”65 However, the existing positivist 
framework continues to deny legal status to these agreements, making it much easier 
for signatories to renege, and “undermining the utility of internationally brokered 
settlements as a device for ending civil strife.”66 Avnita Lakhani has duly argued the 
need for a realist, “progressive international legal system that alleviates the problem 
of the procedural handicap that has, to date, prevented non-state actors from being 
part of the solution.”67 Sheeran also warns that “it would be dangerous” to preclude 
agreements concluded between States and non-state actors from attaining legally-
binding status at the international level.68 He maintains that some peace agreements 
“create a strong expectation of compliance under international law,” despite lacking 
the formal status of a treaty.69 Given the lack of fit between positivist categories of 
international law and the common features and normative functions of peace 
agreements, scholars should continue to consider the myriad ways in which 
international law impacts those agreements, “regardless of whether they fit within 
traditional legal categories.”70 
 However, one must question whether peace agreements are ill-suited to 
international law, or whether international law, through its rigid and outdated 
application, has lost sight of the peace-oriented purposes that underpin it. As Nowrot 
argues, “the normatively binding force of international law” was originally based on 
the necessity of that legal order “for the “‘satisfaction of needs and the pacification 
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of social life.”’71 However, increasingly internationalized threats have borne crises 
with domestic roots that the international system is often powerless to address.72 
These crises include forced displacement and mass migration, the threat posed by 
weakened states, terrorism, and the proliferation of internationalized conflict. It is a 
global imperative that the international legal system adapts accordingly to “the 
changing realities on the international scene.”73 Anne-Marie Slaughter and William 
Burke-White have stressed that the international legal system must “influence the 
domestic policies of states and harness national institutions in pursuit of global 
objectives.”74 Peace agreements are an ideal example of how international law can 
serve this purpose. To achieve optimum outcomes, agreements must extend beyond 
traditional categories to include non-state actors, however.75 By relegating peace 
agreements and non-state actors to ambiguous categories of legal definition, it is “not 
possible to regard these influential entities as being normatively integrated in the 
international legal order in the sense of being legally required to contribute to the 
promotion of global” values.76 Nowrot duly submits that the failure to subject these 
“influential entities” to international law “creates intolerable gaps in the structure of 
the international normative order and ‘imposes unnecessary risks on the inherently 
frail international legal system.’”77 
 Chris Okeke once hypothesized that “‘[i]f international law failed to 
influence and to regulate adequately the course of international relations, it would 
have lost its value.’”78 The increasing fragmentation of existing conflict management 
systems over the past five years is a testament to the inapplicability of the legal status 
quo. Similarly, the decisions in the Armed Activities Case and the Lomé Accord 
Amnesty demonstrated how the strict application of legal doctrine has had negative 
effects for the pacific purposes of peace agreements—purposes that international law 
is supposed to regulate. The way in which the SCSL undermined the Lomé Accord to 
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attain conviction further highlights the inapplicability of existing legal systems to 
conflict resolution contexts. While of course, perpetrators of mass violence must be 
held to account, a preoccupation with justice can isolate international law from the 
pursuit of peace. As former South African President Thabo Mbeki has written, there 
is a time and a place for special criminal courts such as the SCSL, “but it is not in the 
midst of conflict or a non-functioning political system.”79 Aside from innocence, 
guilt, or formal legal status, legally informed approaches to conflict resolution must 
account for the relationship between law and politics; and find ways to check and 
balance their respective influences. 
Accordingly, this thesis seeks a methodological framework that accounts for 
the normative influence of the law on peace agreements, without disregarding their 
status as legal instruments. While categorizing peace agreements under existing 
conceptions of law may be akin to fitting a diplomatic square peg into a legal round 
hole, Bell has argued that “[i]n making them fit we make choices about the nature of 
law and politics and the relationship between the two.”80 Existing work in the field of 
conflict resolution has been mutually detrimental, adopting either an exclusive 
definition that views peace agreements as purely political, or a positivist legal 
framework that neglects the political objectives of peace agreements entirely.81 The 
failure to grasp the multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary aspects of peace agreements 
has only served “to cut-off a host of ways to view not only the conflict of the past but 
also the accommodation of the future.”82 The practical realities of peacebuilding 
reveal that between the poles of “consent and coercion,”83 between the binary choice 
of hard and soft law, there are various combinations of legal form and substantive 
content that can bring the normative power of international law to bear on peace 
agreements. The theory of legalization put forward by Kenneth Abbott, Robert 
Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal84 is an 
                                                          
79 Thabo Mbeki and Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Courts Can't End Civil Wars,’ The New York Times (5 
February 2014) <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/opinion/courts-cant-end-civil-wars.html> 
accessed 26 July 2016. 
80 Bell (n 4) 22. 
81 Antonia Potter ‘The Rule of Law as the Measure of Peace? Responsive policy for reconstructing 
Justice and the Rule of Law in post conflict and transitional environments’ (Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue 2004), 12-13. 
82 Colm Campbell, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Colin Harvey, ‘The Frontiers of Legal Analysis: 
Reframing the Transition in Northern Ireland’ (2003) 66(3) The Modern Law Review 317, 345. 
83 David Morriss, ‘From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire Agreements and the Evolving Role of 
the United Nations’ (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 801, 831. 
84 Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal, 
‘The Concept of legalization’ (2000) 54(3) International Organization 401. 
 49 
ideal example of a versatile, multidisciplinary framework that accounts for these 
variations in agreement design and sustainability. In the next chapter, we will unpack 
this legalization framework, and explain its utility in highlighting recurring processes 
of agreement design – what Bell refers to as an emerging lex pacificatoria. Chapter 4 
explores these concepts, and establishes Abbott et al’s theory of legalization as an 
appropriate model for the analysis of the case studies that follow in chapters 5 – 7.   
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4. 
LAW, LEGALIZATION AND THE LEX PACIFICATORIA  
 
4. I. LEGALIZATION THEORY 
 Rather than “a binary option between hard international law and pure 
politics,”1 Abbott et al.’s concept of legalization envisions a much broader spectrum 
of definition for legal instruments that do not conform to positivist categories of 
public international law. Their theory does not undertake a jurisprudential analysis so 
as to ascertain legal validity, nor is it “proposing a definitive definition or seeking to 
resolve age-old debates regarding the nature of law or whether international law is 
‘really’ law.”2 Instead, Abbott et al. argue that a statute can attain legal status, or 
compensate for ambiguous legal form, by undergoing a distinct process of 
institutionalization, or legalization. A legalized instrument, they argue, is comprised 
of three characteristics: obligation, precision and delegation.  
 Obligation refers to the extent to which parties to a statute are legally bound 
by the rules prescribed by the statute’s text. More specifically, the obligation limb 
measures the degree to which the signatories’ behaviour “is subject to scrutiny under 
the general rules, procedures, and discourse” of domestic and international law.3 
While an obligation prescribed by a peace agreement between a state and non-state 
actor may not be binding under traditional categories of international law, 
legalization theory looks to the substantive content of that obligation and the degree 
to which it may still be binding under the ‘rules, practices and institutions’ of the 
international legal order.  
 Precision measures the degree to which the statute unambiguously prescribes 
authorized or prohibited behavior, establishes new political structures, or addresses 
finer details such as scheduling and financing. A rule that would register high on the 
                                                          
1 Andrej Lang, ‘‘Modus Operandi’ and the ICJ's Appraisal of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in the 
Armed Activities Case: The Role of Peace Agreements in International Conflict Resolution’ (2008) 40 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 107, 162. 
2 Kenneth Abbott et al., ‘The Concept of legalization’ (2000) 54(3) International Organization 401, 
403. 
3 ibid at 401. 
 51 
precision matrix would ideally state “what is expected of a state or other actor” 
clearly, “in terms of both the intended objective and the means of achieving it.”4 
Accordingly, rules that are high on precision are usually “highly elaborated or dense, 
detailing conditions of application, spelling out required or proscribed behaviour in 
numerous situations.”5 As Bell notes, “the language of peace agreements bears this 
out: they are written through with agreed numbers of armed forces, specification of 
weaponry, timetables, and even maps.”6 Precision narrows the scope for self-serving 
interpretation by the contracting parties and limits the space for deviation from 
projected behavior: “[t]he more the exact terms of an agreement are spelled out 
explicitly, the less probability there is for misunderstandings by the parties 
themselves or by international actors reacting to perceived violations.”7 These 
characteristics are particularly important in a conflict-resolution context, where 
parties are divided by trust-deficits and security dilemmas. Clear and unambiguous 
instructions thus become a practical necessity when establishing ceasefires, and 
regulating processes of demobilization and demilitarization,8 for “nothing invites 
aggression like ambiguity.”9 Precise and coherent provisions promote compliance by 
providing clarity with regard to implementation and possible breach of the 
agreement, while ambiguously worded agreements can decrease compliance-pull, 
despite the legal form of the agreement itself.10 
 Finally, delegation refers to the third party actors or institutions to which the 
authority to implement, interpret and enforce the rules of the agreement has been 
delegated. Delegation is typically characterized by various forms of third-party 
dispute resolution: actors or institutions that are “authorized to interpret rules and 
apply them to particular facts (and therefore in effect to make new rules, at least 
interstitially) under established doctrines of international law.”11 Highly delegated 
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provisions would ideally provide for interpretative authority to be vested in courts, 
arbitrators and mediatory or ad hoc tribunals, all of which may serve as dispute 
resolution mechanisms. While binding court decisions are perceived as an ideal form 
of high delegation, Bell contests that precisely worded peace-keeping mandates are 
just as valuable in a conflict-resolution context. Detailed mandates that are 
“underwritten by Security Council resolutions” may provide for “peacekeeping and 
monitoring” and “for oversight and verification of security guarantees.”12 Such roles 
are central “to establishing ceasefires and consequent processes of demobilization, 
demilitarization, and reintegration.”13 Indeed, third-party actors can ease the 
combatants’ mutual vulnerability by mediating between them, “increasing the 
information flow between the parties, verifying the agreements, and assisting in the 
development of institutions capable of reducing security dilemmas for both sides.”14 
In turn, Security Council resolutions can bring the binding force of law to legalized 
peace agreements by “establishing mechanisms for monitoring compliance that stand 
independently of the status of the agreement itself, which nevertheless forms their 
raison d’être.”15 Just as high levels of obligation and precision result in “the 
minimization of wiggle room to make excuses,”16 effective grants of delegation 
increase “the incentives for cooperation and the costs of opportunism.”17 As Gopalan 
posits, delegation thus “limits state behaviour to a narrowly circumscribed range of 
conduct” that is precisely prescribed for by law and is implemented, interpreted and 
enforced by the actors to which such authority is delegated.18 
 When considered collectively, the dimensions of obligation, precision and 
delegation thus provide a useful barometer against which to gauge the legal status of 
an agreement or statute. Agreements that rank high on all three dimensions are said 
to exemplify ‘hard legalization,’ i.e., those agreements that bear the character of hard 
law. Agreements that exhibit ‘soft legalization’ are more akin to soft law, or ‘purely 
political’ instruments. In their example, Abbott et al. point cite domestic legal 
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systems “as prototypical of hard legalization.”19 They refer to a statute ratified by a 
legislative process which is legally binding on all of the nation’s citizens 
(obligation), is clear and unambiguous in the behaviour that it requires or proscribes 
(precision) and is subject to judicial interpretation by the judiciary and enforcement 
by the organs of the police force (delegation). 20 This study adopts their example as 
the standard for a highly legalized agreement. Conversely, an agreement that is 
largely rhetorical, lacking in substantive legal effect, and ambiguous with regard to 
its enforcement and interpretation is considered to be an example of soft legalization. 
Variation among agreements is not considered a binary choice between hard and soft 
legalization, but may depend on the extent to which the institutions established under 
the agreement are comprised, mandated and established, or the degree to which the 
implementation of the agreement is precisely laid out. Such variation is readily 
observable in the case studies analyzed herein.  
 The theory of legalization moves away from traditional thinking that regarded 
international law as requiring a coercive sovereign to ensure compliance.21 Instead, 
Abbott et al stress the importance of institutionalized means of promoting 
compliance, such as normative pressure and compliance-pull, thereby advancing a 
multidisciplinary approach that “creates common ground for political scientists and 
lawyers.”22 Goldsmith and Posner argue that the legalization of an agreement 
increases the normative strength of its provisions as a whole by increasing the 
parties’ sense of obligation.23 Drawing from a similar analogy to that made above 
regarding domestic and international legal spheres, they argue that just as a binding 
contract signifies a more serious commitment on behalf of the parties than a letter of 
intent, “which in turn is a more serious commitment that a hand-shake,” a legalized 
international agreement signifies a more credible commitment and a greater intention 
to be bound than a purely political, non-legalized instrument.24 Peace agreements 
often serve as unique examples of institutionalized compliance-pull. Indeed, Bell 
argues that peace agreements adopt legal protocols in order to be seen as imposing 
substantive legal obligations on the signatories, i.e., to increase the likelihood that the 
parties will comply, regardless of the actual legal status of such obligations. Bell 
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argues that such adherence to established legal form “suggests that the parties 
mutually view them [peace agreements] as legal documents,”25 despite their 
ambiguity under established doctrines of international law. 
 The concept of legalization provides an attractive framework for the 
categorization and study of peace agreements as legal documents. While treaty status 
remains reserved exclusively for agreements between states, Bell argues that state 
and non-state parties may conclude treaty-like agreements that compensate for their 
ambiguous legal form through provisions that are high on obligation, precision and 
delegation.26 By legalizing peace agreements, Bell argues that state and/or non-state 
actors “can make the terms of their agreements sound legal, can refer to international 
law as a basis for their commitments, and can delegate enforcement tasks to a range 
of international actors.”27 Indeed, Abbott et al. maintain that where parties want to 
signify the significance of their commitments, there are few equally effective 
alternatives to legalization.28 Hard legalization in peace agreements can channel the 
behaviour of parties towards compliance and away from divergence. Detail and 
precision in an agreement’s text serve to constrain self-serving interpretation by the 
parties, “and accepted modes of legal discourse and argument all help limit such 
opportunistic behaviour.”29 Effective grants of delegation to interpretative bodies 
such as courts and tribunals further limit “wiggle room to make excuses.”30 Where 
non-compliance is difficult to detect, as in most arms control situations and processes 
of demobilization and demilitarization, effective grants of delegation serve to 
compensate “for the reduced likelihood of detection by increasing the costs of 
detected violation.”31 
 It is thus unsurprising that several academics have identified a positive 
correlation between hard legalization and compliance. Gopalan, for one, has 
repeatedly pointed to the link between hard legalization on all its dimensions, and the 
sustainability of agreements between states that are prone to conflict.32 While not 
guided by a legalization framework, Fortna has also repeatedly underscored the 
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correlation between ‘strong’ ceasefire agreements and peace durability.33 Following 
a review of ceasefire arrangements between India and Pakistan, and Syria and Israel; 
Fortna concluded that ‘strong’ agreements made it easier to maintain peace, and that 
more specific (or precise) agreements produced more sustainable periods of peace.34 
Contrary to other empirical studies that have applied a legalization framework, 
Gopalan concludes that “there is room for cautious optimism about the positive 
correlation between hard legalization and compliance when the actors are high 
conflict states.”35 Gopalan’s research begs the question as to how pervasive this 
correlation may prove after an empirical examination of similar case studies, and 
invites further scholarly work on the subject.36 This thesis makes important 
advancements in that regard, finding a similarly positive correlation by extending 
existing analyses to agreements between state and non-state actors, and probing the 
consequences of legalization for non-state actors of questionable legal standing. 
While lessons from Gopalan and Fortna’s work cannot be applied to conflicts 
involving non-state actors without due regard to the differences between interstate 
and intrastate war, “the general strategies of changing incentives, reducing 
uncertainty, and managing accidents are likely to apply in both contexts.”37 
Legalization theory thus provides a highly versatile framework that reveals the 
overlap between Gopalan and Fortna’s work, extends to fit the parameters of this 
thesis, and reflects how the interdisciplinary exchange of scholarship can “promote 
the dialogue needed to craft better peace agreements, in turn promoting brighter and 
more stable futures for post-conflict countries.”38 
 As demonstrated in Chapter 3, legal academics and practitioners alike “have 
deferred for too long to the view that politics, rather than law, is the answer” to the 
riddle of sustainable peace.39 Gopalan posits that such an assumption “is 
fundamentally flawed and an examination of the agreements using legalization 
theory may help to bridge the gap between law and politics.”40 Indeed, legalization 
certainly represents an attempt to reconcile the interests of both disciplines and to 
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reveal how “legal and political considerations combine to influence behaviour.”41 
Kahler surmises that “legalization, in creating new institutional forms, mobilizes 
different political actors (such as non-state actors) and shapes their behaviour in 
particular ways.”42 It is thus a particularly appropriate lens through which the effects 
of legalization on non-state actors can be viewed: how the law can serve to legitimate 
these actors that previously had limited legal standing, or alternatively, how it can 
isolate and pacify them through structurally biased political structures that present a 
superficial legal aesthetic.  
Furthermore, in defining the complex process of legalization along the 
dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation, Abbott et al. have radically 
simplified a broad spectrum of values. Simplicity allows for variation in agreements 
to be easily identified43 and for widespread empirical analysis “between different 
peace processes as regards how best to promote compliance.”44 The simplicity of the 
tripartite legalization framework further allows peace agreements to be 
“characterized by common innovations as regards form, obligations, and third-party 
delegation, regardless of whether or not they can be placed in a formal legal 
category.”45 Thus, the inherent advantages in applying legalization theory to the 
study of peace agreements offset the difficulties in characterizing such agreements 
under traditional concepts of law, and “point to the importance of legalized models 
as an alternative to formal legal status.”46 
 
4. II. THE LEX PACIFICATORIA 
The adoption of common combinations of obligation, precision and 
delegation in peace agreement design led Bell to conclude that a lex pacificatoria, or 
‘law of the peacemakers,’ is emerging through consistent practice.47 She identifies 
four distinct features that comprise a process of legalization unique to peace 
agreement design. These features are: their provisions on self-determination; their 
tendency to include both state and non-state actors, thereby “straddling international 
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and domestic legal categories”; distinctive forms of obligation, including “both 
treaty-like/contractual and value-driven/constitutional provisions”; and consistently 
employed forms of delegation, “involving multiple intertwined and overlapping legal 
and political mechanisms.”48 Bell argues that these features form the theoretical basis 
of an emerging lex pacificatoria, similar to the distinct lex mercatoria (law of the 
merchants) advanced by the consistent practice of international merchants. Like the 
lex mercatoria, the lex pacificatoria is not a self-contained regime that applies solely 
in the realm of international law to the exclusion of the domestic realm, but instead, 
represents “a source of law made up of custom, practice, convention, precedent—and 
many national laws.”49 A comparative study of peace processes as presented in the 
next three chapters reveals commonalties in the prescription of certain provisions that 
could comprise a lex pacificatoria, thereby highlighting “the unique ways that peace 
agreements “assert their own legalization across international and domestic 
spheres.”50  
 There are certainly advantages to the characterization of peace agreement 
legalization as a distinct legal practice. Conceptualizing the lex pacificatoria as a 
coherent body of law allows scholars to account for the peculiar features of peace 
agreements that are ill-suited to positivist categories of international law, while 
tracking innovations in agreement design and best practice. Studying the features of 
peace agreements in this manner can inform the ‘borrowing’ of successful 
mechanisms across peace processes.51 Furthermore, such study allows for 
“engagement with social science debates on the factors affecting an agreement’s 
success or failure,”52 and can contribute to the growing scholarship on a jus post 
bellum—a law for post-conflict management. The jus post bellum is envisioned as a 
legal template for post-conflict transition and rehabilitation: a set of criteria which, at 
the very least, would provide certain fundamental guarantees and a standard against 
which new legal systems and political structures could be judged.53 While peace 
agreements themselves are in effect an application of the jus post bellum—insofar as 
they are legal instruments concluded after war that regulate the post-conflict order—
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scholars maintain that “the world has far to go before there can be said to be… a jus 
post bellum that is worthy of the name.”54 Viewing common processes of 
legalization as a distinct lex pacificatoria thus represents a novel attempt to elaborate 
on a potential jus post bellum, and establish a theoretical framework for sustainable 
agreement design. 
Indeed, if we are truly understand the process-orientated character of peace 
agreements, then Abbott et al’s theory of legalization needs to be updated to reflect 
its application in a conflict resolution context. Bell’s lex pacificatoria is an attempt in 
this regard, as it accounts for aspects of legalization theory that do not sit 
comfortably with the unique character of peace agreements at present. For example, 
precision will not always be an accurate barometer for gauging agreement success or 
failure, particularly where precisely written provisions do not represent mutual 
agreement between the parties.55 In the absence of political well and genuine 
consensus, precision alone may be “insufficient to providing incentives to 
cooperation.”56 Furthermore, precision can be restrictive and rigid in the face of 
long-term peacebuilding objectives, the requirements and repercussions of which 
cannot be accurately predicted.57 While the law can play a pivotal role in enforcing 
the short-term goals of a peace agreement, Bell argues that “the longer-term goals of 
peace agreements must be achieved through the deeper constitutionalization of the 
commitments they embody.”58 This thesis presents interesting findings in this regard, 
and reveals distinct features of legalized peace agreements that can transition a 
document from short-term to long-term processes of peacebuilding. 
 The lex pacificatoria also provides a basis for further research into the 
implications of third party delegation. Bell raises several questions as to how the text 
of a peace agreement may influence political discourse within the realm of parties to 
the agreement, and indeed, how the international community’s involvement in the 
drafting of the agreement may have significant implications for that relationship.59 
Taken together, the lex pacificatoria, and the processes of legalization that comprise 
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it, thus signal a “range of new inquiries”60 and present a formative framework that is 
advanced by the analyses presented in this thesis. 
 However, Andrej Lang voices a significant dissenting opinion on the lex 
pacificatoria that surmises the traditional legal perspective on peace agreements. 
Lang initially accepts that the lex pacificatoria is an important concept that might 
help our understanding of the peace agreement phenomenon by accommodating “the 
different rationales and mechanisms that are associated with the peculiar nature of 
modern peace agreements.”61 However, Lang dismisses Bell’s theory on the basis 
that it relegates peace agreements to “a distinct, somewhat self-contained category of 
transnational law.”62 In Lang’s view, peace agreements are thus denied the 
compliance-inducing effects of international law.  
Lang errs, however, by conceptualizing the lex pacificatoria as a mere label, 
a political definition applied to peace agreements that are only posing as legal 
contracts. This is to neglect the common legal features, processes and practices 
emanating from these agreements, and the coherent processes of legalization that 
give rise to them. Lang disregards this formative body of law by arguing that peace 
agreements can only have the character of law if they produce “credible legal 
effects,”63 and rely “on the availability of effective adjudication and integration with 
other norms of international law.”64 Lang concludes that the lex pacificatoria does 
not satisfy these criteria, and as such, remains in the category of soft law.65 
Accordingly, he stresses the need for peace agreements to be defined under 
established and recognized doctrines of hard international law.66 Ironically, in 
pursuing this outcome, Lang categorizes peace agreements under the “binary option 
between hard international law and pure politics,”67 which he himself identified.  
 In purporting this view, Lang restricts the analytical potential behind 
legalization to what Abbott et al. described as a “narrow view of the law as requiring 
enforcement by a coercive sovereign.”68 Lang claims that processes of legalization 
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lack “the normative and institutional quality of the international legal system,”69 but 
in doing so, he fails to consider how the legalization of a peace agreement may still 
produce ‘credible legal effects’ through provisions that are high on obligation, 
precision and delegation. Lang’s dismissal of the parallel between the lex mercatoria 
and the lex pacificatoria evidences this. He contests that a legal regime unto 
peacemakers, which is comprised by both state and non-state parties to a conflict, 
cannot operate in the same way as the lex mercatoria, which is based on mutual self-
interest among its parties.70 Unlike the lex mercatoria, the “security dilemma 
dynamics”71 that are inherent in an armed conflict context incentivize opportunism 
among the parties and prevent self-enforcement of a lex pacificatoria in the absence 
of a coercive sovereign. However, this reasoning is negated by the positive 
correlation that exists between hard legalization and peace agreement success.72 
Where security dilemmas present themselves, hard legalization can bridge trust 
deficits by stipulating the costs of non-compliance before the breach occurs.73 High 
precision narrows the scope for self-serving interpretation by the contracting parties 
and limits the space for deviation from projected behaviour. Provisions that are high 
on both obligation and precision further reduce “wiggle room to make excuses,”74 
while provisions that are high on delegation do not incentivize opportunistic 
behaviour, but rather, increase its costs by providing for third-party enforcement 
mechanisms.75 Thus, the peculiar dynamics of legalization do not preclude the 
existence of a lex pacificatoria, but form its raison d’être. 
 Though Lang asserts that Bell has ‘insulated’ peace agreements from the 
international legal system by creating a separate label for processes of peace 
agreement legalization,76 this is not the case. The lex pacificatoria is merely an 
attempt to account for distinct processes of legalization that continue to give rise to 
deeply legal processes and institutions, in the absence of positivist legal frameworks 
that could better regulate them. Thus, the lex pacificatoria is not an attempt to isolate 
peace agreements from the existing norms, rules, practices and institutions of the 
international order, but an attempt to identify the coherent processes of peace 
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agreement design that are emerging through practice, precedent and custom, and to 
recognize these processes as legal. Furthermore, there is little evidence to suggest 
that the theory of legalization is incompatible with customary international law; and 
international legal principles on the recognition of non-state actors and their 
obligations under human rights treaties. 
 Finally, Lang contends that Bell’s ‘softening’ of the law renders peace 
agreements non-justiciable before the ICJ.77 However, an adherence to legal 
positivism has not been advantageous to the enforcement of peace agreements as 
legal documents, as the decision in the Armed Activities case arguably demonstrates. 
As Lang himself has noted, the ICJ’s rejection of the Ugandan counterclaim in that 
case was based on the assumption “that it is not possible to establish legal 
responsibility on the basis of violations of the Lusaka Agreement.”78 The Court’s 
reasoning in this regard implies that the Lusaka Agreement and other such peace 
agreements do not create binding obligations at international law, nor are they 
justiciable before the ICJ. Such an outcome highlights the dangers inherent in 
applying international law too rigidly to peace agreements, and reiterates the need for 
alternative conceptions of the law that can account for the peculiar features of such 
agreements. When the strict application of international law serves only to frustrate 
the goals of peace agreements (which are central to the social objectives that 
necessitated the establishment of the international legal order),79 then the priorities of 
the international system are inherently called into question.80 The interpretation and 
application of international law should involve the promulgation and attainment of 
common values and goals.81 Indeed, even Lang concedes that where the opposite 
occurs, one should acquiesce to Bell’s lex pacificatoria approach.  
But the lex pacificatoria does not represent a ‘softening’ of traditional legal 
concepts, nor a last resort. It is merely a recognition of the distinct processes of 
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legalization that are effecting legal outcomes and normative influence, irrespective of 
their formal legal status. The concept of legalization itself is a model of legal 
definition for peace agreements that reiterates the normative power of international 
law and resituates its role as central to an agreement’s stability, not its voidability. As 
Bell argues, if we do not attempt to define the emerging consistencies in peace 
processes in legal terms, we risk losing sight of the role that international law should 
play in the international realm: “we they risk losing sight… of the moral and 
normative underpinnings of the emerging lex.”82 Inger Österdahl has similarly 
claimed that scholars have a duty to systematize existing and developing “norms for 
the governance of societies in transition.”83 In querying the correlation between hard 
legalization and agreement stability within the parameters of this thesis, the research 
reveals common innovations with regard to precision, obligation and delegation that 
contribute to sustainable processes of peace. This somewhat affirms and contributes 
to the theory of a lex pacificatoria, which presents a more pragmatic approach to 
making principles of law serve processes of peace, not vice versa. We will now look 
at how these innovations emerged through processes of conflict, negotiation, trial, 
and error in the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Sudan. 
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5. 
‘THE MORO PROBLEM’ – CONFLICT IN MINDANAO  
 
“The tenacity and seriousness of the conflict remains complicated with the 
unremitting inability of the state to substantially and decisively address, over 
a long period, its core causes: insubstantial political autonomy; socio-
economic grievances and deprivation; and perceived injustice, discrimination, 
and alienation of the people from the mainstream of Philippine political and 
economic development. The issue boils down to political and economic 
equity and social justice, the crux of the state’s responsibility and kernel of 
nation’s spirit.”1 
 
“The theories that run the gamut from religion to misgovernment were 
relevant only in so far as they were all pieces of an enormously complex 
jigsaw. To pick any one of them as the outstanding cause of the upheaval 
would be a hindrance to understanding the total picture.”2 
  
5. I. INTRODUCTION 
The conflict in the southern Philippines can be traced along a social and 
cultural fault line which first ruptured upon the introduction of Christianity under 
colonial Spain, and is still observable in the contemporary “dichotomization of 
Philippine society between the Christian majority and Muslim minority.”3 Colonial 
efforts to pacify the predominantly Muslim Moro people of Mindanao by force were 
largely ineffective, prompting the Christian Filipino elite to adapt administrative 
policies of political exclusion, “systematic marginalization” and ethnic 
“minoritization” in the post-independence period.4 As a result, contemporary 
Mindanao has consistently lagged behind other urban centres in the Philippines in 
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terms of socio-economic development.5 Provinces with a Muslim majority continue 
to rank among “the poorest, least educated, and most dangerous places in the 
Philippines,”6 with the little infrastructural and educational opportunities that these 
provinces receive “disproportionately going to serve Christian areas.”7  
In the late 1960s, the Moros began to chafe under “the perennial 
discrimination against [them] in many levels of the national life as well as the 
misrepresentation or distortion of their true image as a historic people.”8 The call for 
secession was originally articulated by Dr. Nur Misuari and the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), before finding a more Islamic expression in its splinter 
group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). After President Ferdinand Marcos 
imposed martial law in 1972, the MNLF took up arms against the state to further 
their claim to the Moro homeland. However, asserting that claim came at a 
staggering price. 30 years of conflict between the state and the MNLF alone claimed 
the lives of some 100,000 civilians.9 More than one million others were rendered 
homeless and/or destitute, with the ongoing conflict creating an estimated 200,000 to 
300,000 Muslim refugees.10 The internal displacement caused by the fighting 
contributed to the process of Moro minoritization in Mindanao, and today, many of 
the major cities in Mindanao remain crippled by the effects of protracted conflict.11 
This chapter begins with a brief examination of the features that the 
Bangsamoro peace process has successfully ‘borrowed’ from other international 
processes, and what this tells us about peace agreement design generally. Section II 
analyses the systematic policies of ‘Minoritization,’ ‘Filipinization,’ and 
marginalization that have been brought to bear on the Moro people throughout 
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history, and how these polices contributed to the advent of a militant Moro identity 
and the outbreak of conflict in Mindanao in 1972. The major agreements concluded 
between the state and the alternating Moro secessionist groups are analyzed in detail 
in Section III. The way in which these agreements were worded reveals valuable 
lessons about including the relevant stakeholders and addressing the key issues 
fueling a conflict. The role that legal language and legal guarantees play in 
incorporating these peacebuilding principles into sustainable processes of peace is 
explored in Section IV. 
The history of conflict resolution efforts in Mindanao has mirrored “the 
complexity of the Philippines’ physical geography—an archipelago with differing 
concentrations of conflict and social organisation, where even the history of 
negotiations is disjointed and diverse.”12 The protracted peace process has produced 
an abundance of conflict resolution instruments aimed at ending the conflict, but 
“peace talks have been highly volatile, tenuous, and insubstantial,” and generally 
limited to ceasefires, declaratory statements and framework agreements.13 In the 
diplomatic intervals between negotiations, a “no war, no peace” situation persisted, 
characterized by minor skirmishes, despite the periodical signature of ceasefire 
agreements.14 In perpetuation of a vicious cycle, every breakdown in negotiations 
was succeeded by the outbreak of violence, which only served to “reinforce the high 
distrust and the deep cleavages” that already permeated Philippine society.15 Upon 
returning to the negotiating table, both state and Moro actors treated renewed peace 
talks “as but a continuation of the power struggle by other means,” using ploys and 
maneuvers to better their own position, or to force the opposition to make 
concessions.16  
The 40-year history of the conflict in the Mindanao region of the Philippines 
is thus ripe with potential for academic analysis within the parameters of this project. 
First, though the struggle in Mindanao is tied to broader issues of wealth and power 
sharing between the minority and the majority, the conflict remains characterized by 
ethnic division, “compounded by religious identities that are more tied to cultural 
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ideologies and their popular expressions, including the use of violence.”17 Mindanao 
therefore presents an ideal opportunity to further examine Gopalan’s correlation 
between ethno-religious conflicts and highly legalized agreements.18 Indeed, the 
Bangsamoro is serving as a guinea pig of sorts for pragmatic approaches to conflict 
resolution and the creation of legal anomalies in the interest of peace. As Mastura 
notes, the creation of the autonomous Bangsamoro region is not unlike the creation 
of Kosovo, or the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina,19 both of 
which served as unusual, if not unprecedented, solutions to intractable ethnic 
conflicts. 
The Bangsamoro peace process also supports Bell’s claim that peacebuilding 
mechanisms can be transferred across peace processes.20 The 2014 Comprehensive 
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was influenced by commendable features 
from various other peacebuilding initiatives, including provisions pertaining to ethnic 
groups (the peace process between the Acehnese and the Indonesian state in Aceh), 
systems of governance (devolution in Scotland and power-sharing in Catalonia and 
the Basque country, Spain), and third-party monitoring (as in the North-South 
conflict in Sudan).21 During negotiations on the ill-fated 2008 Memorandum on 
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), the Sudanese experience was frequently cited as an 
appropriate model for third-party monitoring,22 and its effects are now observable in 
the adopted best practices of the International Monitoring Team envisioned under the 
CAB.23 
Negotiators also consulted experts from conflicts zones such as Colombia, 
Myanmar, and perhaps most evidently, Northern Ireland.24 Both Mindanao and 
Northern Ireland share similarities with regard to the sectarian relationship between 
minority and majority communities, and the core-periphery nature of the relationship 
                                                          
17 Jun Mercado OMI, ‘Negotiating the Good Friday Agreement’ (GMA News Online, 11 October 
2011) <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/235009/opinion/blogs/negotiating-the-good-friday-
agreement> accessed 19 August 2017. 
18 See generally Sandeep Gopalan, ‘From Darfur to Sinai to Kashmir: Ethno-Religious Conflicts and 
Legalization’ (2007) 55(2) Buffalo Law Review 403. 
19 Ishak V Mastura, ‘Philippines: Bangsamoro, A Triumph of Western Diplomacy?’ (2013) 9(1) Small 
Wars Journal. 
20 Christine Bell, ‘Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status’ (2006) 100(2) The American 
Journal of International Law 373, 410. 
21 Mastura (n 19). 
22 International Crisis Group interview, Manila, 7 September 2008 in International Crisis Group, ‘The 
Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao,’ Asia Report N°83 (Jakarta/Brussels 23rd October 
2008), 5-6. 
23 Mastura (n 19). 
24 ibid. 
 67 
between the national government the conflict area.25 Northern Ireland’s Good Friday 
Agreement—itself a conscious product of various peace processes borrowing ‘best 
practice’ from one another26—has thus served as a template for addressing 
particularly sensitive and contentious issues in Mindanao, including 
decommissioning: “It is a very similar situation to us... In Northern Ireland they had 
a commission. Maybe we should, too.”27 Teresita Quintos Deles, presidential adviser 
to the peace process, also admitted that the negotiators’ approach to policing and 
decommissioning had been influenced by the British experience in Northern 
Ireland.28 Article 4 of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro calls for the 
establishment of an independent commission to advise on policing within the region, 
similar to the commission established by Section 9 of the Good Friday Agreement on 
Policing and its Annex on the Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland. Article 
5 of the Framework Agreement also states that the MILF will undertake a 
programme of demobilization to put their weapons ‘beyond use,’ which mirrors the 
language used by the parties to the peace process in Northern Ireland.29 Though 
Deles was quick to point out that there are “no fixed templates that can aid with the 
peace process” in Mindanao,30 the applicability of peacebuilding mechanisms from 
one conflict zone to another highlights how the study of various agreements has 
positive implications for peace processes globally. While no single agreement can 
address the unique peculiarities of any given conflict, successful agreements can 
inform and inspire the adoption of certain provisions “in the search for 
implementation,”31 a vision surmised by Fr. Jun Mercado: “Though we are not ‘copy 
cats’ of Northern Ireland, no doubt, we can draw concrete lessons from it if we are 
looking for a fresh wind blowing our own peace story….”32 
Finally, the protracted peace process in Mindanao is ample evidence in itself 
of Gopalan’s claim that our ignorance in the field of agreement design has seen the 
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repetition—or indeed, the omission—of the same features in agreements, despite the 
evidence of their failure (or success) in previous instances.33 All sides in this conflict 
have seen agreements rich in potential—conceived at an opportune time with the 
good faith of all of the parties involved—fall flat at the last moment, due to their 
repeated failures to meaningfully address the substantive issues that underpin the 
conflict. For example, the sustainability of, and support for, the Bangsamoro peace 
process has repeatedly been dogged by a lack of consensus among those who inhabit 
the ancestral domain of the Moro people. This “is partly due to the lack of 
participation of other stakeholders,” 34 i.e., other Moro ethnic groups, Lumads (the 
non-Islamised indigenous tribal people of Mindanao), Christians, and key civil 
society actors. This negligence failed to generate any enthusiasm among the key 
stakeholders with regard to implementation, and failed to adequately address the 
interests of the respective groups.35 Similarly, or perhaps because of this lack of 
national consensus, the issue of land ownership was repeatedly neglected over 30 
years of renewed negotiations. The land issue had been identified as a root cause of 
the conflict, and there was agreement among commentators “that land must be part 
of a strategic, sustainable solution.”36 Indeed, as early as 2002—before the 
breakdown of the MOA-AD and the resumption of hostilities in 2008—Paul Oquist 
of the United Nations Development Programme identified land as the most likely 
source of post-conflict conflict in Mindanao.37 These issues have repeatedly proven 
themselves to be “major gaps” in the state-Moro peace talks,38 and academics and 
practitioners alike can learn much from the negotiators’ inability to achieve 
consensus on these problems. Thus, Mindanao—as was written of Northern Ireland 
before it—is an ideal region for further study, as it “provides a state-of-the-art 
laboratory of peacemaking and peace building that may offer positive and negative 
lessons to other societies attempting to emerge from protracted civil conflict.”39 
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5. II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
5. II. A. THE COLONIAL PERIOD 
The Republic of the Philippines’ unique status as the sole Asian state with a 
Christian-majority stems from the Spanish colonial conquest of the islands between 
1565 and 1898.40 The Spanish introduced Christianity to the sprawling archipelago in 
the mid-sixteenth century, and for the next three centuries, attempted to proselytise 
the indigenous peoples through education and force. As a result, Christianity is 
practiced by ninety per cent of the population today.41 However, Islam has actually 
enjoyed a longer presence in the country’s southern peripheries. Almost two 
centuries before the arrival of the Spanish colonial power, Islam was beginning to 
take hold in the southernmost reaches of the Philippines, “fostering the evolution of 
more complex and cohesive cultural communities with the power to successfully 
resist Spanish attempts to extend political control and Christianity throughout the 
archipelago.”42 In parts of south-western Mindanao, “where Spanish control came 
late and remained tenuous,” indigenous political constructs and processes of state-
building were well-developed, “undergirding a tradition of resistance to alien rule.”43 
By the mid-16th century, the Spanish invaders had to contend with “small but fiercely 
independent sovereign nation-states in the form of sultanates of the main Moro 
ethnolinguistic tribes.”44  
The Moro’s resilience reminded the Spanish of the Afro-Muslim enemy they 
had repeatedly faced on their home front. The Muslims of the southern Philippines 
were thus labelled ‘Moros,’ after the Moors of North Africa. The term is not 
derogatory, but is in fact “articulated and self-ascribed” by the Moro as a rejection of 
the Filipino nation, and a claim of ancestry to the “unsubjugated” and “uncolonised” 
peoples of the Southern Philippines.45 Unlike those who identify themselves as 
Filipino, the Moro believe “that their people have never been part of the Philippines,” 
and that “their current struggle is a continuation of their ancestors’ war for 
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independence.”46 The Filipino natives who had been converted to Christianity were 
compelled by the Spanish to help suppress the Muslim rebellion.47 The Moro thus 
felt the need to declare themselves separate from Christian Filipinos, “who reduced 
them to a state of poverty and underdevelopment; and subjected them to injustice and 
prejudice.”48 They declared themselves a new people, under a new nation: the 
Bangsamoro, or ‘land of the Moro.’  
Spanish dominion over Muslim Mindanao was almost complete by the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. However, it was not brought under the administration 
of a centralized, Manila-based government until the first decade of the twentieth 
century,49 when the United States took Manila from the Spanish during the Spanish-
American war. By then, the once powerful sultanates had ceased to exist as political 
entities.50 The US colonial administration was characterized by two alternating 
strategies: the use of brute military force “to subdue resistance in Muslim 
communities,” and “the systematic deployment of a public educational system” that 
served to demonise the Moro nation and attempted to restructure their ethnic identity 
“in accordance with ideals embodied in white, Western, Christian norms.”51 The use 
of seemingly contrasting policies in Mindanao elicited a similarly contradictory 
range of responses from the Moro people, “ranging from acceptance to 
accommodation to outright resistance.”52 Indeed, the secessionist stance that 
informed the ideology of the contemporary Mindanao Muslims was fomented while 
the Philippines were still subject to US colonialism.53  
However, the creation of the Philippine Commonwealth (1935-1946)—a 
forerunner to Philippine independence—took precedence over the issue of Moro self-
determination.54 Under the Commonwealth, “the Moros lost special provisions 
protecting Islamic and traditional laws, the institution of the sultanate and socio-
economic programmes.”55 They were not represented proportionately in the national 
parliament, and they steadily continued to lose both their native territories and 
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systems of government.56 For the Moros, the Commonwealth thus equated to “being 
ruled by their former enemies,” and served only to reaffirm their ethnic identity.57  
In the later years of US dominion, the administration encouraged significant 
Christian-Filipino settlement in traditional Muslim areas of Mindanao, which was 
labelled as “the land of promise.”58 Christians who settled in the region even 
received financial support from the government for doing so.59 The influx of 
Christian Filipinos irreparably altered the ethnic makeup of the region: by the late 
1960s, Muslims, who had made up 75% of the region’s population at the dawn of the 
20th century, only constituted 25% of the Mindanao populace.60 Christian 
transmigration accelerated throughout the 1950s and 1960s, transforming “the 
demographic picture of Mindanao completely,” and breeding resentment among the 
Moros.61  
 
5. II. B. PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE & MORO REVIVAL 
When the Philippines gained independence in 1946, the Moro could not relate 
to their new found ‘independence,’ nor identify with the Republic, “whose laws were 
clearly derived from Western or Catholic moral values and whose public school 
system was too Americanized and alien to Islamic tradition.”62 Minoritization of the 
Moros, and attempts to reconfigure their identity in line with that of the Christian 
Filipino majority, intensified during this period. Christian migration into the region 
was so significant that the ethnic and social realities of modern Mindanao no longer 
supported the Moro claim to their ancestral homeland.63 By 1990, Muslims made up 
less than 18% of the region’s population,64 and today, only five of Mindanao’s 25 
regions have a Muslim majority.65 Surprisingly, “[t]he legitimacy of the Philippine 
state to govern the Muslim areas of the country was neither questioned nor 
challenged by any of the Muslim elite” during this period.66 This was mainly due to 
the concentration of political power in an aging Muslim ulema (educated scholars), 
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and the absence of an educated, radicalized youth, which did not come to the fore 
until the 1970s.  
Yet, despite their apparent pacification, conciliation for the Moros did not 
equal contentment, nor did it bring about “the resolution of the Muslim-Christian 
dichotomisation of society in Mindanao.”67 The effects of economic inequity and 
political isolation were evident in everyday life in Mindanao, and nurtured a common 
“deepening sense of alienation” among all those who identified themselves as 
Moro.68 In the late 1950s, provinces with a Muslim majority had the lowest literacy 
rates, while boasting the highest unemployment rates.69 The effects of decades of 
minoritization meant that land disputes between Christians and Muslims, and indeed, 
between Muslims themselves, became increasingly frequent.70 State-led 
investigations into social unrest in Muslim-dominated areas established that land 
ownership was the primary cause of Moro discontent,71 which can hardly have been 
surprising given the extent to which government policy favoured Christian 
landowners. Indeed, by the early 1980s, decades of state-led discrimination and 
minoritization had reduced an estimated 80% of Muslims to the status of “landless 
tenants.”72 
 Yet despite the Filipino elite’s monopoly on the policy agenda, by the late 
1950s and early 1960s, significant social change was taking place within the Muslim 
community, “which government policymakers failed to notice or understand.”73 With 
support from Abdel Nasser’s Egypt, thousands of Muslims had the opportunity to 
pursue scholarships at Al-Azhar University—itself a celebrated centre for Islamic 
teaching.74 Many of these young scholars studied in some of Egypt’s most 
prestigious military academies and professional schools.75 While abroad, these young 
people were exposed to the “reformist tendencies” taking place in the broader 
Muslim world, particularly in Nasser’s Egypt.76 When they returned to the 
Philippines and their local communities, they possessed a revived Islamic 
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consciousness and a deeper understanding of Islam itself. Their education allowed 
them to be openly critical of the traditional leaders in their communities, “especially 
those holding political offices,”77 who were not doing enough to address the social 
and economic issues that plagued Mindanao.78 This younger, radical ulema began to 
actively engage in student seminars, and attended “public demonstrations involving 
international issues.”79 Islam had thus embodied the Moro Muslims with a sense of 
dignity, and reaffirmed their ethnic identity within a predominantly Filipino nation.80 
By the late 1960s, Majul asserts that the Moro Muslim youth “had greatly increased 
its political sophistication,”81 and the push for an independent Moro homeland 
returned with a renewed vigour.  
 
5. II. C. THE RISE OF THE MNLF 
In March 1968, a single event cast the “differences between Muslim 
traditional leaders and the youth” into the background, and propelled the ‘Moro 
problem’ to the fore.82 180 Muslims from the southern peripheries of the Philippines 
were recruited by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for the purpose of 
fermenting political discontent in neighbouring Sabah, Malaysia. The ultimate aim of 
this operation was to create a political situation that would warrant a Philippine 
annexation of Sabbah. However, the recruits mutinied and demanded their return 
home. Some argue that the mutiny followed the ongoing non-payment of the recruits’ 
salaries and “complaints on their living conditions in training camps.”83 Other 
accounts claim that the true purpose of  the Sabah mission dawned on the recruits—
that they would have to kill their fellow Muslims in the region—and they refused to 
do so.84 Whatever their motives, the military brass reacted by executing some of the 
mutineers—though accounts vary as to how the massacre occurred and how many 
soldiers were killed. The event came to be known throughout the Philippines as ‘the 
Jabidah massacre,’ or ‘the Corregidor massacre,’ and “the mass execution inflamed 
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Christians and Muslims alike.”85 A Congressional investigation proved inconclusive, 
and “no culprit was held responsible for the ghastly massacre.”86 Officially, the 
matter was forgotten—but not by Muslims.87  
The Jabidah massacre was the catalyst that mobilized young Muslims—those 
who constituted the new ulema—to organise their resistance against a state which 
they perceived to be politically illegitimate and morally bankrupt.88 One of the most 
prominent leaders was a young professor of political science at the University of 
Philippines, Dr. Nur Misuari. In 1969, Misuari and other young, secular-educated 
Moros founded the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and established the 
organization as “the main vehicle for placing the Moro cause on the national and 
international agenda.”89 Misuari’s MNLF did not call for an Islamic state; in fact, the 
movement was “emphatically secular in orientation.”90 Instead, Misuari rallied the 
masses behind a nationalist claim to the ‘Bangsamoro,’ or ‘Moro nation,’ which, he 
claimed, had been illegally incorporated into the Philippine state.91 Misuari called 
upon the peoples of the Bangsamoro to renounce their uncertain, and often 
contradictory, identity as Muslim-Filipinos and declare themselves ‘Moro’, “a 
reincarnation of the pre-colonial identity as the descendants of the ‘unsubjugated’ 
and ‘uncolonised’ peoples” of Mindanao.92 In doing so, Misuari had formulated a 
means for Moros to “separate themselves from those against whom they [were] 
judged unfavourably,” and to establish themselves as a “new people.”93 Through 
Misuari’s vision, what had initially been perceived as state discrimination against the 
Muslims had found a much broader, more inclusive appeal in the form of the Moro 
nation.94 
The declaration of martial law in September 1972 only broadened the 
MNLF’s base of support, “and determined the timing of the warfare by the core of 
Muslim radicals.”95 Military rule forced the MNLF’s hand by restricting the range of 
                                                          
85 Buendia (n 9) 15. 
86 ibid at 14. 
87 Majul (n 69) 903. 
88 Bertrand (n 9) 44. 
89 Santos Jr (n 34) 2. 
90 Buendia (n 1) 119. 
91 ibid. 
92 Buendia (n 45) 211.  
93 Brackette Williams, ‘A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation across Ethnic Terrain’ 
(1989) 18 Annual Review of Anthropology 429 in Buendia (n 10) 15. 
94 Buendia (n 1) 119. 
95 Lela Gardner Noble, ‘The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines’ (1976) 49(3) Pacific 
Affairs, 411-412 in Buendia (n 10) 20. 
 75 
legitimate political activities to a binary choice of acquiescence or violence.96 When 
the state attempted to remove all arms and ammunitions from the public domain, it 
encountered fierce resistance from Muslim communities supported by the MNLF.97 
The MNLF quickly established itself as a fighting force to be reckoned with, 
“displaying all the earmarks of a military operation by an organized army.”98 One 
month after the initial declaration of martial law, the Marcos regime launched full-
scale military operations against the MNLF, initiating what would soon become the 
first conventional war in a series of protracted conflicts that ravaged the southern 
islands of the Philippines for over four decades.99 For the MNLF, the outbreak of 
conventional warfare in their homeland “crystallised the notion of separatism from 
the state” as the only viable alternative to Moro citizenship within a Filipino state.100  
 
5. III. THE AGREEMENTS 
5. III. A. THE TRIPOLI AGREEMENT (1976) 
 The Bangsamoro question was initially addressed by the Tripoli Agreement 
of 1976, which was brokered by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). 
Between 1972 and 1976, the OIC issued several diplomatic resolutions decrying “the 
problem of Muslims in the Philippines” and “the plight of the Filipino Muslims.”101 
In 1974, the OIC officially acknowledged their support for Misuari’s MNLF, despite 
the MNLF’s secular outlook.102 The resolution was crucial to the peace process, 
insofar as it recognized the MNLF as representative of the political wishes of the 
Moro community.103 Having suffered heavy losses during the military campaign 
against the MNLF, the state realized that if it wanted to pacify the secessionist south, 
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it would have to negotiate under OIC auspices.104 However, neither the Tripoli 
Agreement, nor Marcos’ military regime in its entirety (1972-1986) would secure 
self-rule for the Moro people.105  
The Tripoli Agreement begins with an acknowledgement of the vital role that 
the OIC played in bringing the belligerents to the negotiating table. However, the rest 
of the agreement failed to delegate authoritative power to the organization in any 
way. Though Article 3(12) tasked the OIC’s Council of Foreign Ministers with 
helping to set up a Joint Committee comprised of the two parties to the agreement, 
no role was delegated to the OIC to help the Committee achieve its mandate, e.g., the 
release of political prisoners, the supervision of a ceasefire and the resettlement of 
refugees.106 Granted, the OIC was perhaps reluctant to act as a third party to the 
agreement, having expressed an awareness of how complicated the situation was in 
an earlier resolution—“the more so as it concerns the internal affairs of an 
independent sovereign state.”107 Nevertheless, several of the objectives that the Joint 
Committee were charged with could have been more appropriately assigned, or 
readily achieved, by the OIC or a similar third-party actor. Guaranteeing the release 
of all political prisoners, and the freedoms of movement and assembly of the 
internally displaced could also have been more appropriately delegated to a neutral 
third-party actor, rather than a joint committee comprised of the belligerents 
themselves. In the absence of any such grants of delegation, the imprecision and 
ambiguity expressed in Article 3(12) left the Joint Committee without an objective 
authority to refer to if and when it disagreed about its mandate. 
Though the OIC played a vital role in bringing the warring parties to the 
negotiating table, it was also responsible for compelling the MNLF to relinquish its 
demand for total independence.108 The Marcos administration would only accept a 
political solution to the Moro problem that upheld the territorial integrity of the 
Philippines within a unitary state.109 This was first acknowledged by the OIC in 
1974, when it called for “a just solution to the plight of the Filipino Muslims within 
the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
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Philippines.”110 When the Council of Foreign Ministers proposed a plan of action 
that upheld the territorial integrity of the state, the OIC acknowledged it as “the 
fundamental basis for any settlement of the problem.”111 The OIC went on to note 
“with satisfaction” the MNLF’s acceptance of this plan as basis for negotiations, and 
praised “the initiative of the Government of the Philippines to accept autonomy for 
Muslim Mindanao, Basilan, Soulo and Balwan.”112 Though Misuari was violently 
opposed to Marcos’ design to “dilute” Moro self-determination,113 the OIC supported 
Marcos’ diplomatic compromise. Threatened with the withdrawal of the OIC’s vital 
aid and support, Misuari and the MNLF were compelled to abandon their strategic 
goal of complete sovereignty for the Bangsamoro, and settle instead for autonomy 
within the Philippine Republic.  
This compromise is very clearly expressed throughout the Tripoli Agreement. 
Article 1 states that the establishment of autonomy in the Southern Philippines will 
be “within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Philippines.”114 The area of autonomy in the Southern Philippines is expressly 
defined in Article 2 as encompassing 13 provinces, namely: Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-
tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, 
Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato and 
Palawan. Article 3(16) also obligates the state to follow all necessary constitutional 
procedures in implementing the agreement.115 Essentially, these limitations preserved 
the legal and territorial status quo of the existing Philippine state—an entity with 
which the Moro people had become politically disillusioned and alienated from. In 
accepting these conditions, the MNLF was attempting to affect change through the 
same institutions that it had perceived as failing its constituency in the past, 
inadvertently paving the way for the state’s unilateral interpretation and 
implementation of the agreement later.116 
Nevertheless, Article 3 appeared to promise genuine autonomy for the Moros 
on paper. The Agreement envisioned executive and legislative organs with 
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competence over education, regional administration and finance,117 “in compliance 
with the objectives of the autonomy and its institutions.”118 However, the relationship 
between these competences and those of the central government in Manila was 
postponed for discussion at a later date, making it impossible for these institutions to 
function on the basis of the Tripoli Agreement alone. Similarly, the Agreement 
detailed how the executive and legislative organs were to be enacted, and how they 
would function,119 yet the composition of these organs of governance was left to be 
determined “later on.” The Agreement did bestow the Moro with the right to set up 
their own Sharia courts.120 Article 3(3) also states that Muslims from the autonomous 
region would be represented in all the courts of the centralised judicial system, 
“including the Supreme Court,”121 and the procedure for their appointment was 
precisely set out under that provision.  
Article 3(7) acknowledges the Muslims’ right to representation and 
participation “in the Central Government and in all other organs of the State,”122 in 
addition to their own political autonomy. However, discussion of “the number of 
representatives and ways of participation” is once again postponed to a later date, 
paving the way for claims of broken promises, and grounds for misunderstanding.123 
The Tripoli Agreement similarly postpones the discussion of contentious policy areas 
in order to advance the peace process. National defense was to remain within the 
competence of the central government, on the condition that “the arrangements for 
the joining of the forces of the MNLF with the Philippine Armed Forces be discussed 
later.” This language did not guarantee that the MNLF forces would be assimilated 
into the AFP, nor did the Agreement provide a contingency should the later 
discussions break down—as they did during the agreement’s implementation. If the 
parties concerned could not agree on the joining of their armed forces, would 
national defense remain exclusively reserved by the central government? Would the 
parties have to go back to the negotiating table?  
Similar imprecision plagued the central government’s competence over mines 
and mineral resources. A “reasonable percentage” of revenues raised from mines and 
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mineral resources were to “be fixed for the benefit of the areas of the autonomy.”124 
The term ‘reasonable percentage’ was not quantitatively defined in the agreement, 
however, and in the absence of provisions delegating interpretative authority to a 
third-party, it remained open to contention and subjective interpretation. Though the 
Agreement prescribed a Special Regional Security Force for the autonomous area, 
“composed of Muslim officers and men responsible in maintaining peace and 
order,”125 no mechanism under which this special force would be established was 
suggested, and “the relationship between these forces and the Central security 
forces” remained a key talking point to be “fixed later.”126 The lack of precision in 
these paragraphs allowed the parties to feign accord in the absence of genuine 
agreement. The short-term gains of this tactic would come at the cost of long-term 
peacebuilding, 
These major postponements rendered the Tripoli Agreement a framework 
agreement at best. In the absence of precise, more developed terms, the parties to the 
agreement could not meaningfully commit to anything of substantive legal effect; 
they were merely declaring mutually-shared principles, ambitions and vagaries. The 
agreement itself recognized this, and Article 3(11) provides that a Mixed Committee 
composed of representatives of both parties would meet “to study in detail the points 
left for discussion in order to reach a solution thereof in accordance with the 
provisions of this agreement.”127 On paper, this would have further developed the 
provisions of the Tripoli Agreement and paved the way for the signing of a final 
agreement by the state, MNLF and OIC, in accordance with Article 3(14).  
Unsurprisingly, the imprecision that plagued the Tripoli Accord caused it to 
become bogged down in implementation, and eventually, it came apart. Discussions 
aimed at clarifying the finer details of the agreement led to differences of opinion 
and frustration,128 feelings which were exacerbated by the state’s ambivalence on the 
issue.129 The lack of detail in the agreement had necessitated a great deal of trust on 
the MNLF’s behalf, and when negotiations became difficult, the absence of any 
genuine agreement and lack of an effective third-party mediator led to its 
unravelling. When President Marcos insisted upon ratification of the Agreement by 
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plebiscite in the areas of autonomy, Misuari denounced the state’s interpretation of 
the text, and the political process accordingly.130 
To some, it appeared that Marcos had merely used the Tripoli Agreement “to 
divide the ranks of the MNLF” and allow the traditional Muslim ulema—most of 
whom were members of Marcos’ political party—to retain control of the autonomous 
region.131 Indeed, the imprecise and open-ended language that comprises the 
majority of the agreement’s text substantiates this claim. Several provisions on the 
region’s political institutions and key policy areas outwardly convey authority and 
autonomy, when in reality, any power given to the Moros is subordinate to the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, in accordance with Article 1. As a 
result, many of the institutions envisioned under the Tripoli Agreement “were 
cosmetic creations with no real legislative authority and no independent operating 
budget.”132 The President’s active role in administering the region was further 
evidence that Marcos intended to maintain control over the Southern Philippines. 
The President retained control over Muslim appointments to the Supreme Court, as 
well as appointments to the provisional government of the autonomous region, which 
would prepare the region for elections.133 Those appointed to positions of power 
within these institutions were not representative of the Moro struggle, but were, in 
fact, “martial law collaborators and rebel defectors, many of whom were datus 
(cultural or tribal leaders of ancient royal families) and all of whom were absent from 
the province more often than not.”134  
Interestingly, the provisions that were the most purposive and definite in tone 
were perhaps the most forcefully dismissive of conciliation between the parties. The 
limitations imposed by upholding the territorial integrity of the Philippines and 
maintaining the existing Constitutional processes prevented Moro participation in the 
peace process. The Agreement failed to empower the Moros with any form of 
political autonomy—particularly, the capacity to implement their side of the 
agreement. Instead, the Tripoli Agreement actually became the legal and legitimate 
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basis for state unilateralism with regard to the Moro conflict.135 When Misuari 
decried the state’s interpretation of the agreement and the subsequent plebiscite on 
the area of autonomy, the state simply proceeded to implement the agreement on its 
own terms. Because the agreement was born of the existing legal structures of state, 
the MNLF had no recourse to adjudication or an alternative interpretation.   
In March 1977, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1628, and in July 
1979, Presidential Decree No. 1618, which created two autonomous regions on the 
basis of the plebiscite.136 The provinces of South Cotabato, Davao del Sur, and 
Palawan were omitted from these autonomous regions, as the state argued that 
Muslims were a minority in each.137 This was contrary to the single autonomous 
region as envisioned under the agreement. Though the omissions upheld the 
territorial integrity and constitutional processes of the Republic, the state had not 
implemented the agreement as signed. For Misuari, the omissions were proof that 
Marcos had never intended to be bound by the Agreement.138 Once again, secession 
was perceived as the only viable alternative, and fighting resumed in 1977, though 
this time, with less tenacity. 
 On the whole, the Tripoli Agreement was low on precision, obligation and 
delegation. The agreement had left too many details to be clarified at a later date for 
it to be considered a precisely-worded basis for lasting peace. This omission merely 
postponed the inevitable disagreement between the parties and presented a quasi-
agreement in its stead. The text was only legally obligating inasmuch as the parties’ 
good faith sustained the process that flowed from it. But by paving the way for state 
unilateralism and failing to delegate any power away from state sovereignty, the 
agreement was open to subjective interpretation, and could therefore be moulded to 
any purpose that the state wished. Without any effective role in its implementation, 
the MNLF was free to walk away from the process and resort to armed conflict to 
further its aims. Despite failing to achieve lasting peace, the Tripoli Accord was, for 
a time, “the most significant juncture” in the state-MNLF peace process,139 and the 
“main term of reference” for all future negotiations.140 The agreement reframed the 
Moro problem as a question of autonomy rather than independence. From 1976 
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onward, all negotiations between the state and the myriad Muslim groups took place 
within a framework that preserved the sovereignty and territorial unity of the 
Philippine state. 
The Tripoli Agreement is also noteworthy for being the catalyst that ushered 
in a split in the MNLF ranks. Dissatisfaction with the Agreement bred discontent 
among the MNLF’s supporters, which culminated with a split in the movement’s 
ranks under MNLF Vice-Chairman Hashim Salamat in 1981. Salamat’s ‘new 
leadership’ remained heavily influenced by Misuari’s appeal to the Moro nation and 
territory, but the overt influence of religion was evident in the splinter group’s aim to 
secure “an independent Islamic state for the optimum practice of Islam as a way of 
life and governance in predominantly Muslim areas.”141 Salamat attempted to win 
political and financial support for his Islamic-oriented faction from the OIC,142 but 
the organization remained committed to the Tripoli Agreement that it had brokered, 
and reiterated its support for the MNLF as the sole legitimate representatives of the 
Muslims in Mindanao in several resolutions.143 Salamat relocated his organisation to 
Pakistan, and christened ‘the new leadership’ as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) in 1984. The split between the MNLF and the MILF was a watershed 
moment in the conflict that would have a significant impact on the way the peace 
process was to evolve.144 
 
5. III. B. THE FINAL AGREEMENT (1996) 
The twenty-year interval between The Tripoli Agreement (1976) and The 
Final Agreement (1996) was characterized by tentative talks, joint declarations, and 
repeated ceasefire violations, though the fighting never returned to the intensity of 
the period preceding the Tripoli Agreement. The peaceful ouster of President Marcos 
and the replacement of his autocratic regime with a democracy headed by President 
Corazon Aquino, “opened for the first time the possibility of genuine 
compromise.”145 Discussions on the basis of the Tripoli provisions led to the signing 
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of the Jeddah Accord by the state and the MNLF in 1987, but difficulties surrounding 
interpretation and implementation recalled bitter memories of Tripoli, and ultimately 
led to its downfall.146  
The Aquino administration continued to pursue Muslim autonomy, albeit 
unilaterally. The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created 
pursuant to an act of Congress in August 1989. However, the ARMM as it existed 
then was not enough to appease the MNLF’s demands. Despite extending 
institutional autonomy to Muslim areas and endowing these regions with executive 
and legislative powers, the ARMM was essentially an inflated bureaucracy that was 
described as “oversized, demoralized and mostly inept…,”147 and encompassed a 
much smaller territory than the MNLF had hoped for.  
The strengthening of the diplomatic regime under the Ramos administration 
increased the MNLF’s confidence that the government would abide by any 
commitments it undertook in the event of a peace agreement.148 Several factors had 
also made the MNLF more open to the idea of a compromise peace. Years of 
prolonged conflict with the AFP had weakened the MNLF militarily, and the 
proliferation of actors claiming to represent Mindanao’s Muslims had greatly 
impacted their political base. They duly seized the opportunity to make peace in 
order to reaffirm their position as the sole legitimate representative of the Muslims of 
Mindanao—at a time when this was becoming increasingly uncertain.149 
Following preliminary meetings in Libya in 1992 and West Java in 1993, the 
parties agreed to negotiate on the basis of the Tripoli Agreement, including “those 
portions of the Agreement left for further discussion….”150 Indeed, the preamble of 
the resulting Final Agreement recognizes the Tripoli Agreement as a basis for a 
comprehensive solution to the Moro problem, albeit “within the framework of the 
Philippine Constitution.”151 The legacy of Tripoli is reiterated in the penultimate 
recital of the preamble, which states that “the parties affirm the sovereignty, 
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territorial integrity and the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines…..”152 
Article. 153, the Totality Clause, also provides that any conflict in the interpretation 
of the agreement would be resolved “in the light of the Philippine Constitution,”153 
which bound Moro aspirations to the Constitutional framework as it existed then.154 
Article 153 further states that the Final Agreement constitutes the full 
implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, and supercedes all communications “not 
referred to or embodied in this Agreement.”155 
The Final Agreement proposed a phased implementing structure that is 
detailed in Parts II and III of the Agreement. Part I provides a general overview of 
the agreement and broadly timetabled its implementation. Phase 1 would cover a 
three year period, during which time the key organs of the new autonomous region 
would be established.156 Phase 2 would consist of a legislative process and a regional 
plebiscite to confirm the territorial remit of the ARMM.157 Aside from the relatively 
broad timetables for the completion of legislative and procedural tasks, Part I of the 
Final Agreement is low on precision, but high on obligation. It set out a clear 
roadmap of the transitional period, summarising the crucial aspects of the peace 
settlement and the legislative means to achieve them. 
Part II elaborates on the three year Transitional Period, and the way in which 
Phase 1 was to be implemented. A Special Zone of Peace and Development in the 
Southern Philippines (SZOPAD) was to channel public and private investment into 
the region “to spur economic activities and uplift the conditions of the people 
therein.”158 A Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) 
was tasked with monitoring and promoting “development efforts in the area, 
including the attraction of foreign investment, specially [sic] from OIC countries and 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).”159 Article 18 further 
expounds upon the role of the SPCPD, charging it with improving peace and order in 
the new autonomous region with particular attention to the most depressed areas of 
Mindanao. To this end, the SPCPD is conferred with extensive powers over existing 
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agencies already “engaged in peace and development activities in the area.”160 
Article 18 also allowed for the expansion of the powers under the SPCPD’s remit by 
the President, and the creation of “such offices or instrumentalities,” as was 
necessary “for the effective implementation of its mandate.”161 The SPCPD was to be 
assisted by an advisory council and a Consultative Assembly.162 The Consultative 
Assembly was to serve primarily as a “forum for consultation and ventilation of 
issues and concerns,” but was also granted vague policy formulation and 
development regulation roles under the Agreement.163 Both the Consultative 
Assembly and the SPCPD would serve three year terms that would “coincide with 
the three-year term of office of the officials of the ARMM elected in 1996.”164 
The provisions establishing the major organs of the new autonomous region 
exhibited a high degree of precision with regard to their composition, their mandate 
and their competences. However, the means by which these organs were to achieve 
these objectives were not so clearly defined. The SPCPD and Consultative 
Assembly’s roles were to promote development projects in the autonomous region by 
coordinating a number of organisations that were already engaged in development 
activities prior to the Final Agreement.165 How these new organs were going to 
fundamentally alter the socio-economic issues plaguing Mindanao was not explained 
by the Final Agreement.166 Furthermore, funding for the operation of the SPCPD and 
the Assembly was to be sourced directly from the Office of the President and 
Congress.167 The absence of an independent operating budget thus undermined the 
extent to which the Final Agreement bestowed genuine autonomy on the Moro 
people. 
Articles 19 and 20 addressed the integration of MNLF into the Philippine 
National Police (PNP) and the AFP. 1,500 places were made available for MNLF 
combatants in the PNP, with a further 250 places available in special or auxiliary 
services.168 5,750 MNLF were to be absorbed into the AFP, with another 250 to be 
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absorbed by the auxiliary services.169 The Agreement further obligated the 
government to exert the “utmost efforts” in integrating the maximum number of the 
remaining MNLF forces into the ARMM’s Special Regional Security Force 
(SRSF).170 While these displayed some precision, they were not so clear on the ex-
combatants who were deemed surplus to the AFP, PNP, or SRSF. The Agreement 
envisioned a vague socioeconomic, cultural and educational program for 
demobilized combatants, with the ultimate aim of preparing them for alternative 
livelihoods.171  However, the programme seemed implicitly linked to the broader 
development projects intended under the SPCPD and its assortment of existing 
organisations, which had failed to bring prosperity and development to Mindanao 
prior to the Final Agreement. The Agreement’s text was not clear as to how the 
outcome would be different on this occasion. This was indicative of a broader trend 
in the Final Agreement: the good faith of its signatories afforded enough precision to 
the aspects that they believed would go to plan, but failed to sufficiently provide in 
the event that they did not. Any issues on reintegration that the Agreement failed to 
address were made subject to the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP,172 
thereby depriving the Moro of their autonomy should things go awry. 
Part III of the Agreement represented the second phase of its implementation, 
which would take place after the amendment of the existing ARMM was ratified by 
the people in the affected areas in a plebiscite. Part III, Section A details the 
executive, legislative and administrative organs of the new autonomous region. 
Executive power was vested in the head of the government of the autonomous 
region, elected by direct vote of the people.173 A Vice Head would be elected in the 
same manner. Three Deputies, appointed by the Head, completed the Executive 
Council of the autonomous region.174 Legislative power was vested in the Legislative 
Assembly, which was to be comprised of 3 members from each of the districts that 
opt into the region.175 The Assembly was granted legislative authority in all areas, 
except foreign affairs, national defense and security, fiscal and monetary policy and 
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citizenship, which were retained by the central government.176 Under the Agreement, 
the Assembly had power to dictate the functions, responsibilities and structure of the 
autonomous region’s administrative organs, and to adopt its own rules of 
procedure.177 Several other provisions exhibited high precision and high obligation in 
this regard, providing for a parliamentary quorum and penalties with regard to 
absenteeism.178 The legislative process was explicitly detailed under Articles 51 and 
52. 
The latter articles of Part III, Section A clarified the Moro peoples’ rights to 
representation and participation in the national government and all its organs of state, 
including the national assembly, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.179 
While these articles exhibited a moderate degree of precision and elaborated 
somewhat on the unspecified relationship between the regional and federal 
governments, they remained low on obligation. The provisions for Moro 
representation in the national government were merely phrased as items on the policy 
agenda of the national government, and they recall the central government’s 
previously unsuccessful methods of implementing agreements unilaterally and 
attempting to integrate Moro peoples into existing, and majority Filipino, state 
structures. 
Part III, Section C elaborated on an integrated system of education for the 
Philippine archipelago and ultimately recognized the Moro peoples’ right to their 
own educational and cultural values. The Agreement envisioned a regional 
educational system that would promote both Filipino and Islamic “ideals and 
aspirations,” producing “patriotic citizens, conscious of their Filipino and Islamic 
values and Islamic cultural heritage under the aegis of a just and equitable 
society.”180 As a result, the curriculum under the regional educational system was far 
from revolutionary, nor was it overtly Islamic on paper. For the most part, these 
provisions assumed that the national educational system—which had historically 
been based on Christian morality and Western values—remained a superior model, 
and that any arrangement specific to the Moro people should be construed 
(somewhat restrictively) within this system. Article 101 only permitted the gradual 
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introduction of Islamic values into the curriculum after the conclusion of “research 
and studies” as to its effect on education,181 thus further limiting the educational 
autonomy of the regional government.  
Though the educational autonomy granted to the Moro people under the Final 
Agreement was far from revolutionary in practice, it was unprecedented in terms of 
Philippine policy, and is thus hugely symbolic. The Final Agreement “recognizes the 
Muslims’ right to difference and to self-government where, in the past, policies of 
assimilation and subjugation denied even recognition of a difference from Christian 
Filipinos.”182 While educational autonomy remained subject to the minimum 
requirements and standards imposed by a majority Filipino government,183 the Final 
Agreement explicitly recognized the Moro minority and their right to assert their 
identity within a heterogeneous society. “In doing so,” Bertrand contends, “it 
partially removes the recurring threat to the Muslim way of life, which had 
repeatedly been under attack by past policies of Christianization, immigration of 
Christians and repressive policies of the government.”184 
Part III, Section D set out the economic and financial system of the 
Autonomous region. The Regional Government could enact its own system of 
taxation; contract loans, foreign and domestic; and had the right “to formulate 
economic and financial policies and implement economic and financial programs, 
taking into account national laws and policies.”185 In practice however, the 
Autonomous Government remained almost totally dependent on the national 
government for revenue. Under Article 145, the central government pledged to 
provide “a sufficient amount… for infrastructure projects” for an unspecified period 
of time.186 The vague and imprecise wording of this provision effectively left the 
financing of the autonomous region to the whim and fancies of the Manila-based 
government. Such handouts, “unpredictable in amount and timing,” were unlikely to 
pave the way for true autonomy for the Moro people.187 While Section D also 
granted residents of the Autonomous Region “preferential rights over the 
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exploration, development and utilization of natural resources” within the territory,188 
it failed to specify a more elaborate wealth-sharing arrangement that might have 
assured their financial self-sufficiency. 
In many ways, the Final Agreement represented a turning point in the Moro 
conflict, and the beginning of the end of an era in the Bangsamoro peace process. 20 
years after Tripoli, the Final Agreement managed to assimilate the MNLF into the 
Philippine state. Pursuant to the Agreement, Misuari became Governor of the 
ARMM “and pledged to defend the Constitution of the Republic and promulgate its 
laws.”189 A total of of 7,250 MNLF combatants—at least half of whatever force 
strength it had—were integrated into the AFP and PNP as result of the Agreement’s 
confidence building measures, prompting one leading commentator to conclude “that 
the MNLF has been substantially defanged.”190 
However, problems with implementation proved, once more, “that there was 
nothing ‘final’ in the Final Peace Agreement: it was just a prelude to more detours on 
the rocky road ahead.”191 Indeed, less than a month after its signature, the 
compromise entailed by the agreement was proving too good to be true. The 
presidential decree initiating Phase I of the Agreement (Executive Order 371) was 
guilty of notable omissions and imprecisions, failing to specifically allocate funds for 
the transitional organs and displaying a lesser degree of precision than the agreement 
that preceded it.192 As a result, the key institutions of the autonomous region—the 
SPCPD and the Consultative Assembly—were created in an environment that 
restricted their overall impact and made them powerless: “[t]hey had very limited 
funding, no police powers, no control over national projects and programmes that 
were supposed to be within their remit…,”193 and no function other than to make 
recommendations to the Office of the President. This is unsurprising, given how 
ambiguous the SPCPD’s brief remained under the agreement’s text. When the 
SPCPD failed to produce tangible benefits for Mindanao society, public support for 
the Final Agreement began to wane.194 Furthermore, the ARMM bureaucracy was 
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not a good example of how non-Muslim peoples could benefit under MNLF 
leadership, nor did it showcase the transitional institutions in their best light.195 When 
Misuari became Governor of the ARMM, it was already “tainted by charges of 
corruption, internal wrangling and waste.”196 The failure to involve non-Muslims in 
the negotiating and drafting of the institutions envisioned under the Final Agreement 
meant that they received little support from the various minority groups that 
inhabited the region.197 As an agreement between the government and any single 
rebel group, the Final Agreement was “exclusive by definition and was always 
vulnerable to falling short of meeting the disparate aspirations not just of the other 
armed Moro groups but also of those of the unrepresented civil society 
organisations.”198 The Philippine experience thus bears the same lessons relevant to 
conflict zones the world over: in order for a more comprehensive peace to be 
achieved and the causes of conflict abated, all the relevant stakeholders must be a 
party to the agreement.199 The failure to include Christians and Lumads in the 
negotiation and administration of the autonomous institutions isolated them from the 
benefits of that process, and eroded support for the transitional structures from the 
get-go. 
 Autonomy was once more pushed to the forefront of the Final Agreement as a 
cure-all formula for the conflict in Mindanao, but this proved to be to the detriment 
of the other factors that fuelled the conflict. Though the Final Agreement bestowed 
autonomous institutions and competences that aped the political make-up of the 
central Philippine state, the correlation between these institutions and the causes of 
the conflict was so weak that they did little to quell Moro discontent in Mindanao. 
Even when these measures proved effective, they remained irrelevant. For example, 
the agreement focused on developing Mindanao socio-economically, but these 
measures failed to address the real causes for chronic underdevelopment in 
Mindanao: systematic policies of discrimination that were tied to issues of land 
ownership. Though the Agreement’s provisions on socio-economic development 
received an eager response from the international community,200 particularly the OIC 
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and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,201 they failed to achieve the result 
that the agreement anticipated. Without addressing the broader systematic and 
institutionalised reasons for Mindanao’s impoverishment and underdevelopment, 
these measures would fail to make a lasting improvement in the region, despite the 
good will displayed by willing donors.  
 The Final Agreement is high on precision and medium-high on obligation, 
bearing the potential for a broad range of autonomous organs of governance. 
However, the legislation charged with implementing the initial phases of the 
agreement—Executive Order 371—did not adopt as high a degree of legalization as 
the agreement itself did. These mistakes could have been avoided had the 
implementation of the Final Agreement not been so dependent on the domestic 
legislative process, unlikely as the Philippine state was to delegate its sovereignty to 
a third party actor. Unfortunately, the Final Agreement, like its predecessor, was 
notably low on delegation—providing for the support and assistance of the OIC and 
ASEAN, but not going far enough to steer the state away from a unilateral process. 
As the process progressed, dissatisfaction grew within the MNLF over their 
perceived marginalisation from the implementation of the agreement. They accused 
the state of implementing the agreement “unilaterally without completely and 
satisfactorily implementing the important socio-economic development requirements 
of the process.”202 The Final Agreement did not appear to have been legalized to the 
extent that such an outcome could have been prevented. 
 As a result, ‘autonomy’ became something of a dirty word in Muslim 
Mindanao: an empty political formula that had “failed to deliver genuine political 
power, representation, or economic development.”203 Instead, the failings of the Final 
Agreement highlighted the need to focus attention on the root causes of the 
Mindanao conflict: the relationship between Christians, Muslims and other minority 
peoples; and land ownership. Despite a much publicized consultation process, the 
discussions that informed the Final Agreement “were largely limited to the 
negotiating parties, except for a few token efforts to communicate with civil society 
organisations.”204 In this guise, the Agreement could not achieve the myriad of 
aspirations tangled up in the ethnic politics of Mindanao. 
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 For the MNLF, the Final Agreement swept away the little political power and 
military will that it possessed prior to the negotiations. Buendia claimed, somewhat 
prematurely, that following the Final Agreement and their integration into Philippine 
government and society, the MNLF liberationists had “re-constituted their identity as 
Filipino-Muslim of the pre-1971 period.”205 However, to claim that the flawed Final 
Agreement had successfully stifled the Moro call to nation is to ignore the re-
emergence and reinvigorated fervour of the Moro cause under the MILF, almost 
entirely because of the dissatisfaction with that agreement. Shortly after the Final 
Agreement was signed, the MILF also entered into negotiations with the state with a 
view to securing a better compromise than their MNLF counterparts—an opportunity 
made possible by the shortcomings of the Final Agreement. 
 
5. III. C. THE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON THE BANGSAMORO (2014) 
 Throughout the late-nineties, the MNLF continued to decline in military and 
political power, while the MILF’s popularity grew in tandem with criticism of the 
Final Agreement. Because the MILF was not associated with either of the Tripoli or 
the Final Agreement, its standing among Muslims was boosted when the autonomous 
institutions promised under their terms failed to materialize.206 In an environment 
where Misuari, the MNLF, the ARMM and the implementation of the Final 
Agreement were beginning to unravel, the MILF emerged as the new standard bearer 
of Moro aspirations.207 By virtue of a stop-start process of peace-making, the Moro 
people became hopeful that “a better, and more effective agreement” than the 1996 
settlement could be achieved.208 However, many obstacles remained on the path to 
peace. Negotiations were often threatened by “lawless elements” and rogue 
commanders that continued to operate within the MILF’s ranks.209 Ceasefire 
violations were common, and the lack of perceivable progress eventually led to an 
“all-out war” against MILF forces in March 2000.210 Conflict again interrupted the 
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state-MILF peace process in 2003 and 2008.211 Santos Jr claims that the survival of 
the peaceful dialogue, despite outright conflict between the belligerents, “is a 
testament to its secure place in the whole peace process,” and further evidences the 
MILF’s “sincerity in the negotiations by persisting in its strategic (not just tactical) 
decision to give peace a maximum chance.”212 
The first milestone on the road to a more comprehensive peace was the 
Agreement for the General Cessation of Hostilities (AGCH) in 1997. The agreement 
became a point of reference for all subsequent accords between the state and the 
MILF, and remained “the principal ceasefire monitoring mechanism” throughout the 
fighting that interspersed negotiations up until 2014.213 Following exploratory talks 
in 2003, the parties agreed to a tentative framework for negotiations, centred on 
security, rehabilitation and ancestral domain.214 Significant progress had been made 
with regard to the first two aspects when renewed fighting once more interrupted the 
process in February 2003.215 When the parties did return to the negotiating table, the 
issue of ancestral domain—which would prove the most difficult topic—had yet to 
be agreed upon.216  
It was not until 2008 that both the state and the MILF reached consensus on 
the territorial scope of the homeland for the Moro people – the Bangsamoro. The 
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) set out the 
parameters for a final peace agreement, and envisioned extensive powers and 
territory for a future autonomous region. Most significantly, the text provided for an 
“associative relationship” between the autonomous area and the state, suggesting the 
status of “almost-equals.”217  
However, a subsequent Supreme Court judgment struck the MOA-AD down 
for granting the proposed autonomous area “the status of an associated state, or, at 
any rate, a status closely approximating it,”218 in violation of the unitary state 
enshrined under the Philippine constitution. The Supreme Court judgment destroyed 
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much of the progress embodied in the MOA-AD, so much so that when negotiations 
began to gather pace in 2012, the MILF accepted a risky territorial formula that 
would decide the scope of the Bangsamoro territory from scratch. Under the 
Philippine Constitution, all of the suggested provinces of a new Bangsamoro would 
have to vote for inclusion in the region by plebiscite, including the provinces within 
the core territory of the existing ARMM. Such a gambit ran the risk of losing 
territory that the Moro had fought for over the course of 40 years. However, the 
potential for expansion of that territory was much greater under this arrangement, 
and it enabled the MILF to claim that they had not surrendered any territory.219 
 As a direct result of this significant concession, the parties were able to agree 
upon the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) on October 15, 2012, 
which became the anchor agreement for the ensuing CAB and a basis for the basic 
law that would govern the Bangsamoro. The FAB sketched out—in general terms—
the institutional and procedural necessities of “a genuinely autonomous region in 
Muslim-majority Mindanao... with more powers, more territory and more control 
over resources,” that would be able to “raise its own revenues and have its own 
police and judiciary.”220 Supplementary annexes addressing, and precisely detailing, 
the most contentious issues (transitional arrangements and modalities, revenue 
generation and wealth sharing, power sharing and normalization) were negotiated 
over the next 17 months. In March 2014, the CAB, representing the totality of the 
FAB and its annexes, was finally signed by the MILF and the Philippine government. 
The FAB begins with an acknowledgement that the existing political situation 
in Mindanao is unacceptable, and proposes radical institutional change as an 
alternative. The Bangsamoro is to be governed by a political system based on the 
norms of most liberal western democracies, including democratic participation, 
ministerial government, a multi-party political system and accountability for all 
political officers. Legislative power is vested in a Bangsamoro Assembly, composed 
of at least 50 members, with the finer details of election and term of office to be 
defined by the Bangsamoro Basic Law.221 The Bangsamoro government will be 
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headed by a Chief Executive, which will exercise executive authority on its behalf.222 
The Annex on Power-Sharing also precisely provides for the tabling of a vote of no 
confidence and the functioning of government in the absence of the Chief 
Executive.223 
The FAB defines the relationship of the central government and the 
Bangsamoro government as “asymmetric.”224 The International Crisis Group deems 
this definition crucial, as it steers clear of the language that led to the collapse of the 
MOA-AD.225 On that occasion, the term “associative” was perceived to imply “a 
relationship between two sovereign entities, or transitory phase for an entity that 
would later become independent.”226 However, the CAB’s Annex on Power Sharing 
distinguishes asymmetry from association, defining asymmetric as “reflective of the 
recognition of the Bangsamoro identity and their aspiration for self-governance.”227 
It is thus implied that the asymmetric relationship acknowledges the Moro identity 
within the confines of the Philippine nation-state, and not as a stepping stone on the 
road to independence. This is evident from the broad definition of the Moro people  
Under the FAB, both Moro and indigenous peoples have the right to identify 
as “[t]hose who at the time of conquest and colonization were considered natives or 
original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and its adjacent islands… 
and their descendants….”228 The right of indigenous peoples to identify as 
Bangsamoro is explicitly acknowledged by the agreement.229 Indeed, the inclusivity 
of the Bangsamoro is enshrined under the provisions of the CAB. The Annex on 
Power Sharing provides that representation in the assembly shall reflect the diversity 
of the Bangsamoro, thereby taking non-Moro communities, women and settler 
communities into account.230 To this end, a council of leaders—chaired by a Chief 
Minister and comprised of representatives of the non-Moro and settler communities, 
women and other sectors—is envisioned under the Annex on Power Sharing.231 
Part II of the FAB states that there will be a Bangsamoro Basic Law, which 
will govern the Moro homeland. The Basic Law will be drafted by a Transition 
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Commission, which is explicitly detailed and mandated to serve as “the central 
transitional mechanism for the MILF’s participation in the joint tasks required under 
the FAB.”232 The Transition Commission would propose the Basic Law to the 
President of the Republic, who would initiate it in the domestic legislative process.233 
Once enacted by Congress, the basic law would be made subject to public plebiscite 
within the constituencies that opt-in to the Bangsamoro territory.234 Upon 
ratification, the Basic Law would apply throughout the Bangsamoro, providing for 
the creation of a provisional Bangsamoro government (the Bangsamoro Transition 
Authority) and the abolition of the existing ARMM. 
Part III of the FAB provides for the exclusive, concurrent and shared powers 
of both the central and Bangsamoro governments, the particulars of which are set out 
in the Annex on Power Sharing. Under Part III, Article 2 of the FAB, the Central 
Government reserves several powers, most notably with regard to defense and 
external security, foreign policy, monetary policy, and the common market and 
global trade. Both the Central and Bangsamoro governments exercise concurrent 
powers in the Bangsamoro territory on issues of practical or mutual importance. 
These powers include quarantine, human rights protection, the penal system and the 
relationship of the Sharia justice system to the central Supreme Court.235 Perhaps 
most notably, both governments will exercise concurrent powers with regard to land 
registration, government funding for infrastructure and customs and tariff laws—all 
of which are factors that had previously rendered Mindanao underdeveloped and thus 
created conditions conducive to conflict.236 Granting the Moro people autonomy to 
address these issues, and coupling that empowerment with the practicality of 
government funding, is a big step towards pacifying the factors that had previously 
bred conflict in the region.  
The Annexes’ 58 sections on the exclusive powers of the Bangsamoro 
government are exhaustive, and grant the Bangsamoro government competences in 
key areas, including trade, industry investment, labour, budgeting, education, culture 
and language, customary laws, the justice system, and natural resources.237 The 
Annex on Power Sharing also entrusts the Bangsamoro government with the 
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protection of the rights of indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro in accordance with 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.238 The issue of 
land management, land distribution and land reclassification is also granted to the 
Bangsamoro government—an unprecedented acknowledgement of an issue that has 
been at the core of conflict in Mindanao for centuries and a step towards lasting 
peace in the region.239 
Further to the powers conferred in the Annex on Power Sharing, Part III of 
the FAB also grants the Bangsamoro government competence over the Sharia justice 
system, its formal institutionalization and the expansion of its jurisdiction within the 
Bangsamoro.240 The supremacy of the Sharia legal system shall only apply to 
Muslims however,241 though the agreement does not define who ‘Muslims’ are for 
this purpose—does this include practicing religious Muslims or all of those who 
come from a traditionally Muslim ethnic group? The rights and traditions of 
indigenous peoples must also influence the formation of the system of justice 
available in the Bangsamoro.242 The FAB thus provides for the prescription of 
alternative dispute resolution systems,243 including “indigenous processes,” 
customary laws and historical and community traditions.244 
The FAB recognizes that “wealth creation (or revenue operation and 
sourcing) is important for the operation of the Bangsamoro.”245 This addresses the 
failure to provide independent funding for the Bangsamoro’s predecessor, the 
ARMM, and appears to be an implicit acknowledgement of the static institution’s 
resulting redundancy. Despite this, the content of the FAB’s provisions on revenue 
generation are remarkably similar to those of the 1996 Final Agreement. The 
Bangsamoro is endowed with the power “to create its own sources of revenues and to 
levy taxes,” and “to receive grants and donations from domestic and foreign 
sources,” in the same way that the Final Agreement empowered the ARMM.246 
However, the key distinction on this occasion is the emphasis on bilateral 
implementation. Previous agreements had allowed the government to implement 
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agreements on its own terms and at its own pace, thus reducing the ARMM to a body 
dependent on unpredictable grants and handouts. The CAB, however, commits to 
making the government and MILF co-dependent partners in peacebuilding, providing 
for an intergovernmental fiscal policy board “to address revenue imbalances and 
fluctuations in regional financial needs.”247 Such a forum allows for periodic review 
of the development needs of the Bangsamoro,248 and provides a sustainable 
alternative to conflict in the event of a dispute. The central government also commits 
to “extending assistance to the Bangsamoro Government in the matter of tax 
administration and fiscal management,” including the provision of capacity building 
and training programs.249 Ideally, this practical support should encourage the 
independent development of an autonomous Bangsamoro region, rather than another 
mismanaged and dependent successor to the ARMM. To this end, the FAB provides 
for a regular block grant from the central government to the Bangsamoro 
government,250 which will be enshrined under the Basic Law.251 This notable 
provision attempts to avoid the unpredictable and sporadic funding that the ARMM 
received, which only reinforced Moro dependency as opposed to autonomy.  
The provisions on taxing powers, as set out in the Annex on Revenue 
Generation and Wealth Sharing, are high on precision—even more so than the 1996 
Final Agreement. The Annex even details the distribution of central government 
taxes collected in the Bangsamoro territory, with 25% being retained by the central 
government and the remaining 75% accruing to the Bangsamoro government.252 
Under Part II, extensive powers are devolved to the Bangsamoro government, 
including “control over existing government-owned and controlled corporations and 
financial institutions operating exclusively in the Bangsamoro territory.”253 
Government income derived from the operation of these corporations shall be 
returned to the Bangsamoro government.254 Interestingly, the participation of the 
Bangsamoro government in the operations of these corporations will be determined 
by the intergovernmental fiscal policy board, and the share of the Bangsamoro 
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government in the income of these corporations will be calculated accordingly.255 
Part IV of the FAB also addresses the issue of wealth sharing with regard to 
the natural resources of the Bangsamoro region. Article 4 envisions “a just and 
equitable share in the revenues generated through the exploration, development or 
utilization of natural resources.”256 The Bangsamoro government is entitled to 100% 
of all non-metallic minerals within the territory, 75% of all metallic minerals, and 
50% of all fossil fuels and uranium, with the remainder to be retained by the central 
government.257 The Bangsamoro and central government would jointly exercise the 
power to grant exploration and development rights to fossil fuels, “giving 
preferential rights to qualified citizens who are bona fide inhabitants of the 
Bangsamoro.”258 The CAB is much more precise than its predecessors on this issue, 
and the provision of precise wealth-sharing formulae is a first in the protracted 
Bangsamoro peace process.  
Part V of the FAB defines the territorial scope of the Bangsamoro, which 
encompasses the existing geographical area of the ARMM, the municipalities that 
voted for inclusion in the ARMM in a 2001 plebiscite, the cities of Cotabato and 
Isabela, and any other contiguous land unit where the local government—or at least 
10% of the qualified voters in the area—wish to be included in the Bangsamoro.259 
This last aspect is crucial as it allows any contiguous land unit to “opt-in” to the 
Bangsamoro territory at any time, so long as the majority of the residents therein 
approve the decision by plebiscite.260 The territorial scope of the Bangsamoro has yet 
to be confirmed by popular plebiscite,261 and thus runs the risk of reducing the 
Bangsamoro to a smaller tract than it appears on paper. On the other hand, the 
formula envisioned under the CAB will allow the largest Moro constituency ever 
recognized by the Philippine state to express its demand for an ancestral Moro 
territory and self-governing polity. Though difficulties with implementation have 
thus far prevented this, the CAB provides a commendable legal process for 
establishing a sustainable autonomous unit. 
Part VI of the FAB enumerates the basic rights of citizens of the Bangsamoro 
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“as directly enforceable law.”262 This includes many of the norms of most liberal 
democracies, including the right to freedom of expression, belief, speech, the right to 
privacy and the right to equal opportunity and non-discrimination. The FAB provides 
that “[v]ested property rights shall be recognized and respected,”263 and proceeds to 
acknowledge the “unjust dispossession” of the Bangsamoro of “their territorial and 
proprietary rights.” The acknowledgment of previous injustices against the Moro is 
very significant. Not only does this provision once more address the contentious 
issue of land, it also provides a legal basis for the Moro people to seek restitution, 
and a practical means to further their own development. Under the Annex on 
Normalization,264 a Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission is to 
undertake a study in the field of transitional justice, and “produce a set of 
recommendations on the appropriate mechanisms to address legitimate grievances of 
the Bangsamoro people, correct historical injustices, and address human rights 
violations and marginalization through land dispossession….”265 In theory, the 
mechanisms that result from this study may yet serve as a legal basis for the Moros 
to assert their ancestral rights, though the absence of more precise provisions renders 
this outcome uncertain. It is a certainty, however, that if the issue of land is not 
resolved by this means or another, the sustainability of the CAB is in jeopardy.266 
Elsewhere, Part VI continues in a similar vein of addressing the shortcomings 
of previous agreements vis-à-vis indigenous peoples’ rights. Article 3 explicitly 
provides for their protection,267 which is supplemented by the many provisions 
throughout the Annex on Power Sharing that provide for the protection of the rights 
of indigenous peoples, their customary rights and their traditions. In this manner, the 
CAB uses legal protections to assuage the concerns of minority groups, and ensure 
their participation in new political structures. 
Under Part VII of the FAB, a third-party monitoring team is tasked with 
monitoring the implementation of the agreement and all of its annexes.268  The team 
is to furnish the parties and the Malaysian facilitator with a report on the progress of 
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the agreement’s implementation.269 However, the parties are not bound by the team’s 
recommendations in this regard. Instead, the third-party monitoring team relies upon 
the good will and good faith of the parties towards the peace process, which is 
perhaps guaranteed by the high-precision evident throughout the rest of the CAB. 
Section VIII of the FAB addresses the ‘Normalization’ of post-conflict 
Mindanao, and the need for both parties to work together to secure “peace on the 
ground.”270 To this end, the FAB establishes a Joint Normalization Committee to 
oversee the various normalization bodies,271 including the Joint Peace and Security 
Committee (which would co-ordinate the security component of the normalization 
process)272 and the Joint Peace and Security Teams (units comprised of the various 
ex-combatants, charged with maintaining peace, order and stability in certain 
areas).273 These various bodies are mandated with a medium-high degree of precision 
throughout the Annex on Normalization,274 though it is envisioned that these 
transitional mechanisms will cease to exist once a Bangsamoro police force becomes 
operational.275 An impartial and accountable Independent Commission on Policing is 
tasked with recommending “appropriate policing” in this regard.276 The FAB also 
laid out a precise consultative role for the MILF in the appointment, employment and 
deployment of existing police forces in the Bangsamoro.277 As part of a peacetime 
society, former MILF combatants would be decommissioned and transitioned to 
“productive civilian life.”278 In contrast to previous agreements that addressed this 
issue, the CAB provides for the socio-economic rehabilitation and development of 
these former combatants, proposing “a comprehensive needs assessment” of MILF 
members and their communities.279  
The transferability of successful peacebuilding mechanisms across peace 
processes is also highlighted by the CAB’s normalization provisions. The influence 
of the Good Friday Agreement’s provisions on a professional, impartial, and 
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accountable police force is evident in the values that the CAB prescribes to guide its 
Independent Commission on Policing.280 An independent commission was also 
established to oversee the disarmament of combatants and decommissioning of 
weapons in Northern Ireland.281 Under the CAB, a similarly independent 
decommissioning body is established to “[p]lan, design and implement techniques 
and technologies for weapons collection or retrieval, transport, and storage and 
putting weapons beyond use,”282 a phrase that echoes the commitments of the parties 
to the peace process in Northern Ireland. This example of ‘borrowing’ successful 
provisions from another peace processes supports one of the principle arguments 
underpinning this thesis: that attention to successful aspects of agreement design can 
inform potential solutions in different contexts and settings. 
The need to “intensify development efforts” in the Bangsamoro is also 
recognized in the FAB, which refers to the need for multi-donor financial support in 
the same way that that the 1976 and 1996 agreements had done.283 On this occasion, 
however, development efforts are much more precisely detailed under Part G of the 
Annex on Normalization, which refers particularly to the need for programmes that 
reinforce social cohesion and the unity of communities, and the specific needs of 
indigenous peoples, and the needs of decommissioned women auxiliary forces from 
the MILF.284 A Trust Fund is envisioned to channel multi-donor investment towards 
priority sectors of Bangsamoro society with efficiency, accountability and 
transparency.285 The government further pledges to fund the normalization 
process.286 While low on precision with regard to how this funding might be 
distributed or indeed, generated, this provision is high on obligation, and its inclusion 
is wholly practical when one consider how funding issues ultimately sunk the 
ARMM.  
 The FAB’s provisions on normalization also address the AFP’s presence in 
Mindanao, and provide for the gradual withdrawal of the AFP from the Mindanao 
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region, “consistent with a normal and peaceful life….”287 The possible influence of 
the British experience in Northern Ireland is again evident here, as the text is very 
similar on issues such as the reduction of the numbers and role of the Armed Forces 
and the removal of security installations.288 Crucially, the Annex on Normalization, 
together with Article 8 of the FAB’s provisions on normalization, addresses the need 
for both groups to disarm private armed groups,289 “using diverse and appropriate 
approaches or methodologies….”290 These groups had been responsible for the 
flaring of tensions throughout Mindanao’s long road to peace, and on several 
occasions, had brought the peace process to the brink of collapse. The inclusion of 
these provisions is a valuable countermeasure against potential spoilers, and the 
derailing of a dearly bought agreement.  
 Finally, the FAB concludes with a vow that this agreement will not be 
implemented unilaterally.291 This provision is not merely a recognition of previous 
mistakes, nor a political expression of good will. The body of text and annexes that 
comprise the CAB speak to the value of partnership between the Philippine state and 
the MILF, and give effect to a range of political mechanisms that necessitate their 
cooperation. The intergovernmental fiscal policy board, the intergovernmental 
Relations body, the Transition Commission, the Joint Normalization Committee, the 
Joint Peace and Security Committee and the Joint Peace and Security Teams 
established under the process of normalization, are all central to the bilateral 
implementation of the CAB and the establishment of good governance in the 
Bangsamoro. These bodies also serve as the primary forum for the resolution of 
disputes with regard to the specific mandate of each body. Disputes are only referred 
to the peace panels if they cannot be resolved at this level, allowing each specialized 
problem to be compartmentalized and addressed bilaterally, without undermining the 
overall peace process. The provision of, and emphasis on, this dispute resolution 
aspect evidences a higher degree of precision than that of previous agreements. 
 Even where precision is not so evident, however, the emphasis remains on 
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bilateralism. Though not expressly detailed, a consultative role for the MILF in 
establishing police measures in the Bangsamoro gives the MILF a cooperative role in 
a task that will largely be undertaken by the government. Though it is not explicitly 
identified who will carry out the special socio-economic development programmes in 
the Bangsamoro, the parties’ bilateral commitment to intensify development efforts 
in the region imply that they will undertake this task together. The Central 
government’s commitment to extending capacity building and training programmes 
with regard to fiscal management, and the role of the Transition Commission in 
providing for fund transfers to the Bangsamoro government from the Central 
government, is further evidence in this regard. The emphasis is no longer on 
unilaterally granting autonomy to the Moro people—a precedent which had been 
established by the Tripoli Agreement and inadequately achieved by the Final 
Agreement—but on bilaterally establishing the institutions through which the Moro 
can one day exert their own agency.   
 This move away from unilateral implementation is indicative of an 
overarching shift in the way that the parties’ perceived the conflict. Autonomy could 
not serve as a sustainable solution to the Moro problem unless it granted the Moro 
the power to grapple with the factors that fueled conflict in their homeland for some 
40 years. Thus, throughout the CAB, the emphasis is no longer on the autonomous 
political institutions—similar incarnations of which had been espoused in the Final 
Agreement, with little practical effect—but rather, on the contentious issues that 
underpinned the conflict. Land ownership, ancestral domain, wealth sharing, the 
ownership of natural resources, the rights of indigenous and minority peoples and 
their relationship with the Moro people: these issues had not been adequately 
addressed prior to the CAB, and this shortcoming was central to the downfall of 
previous agreements. In particular, the failure to consider the interests of minority 
groups in the negotiations leading up to the Final Agreement meant that the 
agreement came into being with its popular support already limited. With the CAB, 
the emphasis was placed on achieving a truly comprehensive settlement that 
addresses each of the key issues with a degree of precision that is notably more 
sophisticated than any of the agreement’s predecessors. The rights of indigenous 
peoples are expressly guaranteed under the Agreement, and their choice to opt-in or 
out of the Moro identity is respected. Provision is made for the establishment of 
alternative dispute resolution systems, should indigenous peoples and Christians not 
 105  
wish to obey Sharia law, and their customary rights and traditions will be respected. 
Crucially, the vested property rights of all Bangsamoro citizens, including 
indigenous and Christian peoples, and the legitimate grievances of the Moro people 
are both recognized and respected. The CAB also lays the basis for the Moro to 
assert their ancestral rights through restitution and transitional justice procedures.  
Ultimately, the CAB is high on precision and high on obligation when 
compared to any of its predecessors. Granted, many of the institutions and features 
envisioned under the CAB are not entirely novel or creative departures from those 
that came before. Autonomous executive and legislative organs, reformed security 
forces, and generous economic provisions had been included in previous agreements, 
but they did not produce a sustainable peace. This suggests that the degree of 
precision employed in crafting the CAB has had a significant impact on sustaining 
the relevant parties’ consensus, thereby encouraging expectations that this agreement 
may finally bring about peace in Mindanao. Not only have the omissions and failings 
of previous agreements been addressed in the CAB: they have been considered in 
detail. This degree of precision may yet prove responsible for realizing the potential 
that many of these key institutions bore under the Tripoli and Final Agreements.  
Drafting the CAB with precision has further sustained the parties’ consensus 
by limiting the scope for unilateralism. State-driven implementation of the Tripoli 
and Final Agreements led to disputes over the implementation of the agreements, a 
return to entrenched positions despite the consensus embodied on paper, and, in the 
absence of adequate dispute resolution systems, the eventual collapse of the peace 
process. The level of detail prescribed in the CAB severely restricts the scope for 
state unilateralism, creating bipartisan mechanisms charged with some of the most 
sensitive details of the peace process, including disarming, decommissioning, 
restructuring the police force, maintaining peace and security during the transitional 
phase, and drafting a basic law for application after it. Each of these bodies also 
serve as the primary forum for the resolution of disputes specific to their field, before 
elevation to the parties’ peace panels. This gives the MILF a significant voice in 
every stage of the implementation process, which takes place entirely within the 
domestic legal sphere of the Philippine Republic. Precision thus ensures participation 
in the process, encourages continued dialogue between former combatants, and 
avoids the escalation of minor disputes into potential spoilers.  
For all of its precision and obligation, it is all the more notable that there is 
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not much to say on the CAB with regard to the third limb of the legalization troika: 
delegation. A third-party monitoring team is established under the CAB (as under the 
Final Agreement, though higher on precision on this occasion), though its 
recommendations to the peace panels on the implementation of the agreement are not 
binding on the parties. This is perhaps a significant setback, given that problems with 
implementation have been to the detriment of two previous agreements. Similar 
setbacks beset the Independent Commission on Policing and the Independent 
Decommissioning Body, which lack any significant enforcement mechanisms and 
exist solely to make recommendations to the peace panels.  
However, the potential damage made possible by a lack of delegation is 
mitigated by the CAB’s high-precision, which provides for bipartisan 
implementation mechanisms at every stage of the process and a radical network of 
communications for the resolution of disputes. This greatly limits the scope for 
unilateralism with regard to the Agreement. Furthermore, building peace in an 
established Republic such as the Philippines is decidedly different from building 
peace in states with little central authority or a concentration of authority in an 
unrepresentative elite (as is explored in Chapters 6 and 7). The demands of 
established domestic constituencies—such as the Moro, Christian and indigenous 
communities—“are more important in the calculations of an elected government than 
the opinions of some international experts on the peace process, development, and 
diplomacy.”292 This is an important point to remember when considering the 
respective roles that law and politics play in promoting compliance. The CAB 
empowers these political communities to an unprecedented extent, ensuring the 
relevant stakeholders’ inclusion through legal provisions that are high on precision.  
Though it would be premature to call the burgeoning process a success, the 
MILF’s participation in the legislative debate on the BBL in February 2016 is an 
encouraging sign that the conflict has shifted from the battlefield to the parliament. It 
remains to be seen whether the CAB’s text, which bears so much promise, can stand 
the test of time. History has demonstrated that low-delegation to third party actors 
and an insistence on constructing peace within the limits of the Philippine domestic 
legal system does not bode well for peace efforts in Mindanao. However, the CAB’s 
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co-operative approach to peacebuilding has sustained itself to date. Despite a fatal 
‘mis-encounter’ between state and MILF forces in January 2015 and the defeat of the 
proposed BBL in Congress in February 2016, the parties have continued to pledge 
their support to the CAB, and have renewed the mandates of several of its 
multilateral bodies to that end.293 More recently, the imposition of martial law and an 
escalating conflict with extremist militants linked to the Islamic State have made 
Mindanao an increasingly volatile region in which to build peace. Yet the stability of 
the CAB’s implementing mechanisms may yet prove strong enough to weather the 
political storm that is blowing ill in the Philippines. 
 
5. IV. CONCLUSIONS 
A striking feature of over 40 years of negotiations in Mindanao is how the 
whole process gradually inched towards a more inclusive, precise and comprehensive 
settlement. From the initial Tripoli Agreement to the Comprehensive Agreement on 
the Bangsamoro, each agreement between the militant Moro groups and the 
Philippine state marked a small, cumulative step towards peace.294 It is reasonable to 
suggest, on this basis, that the lessons learned from the shortcomings of previous 
agreements were central to the peacemakers’ ability to move the peace process 
forward. This was a process that “time and again reinvented itself when stumbling 
blocks arose,”295 necessitating legal creativity that cannot be attributed to a more 
amiable political climate alone. The international community is now eager to learn 
from the Philippine experience, so what lessons, if any, can be gleaned from this 
legal analysis? 
 Perhaps the most obvious lesson imparted by the conflict in Mindanao is the 
value of precision in designing peace agreements. Based on the Philippine 
experience alone, it is apparent that agreements that are high on the precision matrix 
encourage more stable and durable settlements that legally bind the parties to a 
greater extent than their imprecise relatives. The low-precision evident in the Tripoli 
Agreement rendered it an uncertain roadmap to peace at best. Its ambiguity with 
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regard to the key issues was ultimately not constructive: it undermined the parties’ 
tenuous consensus when these issues had to be discussed in more detail. Similarly, 
the Final Agreement, though wholly more precise than its predecessor, came apart 
due to a lack of precision in the legislation charged with implementing the 
agreement. Finer details with regard to the funding of the autonomous institutions 
and the region itself were postponed to a later date that never came to pass, and it is 
therefore unsurprising that these institutions became static and ineffective.  
The CAB was also guilty of postponing its finer details to an uncertain date in 
the future. The finer details of post-conflict society in the Bangsamoro had to be 
clarified under the Basic Law, which had yet to be drafted when the CAB was 
concluded. However, this imprecision is mitigated by the precision evident 
throughout the rest of the CAB. The bipartisan implementation bodies precisely 
prescribed under the CAB provide a means through which the parties can transition 
from short-term to long-term commitments. These bodies allow both parties to settle 
their disputes over imprecisions in the agreement within the legal limits of the peace 
process, and to clarify these provisions together as partners in peace-making. The 
parties can anticipate the outcomes due under the agreement with certainty, and 
challenge errant behaviour in established political forums. This precisely detailed 
peacebuilding infrastructure underscores the importance of legal language and legal 
instruments as a means to resolve conflict and bridge trust-deficits between estranged 
communities. 
Another important lesson one can take from Mindanao is “the value of open, 
structured and inclusive negotiations to end conflict.”296 The Philippine experience 
has charted a broad spectrum of inclusivity, from the closed negotiations that brought 
about the unilateral Tripoli Agreement, to the widely consultative negotiations that 
resulted in the bipartisan structures of the CAB.297 Agreement stability can also be 
charted on this same spectrum. The Tripoli Agreement was the product of exclusive 
negotiations between the Marcos administration and the MNLF under Nur Misuari. 
Misuari’s highly centralized leadership provided little room for input from dissenting 
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voices, thereby engendering a split in the MNLF ranks and a gradual decline in the 
MNLF’s influence on the peace process. The Final Agreement, though perhaps 
acknowledging the failures of Tripoli before it, also came under fire for its “much 
vaunted ‘consensus and consultations,’” which “were largely limited to the 
negotiating parties, except for a few token efforts to communicate with civil society 
organisations.”298 Because minority groups were not consulted during the 
negotiations of the agreement, they had little support for the institutions that resulted 
from it, which predominantly catered to the aims and aspirations of the Moro nation. 
A failure to consult any minority groups also felled the landmark MOA-AD. 
The CAB, in contrast, envisioned a homeland for the Moro people that 
expressly guaranteed the rights of indigenous and minority peoples within the 
territory. Minority peoples also had the right to (refuse to) identify themselves as 
Moro—a provision that is crucial to the minorities’ perceptions of inclusion and 
recognition within a predominantly Moro entity. Political representation of 
marginalized groups is guaranteed under the CAB, which provides that indigenous 
peoples and women—often neglected throughout the texts of previous agreements—
shall be represented in the assembly and the Council of Leaders. Development efforts 
are much more focused on the specific needs of women on this occasion, and the 
CAB makes particular reference to the needs of decommissioned women auxiliary 
forces from the MILF. Overall, development efforts throughout the CAB take 
account of the needs of non-Moro communities, and any resulting programmes must 
have social cohesion and the unity of communities as their central thrust. As a result 
of the CAB’s inclusivity, the agreement takes a comprehensive account of the 
broader social problems that have beset Mindanao—chronic underdevelopment, the 
distribution of wealth and resources—and not just the ethno-nationalistic cause of the 
Moro people which had dominated the focus of previous agreements. 
Inclusion also featured notably in the implementation mechanisms of the 
CAB. While the agreement remains rooted in the realm of Philippine domestic law, 
the bipartisan structures charged with some of the most sensitive details of the peace 
process included the MILF as a political partner in peace in ways that previous 
agreements did not. These structures allowed the MILF to express its dissatisfaction 
with the process at the most radical level and subject any discrepancies to 
international scrutiny through the third-party monitoring team. This level of inclusion 
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is unmatched by the Tripoli and Final Agreements, which attempted to realise Moro 
aspirations through state unilateralism. In the absence of a legitimate role in the 
implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, the MNLF resorted to illegitimate means 
to express their grievances with the process. Similarly, the unilateral implementation 
of the Final Agreement meant that the MNLF could not shape the emerging ARMM, 
which pandered to Manila’s system of governance and remained dependent on it for 
funding. Thus, the Philippine experience teaches us that when making peace, it is 
crucial that all of the relevant parties are involved at every key stage of the process—
that they undertake bilateral obligations as partners in peace and do not defer to 
unilateral declarations of intent where precision is lacking. 
The importance of precision and inclusion came together to great effect in the 
form of the CAB, and thereby revealed another key lesson in peace-making—that 
sustainable processes of peace must address all the key issues relevant to the conflict. 
While this may seem obvious, the desire to postpone or evade difficult and 
contentious issues has been a glaring omission from over 40 years of peace-making 
in the Philippines, and is a marked feature of conflicts the world over. The CAB, 
however, explicitly addresses the issues that originally ignited the conflict in 
Mindanao and repeatedly fuelled it, despite several negotiated agreements. It directly 
addresses land ownership, providing a legal basis for the Moro people to seek 
reparation and a practical means to further their own development. The CAB 
addresses the contentious issue of religion in a manner more satisfactory than its 
predecessors, granting the Bangsamoro government exclusive competence over 
education and justice so that they may establish Islam as a way of life and 
governance. Indeed, the CAB also clarifies the overall relationship between Moros, 
Christians and Lumads and their respective place within the Bangsamoro nation. The 
Final Agreement paid little attention to this relationship, and was thus perceived 
among the different ethno-linguistic groups as a document that catered solely to the 
needs of the MNLF’s ethnic base. Crucially, the CAB grants the Moro people the 
autonomy to address these issues themselves, empowering them to challenge the 
structures of inequality that had made violence an enduring vehicle for political 
expression.  
As a crucial limb of the legalization methodology, the role of delegation in 
sustaining processes of peace merits further discussion within the Philippine context. 
Though the OIC played a valuable role in finding a diplomatic solution to the Moro 
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problem, neither the Tripoli Agreement nor the Final Agreement gave the 
organization any practical role in the implementation of that solution. Sensitive tasks 
such as the release of political prisoners, the supervision of a ceasefire, and the 
resettlement of refugees were not delegated to the OIC under the Tripoli Agreement, 
and the state’s relationship with the OIC under the Final Agreement remained 
diplomatic, but in no way legal. It is tempting to suggest, on this basis, that the 
omission of robust delegation strands in these agreements ultimately caused their 
collapse. However, a lack of third-party delegation throughout the Final Agreement 
did not derail its implementation, nor could have it affected a substantially different 
outcome.  
Likewise, the examination of the CAB above has revealed that delegation is 
not always essential in the search for sustainable peace, particularly in the context of 
established states. The absence of a sovereign third party with the ability to enforce 
can be mitigated by a precisely detailed agreement that provides for bipartisan 
implementation mechanisms at every stage of the process and a radical network of 
communications for the resolution of disputes. Had the Tripoli and Final Agreements 
provided for more inclusive means of bilateral implementation, the parties to the 
conflict may have made peace on the basis of their own good faith and the “good 
offices” of willing third-party actors. That the CAB has sustained itself to date on 
this basis substantiates this claim. While the success rate of provisions that are high 
on delegation cannot be judged from a study of the Philippine experience alone, this 
analysis does suggest an interdependence between the headings of obligation, 
precision and delegation, and how a proficiency in one may make up for a deficiency 
in the other. By exploring these headings and their various combinations, one can 
take account of the unique features and peculiarities of a given conflict, and tailor our 
conflict resolution instruments to its needs accordingly. 
As a case study, the conflict in Mindanao is both a warning and an example. 
Four decades of conflict, hundreds of thousands dead and displaced, and several 
failed agreements all underscore the consequences should we fail to learn from the 
mistakes of our past. But ‘the Moro problem’ is also a success story: a process that 
reinvented itself repeatedly, despite renewed hostilities and entrenched positions;  a 
process that reiterates the claim that there are lessons to be learned from conflict 
zones like Northern Ireland that are applicable to processes of peace on the other side 
of the world. If there is a silver lining that sheds light on over 40 years of conflict and 
 112  
human suffering in the Philippines, it is the knowledge that their efforts, innovations 
and lessons learned will serve as “invaluable examples to those engaged in 
comparable conflicts around the world.”299 The duration of the conflict in Mindanao 
and the elusive search for a sustainable solution underscores the value of legal 
precision in addressing these conflicts—that “[i]t is better to be cautious and 
meticulous rather than to rush up things only to repent later.”300 
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6. 
‘A Better Destiny’: The Pursuit of Peace in Sierra 
Leone 
 
The search for peace in Sierra Leone has been pursued against daunting odds. 
Implementation got underway in a complex context that affected how the 
words and ideas in the agreement could be translated into reality in a 
severely damaged nation. The physical devastation within the country, the 
exodus of skilled Sierra Leoneans, the disruption of schooling, high numbers 
of traumatized war victims, the destruction of authority systems, and deeply 
rooted social problems, particularly the neglect of youth, were all part of the 
environment in which the Lomé Agreement was to succeed or fail.… If the 
war had really been waged on the grounds of an ideology of some sort, 
perhaps the agreement could have addressed substantive issues and then 
might have enjoyed a better destiny.1 
 
6. I.  INTRODUCTION  
The civil war in Sierra Leone surpassed all expectations of its potential scope 
and eluded expectations of a peaceful end to the conflict for a significant period of 
time. When the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched its insurgency in the 
eastern part of Sierra Leone in March 1991, the group’s raids were perceived as spill 
over from the internal conflict in neighbouring Liberia—isolated incidents that 
would be short-armed in reach and short-lived in duration. What followed, however, 
was “a degree of social collapse more alarming than anywhere else in the region.”2 In 
the absence of conventional battles—“except those for control of diamond mines or 
strategic bridges or highways”3—the amputation and maiming of civilians became a 
ghastly feature of the conflict, and the indiscriminate violence claimed between 
30,000 and 50,000 lives.4  
However, as J Peter Pham notes, “a fixation on the manifestations of violence 
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during the civil war… risks obscuring the fact that the conflict neither began with the 
invasion of eastern Sierra Leone” by the RUF in March 1991, nor did it end with the 
conclusion of the Lomé Accord in July 1999.5 The conflict can be perceived as the 
culmination of a process of decline characterised by the lack of a cohesive national 
identity, weak governance structures and capacity; rampant corruption, and economic 
mismanagement.6 Even before the RUF invaded the country from neighbouring 
Liberia, the country had struggled to assert its statehood. After gaining independence 
from colonial oppression in 1961, Sierra Leone went from being a promising 
democracy that was the envy of the region, “to being the exemplar of Africa’s post-
colonial ‘neo-patrimonial’ malaise.”7 Political reform in the early 1990s looked 
encouraging, and allowed the government to conclude the 1996 Abidjan Agreement 
with the RUF. When a military coup derailed the agreement’s implementation, it 
drew international criticism for “cutting short one of West Africa’s ‘most promising 
political evolutions.’”8 By the time the civil war was officially declared over in 
January of 2002, it had outlasted several political attempts to resolve the fighting 
peacefully, and precipitated military intervention by a range of external actors. Post-
conflict, the country became host to the largest UN mission of its time.9 The conflict 
is an example of how “the seemingly ‘low intensity’ conflicts of state sovereignty 
and order” can easily evolve into “full-blown geopolitical crises of the first order” 
through ineffective engagement,10 and thus, an ideal case study in a conflict 
resolution context. 
This chapter begins with a general overview of the conflict in Sierra Leone: 
the factors that made it susceptible to civil war, the difficulties that it posed to peace-
making efforts, and the lessons that can be learned from those efforts. Section II 
offers a more elaborate analysis of the state’s colonial and post-independence 
experience, which set a prolonged period of decline in motion and culminated with 
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the outbreak of civil war in 1991. The peace agreements that sought to end the 
fighting are analysed in detail in Section III. Each agreement highlights valuable 
lessons with regard to prescribing short-term and long-term commitments, dealing 
with errant partners-in-peace, and building peace in a state in the midst of collapse. 
These conclusions are discussed in detail in Section IV. 
For some, the difficulties of negotiating peace in Sierra Leone “uncovered the 
fragility of peace processes,”11 and highlighted the central role the international 
community would have to play if peace agreements were to prove effective as a 
means to terminate conflict. The conflict eluded ideas of “what a war should be,”12 
and asked many questions of the applicability of legal instruments to a group that 
“appeared less interested in politics than plunder, and who, therefore, were extremely 
difficult to accommodate in any rational political settlement.”13 The RUF was a 
particularly errant partner-in-peace, and the Front’s leadership promising one thing 
and doing another “became a common feature of the peace process.”14 This, in turn, 
encouraged the perception that the RUF was not negotiating in good faith, and was 
merely using negotiations as a means to regroup and re-arm.15 The frustration with 
the peace process through this time is perhaps best surmised by a damning report by 
the International Crisis Group, which recommended the abandonment of the Lomé 
Agreement, the cessation further political engagement with the RUF, and the use of 
military force against any remaining rebels.16 The same frustration may be keenly 
felt in western and wider Africa today, where non-state actors continue to violently 
challenge the rule of law in Mali, Nigeria and Libya. 
Despite the fact that the RUF had repeatedly shown that it could not be 
trusted,17 agreements that resulted from the Sierra Leonean peace process continued 
to rely on the cooperation of rebel leaders. The Lomé Accord, in particular, was 
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overly generous to the RUF leader Foday Sankoh, and assumed he would be able to 
exercise a sufficient degree of centralised control over the rebels.18 This assumption 
proved to be “tragically flawed,” and “[t]he inconsistencies of the RUF leader in 
word and deed were largely responsible” for the agreement’s difficult 
implementation.19 The insistence on using Sankoh as a means to resolve the 
conflict—despite the evidence to suggest this would not work—reveals that certain 
provisions within the agreements themselves were “defective,” and could not be 
expected to work.20 This once more validates Gopalan’s claim that a lack of attention 
to agreement design has seen the repetition of the same features in agreements, 
despite the evidence of failure in previous instances,21 and “underscores the 
importance of looking again at the process and outcome of past accords.”22 If we are 
to garner some kind of positive lesson from “the tragedy of Sierra Leone,”23 then a 
reflection on the principal outputs of its troubled peace process is necessary. 
An in-depth analysis of the process’s principle agreements—the Abidjan 
Accord, the Conakry Peace Plan and the Lomé Accord—points to structural flaws 
within the agreements themselves, which were ultimately unsuccessful despite 
incorporating an arsenal of accepted transitional justice mechanisms and post-
conflict processes.24 One such feature is the idea of ‘power-sharing,’ which emerged 
in the immediate post-Cold War era “as a standard mechanism for rebuilding sharply 
polarised societies and those torn by wars, most of which have turned out to be 
unwinnable and of doubtful ideological pedigree.”25 In their analysis of power-
sharing in the Sierra Leonean context, Binningsbø and Dupuy cite conflicting 
authorities as to whether power-sharing contributes to sustainable peace,26 or “on the 
contrary,” to renewable cycles of violence.27 They argue, in turn, that the Sierra 
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Leonean experience “is a crucial case when it comes to understanding the relation 
between power-sharing and peace.”28  
The Sierra Leonean example also offers a unique opportunity to acutely 
highlight the importance of economic provisions in peace agreements—a dimension 
that is particularly relevant to each of the case studies analysed in this thesis. Aning 
and Atuobi posit that provisions that directly address economic issues give the 
warring parties the opportunity “to contribute to the successful implementation of 
peace agreements and the peace building processes that follow” by tackling those 
factors that are conducive to conflict.29 However, in their analysis of the economic 
dimensions of peace agreements in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast, they 
conclude that “economic issues, including the illegal exploitation of natural resources 
to finance conflicts, were not given serious attention.”30 This is despite the fact that 
“the region has experienced years of violent conflict, the causes and sustenance of 
which have included both the management and the looting of natural resources.”31 
Neither the economic inequalities that fuelled the conflict nor the illegal exploitation 
of natural resources by the warring factions were appropriately addressed during the 
peace process in Sierra Leone. The Lomé agreement did, however, address the 
importance of natural economic resources and their centrality to the conflict, and 
provided for a manner in which those resources could be managed in its aftermath. 
Both Aning and Atuobi contend that this was a “critical measure” in the Lomé 
agreement, and argue accordingly that Sierra Leone “therefore provides a useful 
template for addressing economic issues in peace agreements in West Africa.”32 This 
analysis bears important lessons in that regard, both for the management of such 
resources in similar conflicts, and for the purpose of comparison with the case 
studies explored herein. 
In many ways, “Sierra Leone is a test case for international responses to 
disorder and the consequences of state collapse elsewhere,”33 and as such, it is at the 
centre of this project’s aims of learning from the failures of the past and applying 
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those lessons to contemporary conflicts. As a case study, it facilitates debate on the 
role that international law can play in such instances, and serves as an interesting 
counter-argument for those “who increasingly doubt that civil wars can be resolved 
through negotiations.”34 Indeed, writing in 2005, Pham noted that “in discerning the 
way forward through the tangled thickets of the years ahead,” a reflection upon the 
pursuit of peace in Sierra Leone “and the-for once-forceful and perseverant 
international response that turned the tide might indeed be salutary.”35 That kind of 
reflection is even more necessary over a decade later as we look for novel ways to 
resolve increasingly porous interstate conflicts with a myriad of armed groups with 
diminishing respect for the rule of law. 
 
6. II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
6. II. A. COLONIZATION & INDEPENDENCE  
The modern-day republic of Sierra Leone is rooted in the efforts of British 
philanthropists who established a colony on the West African coast in 1789 as a 
haven for emancipated black slaves. From this settlement, the state of Sierra Leone 
slowly emerged over the next 150 years, making the country one of the oldest 
modern polities in Africa.36  In order to assert control, the British used parochial 
tribal networks as local government units, thus inadvertently encouraging the 
development of a patron-client system of governance whereby those “at the top end 
of the chain needed to keep the chiefs and ‘big men’ on board by supplying them 
with resources and favours.”37 This patron-client system of governance persisted 
post-independence, cultivating the social inequalities and gross disparities in wealth 
that became at least one of the factors fuelling conflict in Sierra Leone in the 1990s. 
In the wake of World War II, a desire for self-determination and a demand for 
independence swept across much of Africa. Britain was acutely aware of “these new 
realities,”38 and began to devolve more and more power to the Sierra Leonean 
people, culminating with independence in 1961. The nation’s “push for 
independence was rather muted,” with “more parochial matters, such as chieftaincy 
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and elite divides” dominating the agenda, much to the detriment of the bigger goals 
of nation and state-building.39 Indeed, Harris argues that the Westminster-styled 
parliamentary democracy that Sierra Leone inherited from Britain “had already been 
thoroughly compromised in its reliance on ‘traditional’ authorities to pacify the 
hinterland.”40 The post-colonial state that emerged was not an all-inclusive nation 
built on a shared understanding of identity and culture, but “a politically and 
economically over-centralised, institutionally weak, somewhat patronising and 
numerically restricted regime.”41 Thus, as Pham notes, while Sierra Leone’s descent 
“into state failure and civil war may have come slowly over several decades,” the 
seeds of its destruction were rooted in its origins and the decline was steady.42 
 In 1967, Siaka Stevens’ All Party Congress (APC) defeated the incumbent 
Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), which had led the country since independence 
six years previous. Stevens, however, was prevented from taking power by a military 
coup that attempted to preserve the SLPP’s leadership. The attempt was overthrown 
by another coup instigated by junior officers in the Sierra Leonean army (SLA) just 
48 hours later, which itself gave way to an interim military regime. This rapid turn of 
events signified “the emergence of the military as a force too-often ready to interfere 
in Sierra Leone’s politics,”43 another insidious element of the state apparatus that 
would play a key role in its civil war. When Stevens was restored to power in 1968, 
he used the political instability to transition Sierra Leone to a one-party state. Stevens 
styled the state as his own “personalised dictatorship,”44 which placed him at the 
centre of a patron-client system that “increasingly starved the formal state of 
resources.”45 Perhaps most notably, Stevens disempowered the key organs of the 
state apparatus, including the legislature, the civil service, and crucially, the police 
and the military, thereby “disabling agencies of restraint and institutions for conflict 
management.”46 It was in this environment that the proximate causes of war—
“economic decline and poverty, high youth unemployment, violations of the rule of 
law, government dysfunction, rural isolation, and regional and ethnic grievances”—
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flourished.47 
However, Stevens’ despotic rule did not go unchallenged. From 1977 
onward, Stevens’ regime faced increasing public pressure from students at Fourah 
Bay College in Freetown, which became a seedbed for anti-government sentiment 
throughout the following decade.48 Some scholars argue that the foundations of the 
RUF lie in this environment, where youths were either brutalised at the hands of 
APC security forces or radicalised by anti-APC sentiment.49 Indeed, many of the 
radical students expelled from Fourah Bay found their way to Libya, where they 
received support for an anti-APC revolution.50 By 1987, these would-be founders of 
the RUF were actively recruiting students and alienated youths to their cause.51 The 
tragedy of these youths lies in the “salient political message” they expressed prior to 
their militarization: “they were dissatisfied with APC government corruption, the 
elite’s exploitation of Sierra Leone’s military wealth, and the inaccessibility of the 
urban economy.”52 While this message was somewhat compromised by a wave of 
indiscriminate violence, these philosophical beliefs continued to fuel the RUF’s 
sense of victimhood and apathy for the state throughout the conflict that was to 
come. 
 
6. II. B. THE RUF: PEDAGOGY AND PRACTICE 
Initially rallying under the banner of ‘No More slaves, No More Masters. 
Power and Wealth to the People,’ the RUF’s populist message gained traction with 
those “who were confronted with terrible social and economic conditions and lacked 
any means of changing the situation politically.”53 For many young followers, the 
RUF’s promise of free education and health-care54—basic services long neglected by 
the APC government—was an immediately more attractive option than 
unemployment and poverty. As a result, “there was no shortage of potential recruits 
initially and the organisation’s ranks were soon swelled by idle and violent youths 
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from Freetown’s slums.”55 
The RUF’s ranks also swelled due to the number of youths forcibly recruited 
by Sankoh and his followers. Loyalty was often ensured through fear, and the effects 
of drugs and alcohol, which were readily provided to child soldiers. Other 
particularly young recruits had nowhere else to go. But the RUF’s ideology had a 
potent effect of its own on disillusioned youths. Young abductees from the rural 
fringes of Sierra Leone, “accustomed to being looked down upon by a distant urban 
elite,” found relevance in a rebel movement that “analyzed Sierra Leonean politics in 
terms of a neglect of rural education....”56 The APC’s ongoing exploitation of the 
state apparatus in tandem with a depletion of the nation’s living standards57 merely 
provided an adequate backdrop against which the RUF could claim, at least 
ostensibly, that it was fighting “for a redress of the iniquities of Sierra Leonean 
society....”58 Though the RUF did little to actually achieve a just redistribution of 
wealth, its revolutionary rhetoric managed to find resonance with “significant 
segments of the country’s population.”59 
The RUF’s attempts at managing the territory it gained highlight how its 
revolutionary programme did not translate into equality and prosperity in practice, 
however. The movement’s 1995 pamphlet, ‘Footpaths to democracy: Toward a New 
Sierra Leone,’ contained some rhetorical references to “social justice and pan-
Africanism,”60 but it gave little indication of what sort of government would replace 
the incumbent APC. Unlike several other revolutionary groups—e.g., the Irish 
Republican Army in Northern Ireland and the Rwandan Patriotic Front in Rwanda—
the RUF did not have a formal political wing until the conflict had been concluded, 
and the group was not politically styled as a “government-in-waiting” with cabinet 
positions and a clear plan of action.61 In the absence of a clear political ideology or 
alternative model of governance, the group made no attempt to administer the 
territory it controlled, “except with cursory gestures such as the appointment of 
compliant chiefs.”62 No legitimate tax system was put in place for the provision of 
services, nor did the RUF attempt to win grassroots support by building “parallel 
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political institutions.”63 Instead, the RUF sought to use the public state apparatus to 
pursue private aims, “to claim its prerogatives for personal gain.”64 Thus, as Reno 
notes, the RUF’s idea of what constituted politics was not so different from that of 
the APC’s.65 Indeed, the military strategy of the RUF supports this argument. When 
the rebels began to make meaningful gains in the east of the country in the mid-
1990s, they made certain to capture the region’s key diamond fields in the process.66 
As the conflict waged on, the RUF’s revolutionary programme was revealed to be 
tainted by the same corruption it supposedly opposed, and their campaign soon came 
to be perceived as one of “‘greed’ not ‘grievance.’”67 In time, the overtly 
revolutionary aims of the RUF were “jettisoned in favour of brutality against 
civilians and the looting of mineral resources (especially diamonds),”68 and “the 
rebels themselves soon became a by-word for terror....”69 
 
6. II. C. THE SIERRA LEONEAN CIVIL WAR 
By the late 1980s, the general decline of the Sierra Leonean state was clear 
for all to see, “and basic utilities like electricity and water supply had virtually 
collapsed even in Freetown….”70 Liberal economic reforms—originally introduced 
as austerity measures by the IMF and World Bank in 1977—were institutionalised as 
‘structural adjustment programmes’ that continued to informalise and scale back the 
state apparatus. In no sector was this more apparent than the military. Austerity 
measures and neo-liberal conditionalities on aid had taken their toll on the armed 
forces, and by the early 1990s, the SLA lacked the capacity and infrastructure 
necessary to resist any form of invasion or insurrection.71 With the military unable to 
protect the state’s borders, and the state itself unable to assert itself effectively within 
those borders, the APC government became “a virtual sitting target awaiting its 
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fate.”72 On 23 March 1991, the RUF—with the apparent support of Liberian warlord, 
Charles Taylor—invaded eastern Sierra Leone from positions in Liberia, sounding 
the death knell for the APC government and the beginning of the Sierra Leonean 
civil war.  
By April 1992, SLA soldiers fighting the RUF advance had not been paid in 
three months.73 On 29 April 1992, disgruntled young officers led by 27 year old 
Captain Valentine Strasser staged a military coup and installed a military 
government, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Though the NPRC 
coup was allegedly regarded as a welcome development by the RUF,74 the NPRC 
moved quickly against the rebels in order to reinforce their own legitimacy.75 In the 
absence of an effective military force of its own, the NPRC employed non-
conventional forces to counter the RUF threat. Local militias—known as kamajors, 
and based on traditional African hunters’ guilds—had been set up voluntarily at the 
beginning of the conflict as “village self-defence groups, armed only with hunting 
rifles.”76 Unlike the conventional SLA units, the kamajors were not afraid to follow 
the RUF into the bush, thus countering the effectiveness of the rebels’ guerrilla 
campaign as the war waged on. As their military successes against the RUF mounted, 
the burden of military defence was increasingly shifted on to these localised 
militias.77 The NPRC also turned to mercenary groups, principal of which was the 
South Africa based Executive Outcomes (EO). In exchange for diamond mining 
contracts and a share in resource revenues,78 EO were tasked with re-capturing the 
diamond and mineral mines and destroying the RUF’s headquarters. Within two 
weeks of its arrival in March 1995, the technological superiority of EO had 
succeeded in pushing the rebel advance back into the country’s interior, and 
following a major kamajor offensive (logistically supported by EO) in October 1996, 
the RUF headquarters were destroyed.79  
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The military intervention by EO stalled the conflict for a time and allowed the 
normality of peacetime to return to Sierra Leone, so much so that civilian elections 
could take place in February and March of 1996. Elections produced a reputable 
President in the form of Ahmad Kabbah, a retired UN bureaucrat. Kabbah took up 
peace talks that would culminate with the Abidjan Accord in November of that year, 
“[b]ut, as subsequent events were to reveal, the signing of the agreement was one 
thing, its implementation quite another.”80 
 
6. III. THE AGREEMENTS 
6. III. A. THE ABIDJAN PEACE ACCORD (1996) 
The Abidjan Accord underscored a period of relative peace between 1996 and 
1997.81 However, the structural causes of conflict were not abated, nor adequately 
addressed by the agreement. Socio-political factors that pre-dated the Accord put a 
sustainable agreement “out of reach from the start,”82 and ambiguities in the 
agreement’s text, particularly regarding re-integration of RUF combatants and the 
delegation of peacekeeping duties, “rendered the Abidjan Accord a non-starter.”83 
Following initial talks in Abidjan in February 1996, Kabbah’s government 
concluded a ceasefire agreement with the RUF. Talks continued throughout the 
summer of 1996, but despite the significant leeway given by the government, 
Sankoh’s signature on the draft agreement was not forthcoming. Speaking before the 
UN General Assembly in New York, Kabbah ominously opined that Sankoh 
appeared “‘to be unwilling to honour his commitment to sign the agreement, 
manufacturing several excuses to justify his prevarication.’”84 Kabbah also warned 
“that RUF intransigence could lead to a ‘full-scale resumption of the hostilities, 
given the current level of distrust between the two sides,’”85 a fateful prediction that 
the Abidjan Accord did little to nullify. Eventually, the government consented to the 
expulsion of EO forces from the country, which some argue was the primary 
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objective that the RUF sought to achieve from the talks.86 Sankoh finally signed the 
agreement on 30 November 1996, nearly 8 months after negotiations had begun and 
just before Kabbah’s self-instated deadline of 1 December. 
The Abidjan Accord begins with a call for “a total cessation of hostilities” 
and “the establishment and consolidation of a just peace.”87 A Commission for the 
Consolidation of Peace was to serve as a “verification mechanism responsible for 
supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with all the 
provisions” contained in the agreement.88 The Commission was tasked with 
establishing and coordinating the expansive peacebuilding infrastructure set out 
under the agreement, but its means to do so was not expressly stated. The 
Commission appeared to lack any executive, legislative or legally binding power, 
and the language mandating the institution was vague and inconsistent. The 
Commission had “the power to prepare preliminary legislative drafts,” and “to 
recommend the preparation of enabling measures,”89 but it lacked the authority to 
legally bind the signatories in these regards. The signatories “undertake to comply 
with the conclusions of the Commission,” or “undertake to consult the Commission 
before taking decisions on measures relating to the present Peace Agreement.”90 
Thus, the declarations of the Commission remained dependent on the continued good 
will of the signatories in an environment where trust and security concerns have not 
been guaranteed. 
Many of the Abidjan Accord’s more practical provisions addressed the issues 
of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, though the extent to which these 
complex processes were mapped out was left wanting. The Accord provided that 
disarmament would begin upon the combatants’ entry into “designated assembly 
zones,” which were not identified under the agreement.91 The processes of 
demobilization and reintegration were to begin “as soon as practicable thereafter,”92 
under the supervision of a Neutral Monitoring Group comprised of international 
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monitors.93 However, the scope of its mandate and its powers were penned 
ambiguously, as the monitors were not expressly identified in the agreement, and had 
yet to be drawn from the broadly defined “international community.”94 As part of the 
demobilization manoeuvres, surplus SLA units would be confined to barracks, and 
EO forces would be withdrawn from Sierra Leone within five weeks of the 
deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group.95 Article 12 on the withdrawal of EO 
is notably more precise than many other articles throughout the Abidjan Accord, 
lending credence to Harris’ claim that the expulsion of EO forces from Sierra Leone 
was what the RUF sought most of all from the Accord.96 
The Accord’s provisions on reintegration evidenced a rather casual approach 
to one of the most significant concessions granted by the government to the RUF: the 
promise of livelihoods in policing, military and civil capacities.97 The provisions on 
reintegration were extremely vague, providing no disclaimer as to how it would not 
be possible to assimilate all RUF forces into the nation’s military, nor any suggestion 
as to what would become of those ex-combatants that did not qualify for 
assimilation.98 This is particularly striking when one considers that reintegration 
outside of the policing and military sectors is not adequately addressed anywhere 
else in the Abidjan Accord.  
Regardless, the Abidjan Accord does attempt to supplement political 
processes and address the populist elements of the RUF’s basic ideology. The RUF is 
granted freedom of the press and access to the media, as well as freedom of assembly 
and expression, so as to “ensure the full and unrestricted participation of the RUF/SL 
in the political process….”99 The parties also appeal to the international community 
for funds that will enable the RUF to transform itself into a political party.100 To 
further facilitate RUF participation in Sierra Leonean society, “and to promote the 
cause of national reconciliation,” the Accord grants an amnesty “in respect of 
anything done by [the RUF] in pursuit of their objectives as members of that 
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organization.”101 Similarly, Article 19 provides that “All political prisoners and 
prisoners of war” shall be released.102 Inherently controversial due to the particularly 
brutal nature of the conflict in Sierra Leone, amnesty provisions became a staple of 
all of the peace agreements that emerged from the country, though their role in 
sustaining processes of peace—and/or denying access to justice—is a matter of 
fervent academic debate. 
The Abidjan Accord also makes notable attempts to address the systematic 
corruption that catalysed the state’s descent into conflict and fuelled the RUF’s 
populist appeal. Article 16 acknowledges Sierra Leone’s modern history of 
corruption, and proposes an office of Ombudsman to promote the accountability of 
public services.103 However, the provision is notably low on precision, and relatively 
low on obligation. It is unclear what powers the office should have, or how the office 
of Ombudsman is to be comprised. Similarly, Article 18 acknowledged the history of 
electoral corruption in Sierra Leone and vowed to reform present electoral processes 
through a National Electoral Commission.104 However, the composition of the 
Electoral Commission was postponed to a later date. As these provisions are notably 
lacking in precision and low on obligation, they do little to alleviate the root causes 
of corruption in Sierra Leone, and in a state in the midst of collapse, they do less still 
to inspire radical change in the country’s governance structures. 
Elsewhere, the Abidjan Accord addresses the “socio-economic dimension to 
the conflict which must also be addressed in order to consolidate the foundation of 
peace.”105 To this end, the Accord sets out a number of guiding principles that will 
inform the socio-economic policy of the country, “taking into account available 
resources.”106 Many of these ‘principles’ attempt to alleviate the root causes of the 
conflict in Sierra Leone: economic mismanagement, systematic corruption, 
exploitation of natural resources, and an idle, “marginalized youth easily prone to 
violence given their alienation from traditional societal restraints.”107 Yet, in the 
absence of more precise provisions, these principles are only ‘guiding,’ not binding. 
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This language does not suggest that the principles are high on the obligation matrix. 
Though several human rights and economic rights instruments are referenced 
throughout the agreement,108 they are not explicitly recognized as guiding 
frameworks for the resolution of socio-economic issues. Furthermore, the 
agreement’s provisions for addressing these root causes are entirely dependent on 
uncertain funding sources.109 When coupled with the fact that the Abidjan Accord’s 
plan for economic reconstruction already had to take available resources into 
account, it did not amount to an entirely reliable nor sustainable method of 
addressing the conflict’s root causes. 
The agreement does boast some particularly noteworthy sections however. 
The Abidjan Accord’s provisions on human rights are quite strong, perhaps as a 
result of the gross human rights violations that characterised the conflict in Sierra 
Leone. The agreement guarantees the rights set out in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights,”110 giving 
those rights hard law effect in accordance with the 1991 Constitution.111 To ensure 
protection of these rights, the Accord called for the establishment of a National 
Commission on Human Rights with “the power to investigate human rights 
violations and to institute legal proceedings were appropriate.”112 The Commission 
on Human Rights was not further elaborated upon, though it seemed that its 
functions would be heavily dependent on “technical and material assistance” from 
the UN and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.113 The 
Commission did not get an opportunity to carry out its mandate due to “the speedy 
collapse of the Abidjan Accord,”114 but many of the provisions pertaining to human 
rights and international humanitarian law were carried over to the Lomé Accord. 
This suggests that stakeholders considered strong human rights guarantees to be 
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central to a sustainable peace process. 
The Abidjan Accord concludes with the proviso that the Ivory Coast, the UN, 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Commonwealth “shall stand as 
moral guarantors that this Peace Agreement is implemented with integrity and in 
good faith by both parties.”115 Given the ambiguous role of a ‘moral guarantor,’ it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the agreement was neither negotiated nor implemented in 
good faith. The RUF was slow to disarm in accordance with the agreed schedule, and 
the process “was handicapped by poor planning, corruption, mismanagement, and 
lack of funds.”116 Despite a general ceasefire in March 1996, RUF attacks on villages 
and road traffic continued during negotiations,117 prompting devastating responses 
from EO and government forces.118 Following the conclusion of the Abidjan Accord, 
the ceasefire was not firmly re-established, by January of 1997, the RUF was 
accusing the government of waging all-out war against it.119 Many of the key aspects 
of the Abidjan Accord were not implemented, “except that in February 1997… in 
mistaken expectation of the imminent arrival of a UN force, the contract with 
Executive Outcomes was terminated.”120 Owing to the absence of a conventional 
disciplined and well-trained national army, the withdrawal of EO created a vacuum 
that opportunistic parties soon moved to fill. Three months to the day after EO 
departed Sierra Leone, the ill-disciplined SLA—which had been largely neglected in 
the efforts to contain the RUF—mutinied,121 overthrowing Kabbah’s democratically 
elected government, and bringing an end to the Abidjan Accord. 
While the Abidjan Accord committed many good standards and principles to 
paper, an analysis with the benefit of hindsight reveals several fatal flaws that 
hastened the agreement’s premature collapse. For the most part, the Abidjan Accord 
is a substantively ambiguous document, leaving many procedural aspects to be 
clarified at a later point in time. For example, the composition of the Commission for 
the Consolidation of Peace—the body bearing chief responsibility for 
implementation of the agreement—was not detailed under the agreement, other than 
that it would “comprise representatives of the Government and the Revolutionary 
                                                          
115 Abidjan Accord (n 87) Article 28. 
116 Gberie (n 13) 25. 
117 ibid at 23. 
118 Richards (n 12) 44-45. 
119 Gberie (n 13) 25. 
120 Harris (n 37) 105. 
121 Pham (n 5) 142. 
 130  
United Front of Sierra Leone.”122 Similar imprecisions plagued the Demobilization 
and Resettlement Committee, the National Electoral Commission, and the broad-
based Socio-Economic forum. Such a lack of detail increased the likelihood of post-
agreement conflict by broadening the scope for misinterpretation and disagreement. 
By neglecting to explicitly provide for the appointment of individuals to any of these 
bodies, the parties jeopardized these bodies as long-term forums for non-violent 
conflict resolution.  
Delaying the discussion of more substantive issues until the post-agreement 
stage also allowed the security situation to deteriorate in the meantime. The articles 
on disarmament and demobilization perhaps best exemplify this counter-productive 
strategy. By postponing the identification of appropriate assembly zones for the 
disarmament of combatants to a later date, the Abidjan Accord preserved an unstable 
and uncertain security situation that might have been somewhat abated had the 
assembly zones been discussed as part of the negotiations and incorporated into the 
agreement. The failure to identify neutral third-party monitors further destabilized 
the agreement during implementation. The agreement did not explicitly establish that 
the neutral monitors would in fact be UN ‘blue helmets,’ opting instead to clarify this 
detail at a later date. This omission was critical, as Bartholomew argues that the 
provision of UN monitors would have been a deal breaker for Sankoh, who “‘was 
perennially suspicious of the UN.’”123 Omitting to identify the neutral monitors as 
UN personnel in order to circumvent Sankoh’s concerns merely postponed the 
inevitable disagreement on the issue to a later point, and heightened tensions around 
the demobilization process. Such imprecision allowed the Abidjan Accord to be 
presented as an agreement born of consensus, when in reality, many of the more 
contentious aspects had yet to be clarified post-agreement. 
Similar imprecisions and vagaries plagued the issue of reintegration and the 
provision of jobs for ex-combatants. Under the Abidjan Accord, the framework for 
the assimilation of ex-combatants and RUF members into the SLA was not explicitly 
set out, but was left to be clarified by the Commission for the Consolidation of 
Peace.124 Such uncertainty was not likely to assuage the RUF recruits who were 
seeking post-conflict livelihoods, nor the SLA soldiers whose already-uncertain 
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livelihoods would be threatened by the prospect of RUF and kamajor assimilation. 
The Abidjan Accord made several token references to the reintegration of 
combatants in civilian society,125 but the agreement did not identify any particular 
programmes that would achieve this. Bartholomew argues that the uncertainty 
around reintegration opportunities was particularly damaging to the prospect of 
sustainable peace, because “RUF member inclusion (such as opportunities to 
participate in the urban economy) was of paramount concern for the rebels since the 
outset of the conflict.”126 Imprecision thus increased the likelihood of 
misunderstanding among the former combatants,127 which had further negative 
effects on issues of trust and security. 
One such negative effect becomes quite clear when one compares the 
language used in the articles on reintegration to those on demobilization and 
disarmament. The provisions on the reintegration of former combatants are severely 
lacking in precision and substance, void of any method or timeframe for the creation 
of employment opportunities. The articles pertaining to the disarmament and 
demobilization of RUF combatants, in contrast, are quite detailed, even by the 
general terms of the Abidjan Accord. The agreement’s primary purpose thus appears 
to be moving the ‘defeated’ RUF soldiers into designated assembly zones, rather than 
providing them with alternative livelihoods once peace is achieved. This arrangement 
cannot have assuaged legitimate security concerns for ex-RUF combatants. The 
unilateral focus on demobilizing the rebels “likely increased RUF anxiety and, by 
extension, the likelihood of future hostilities.”128 Of course, one can accept that 
issues surrounding demobilization and disarmament are a more pressing peacetime 
necessity, and that the provisions on demobilization were duly drafted more precisely 
with short-term objectives in mind. However, it is the sum of the Abidjan Accord’s 
imprecise parts—and how these various parts relate to each other—that left the 
agreement lacking in detail and in good faith. Without such characteristics, assuaging 
security and trust concerns becomes very difficult indeed. 
As a result of the many imprecisions that litter the Abidjan Accord’s key 
provisions, the agreement was made overly reliant on an inflated bureaucracy that 
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failed to account for the accelerated decline of the Sierra Leonean state during the 
conflict. With the state on the brink of collapse, and the agreement lacking precisely 
worded provisions and concrete guarantees, who was going to guide the combatants 
through the complex process of making peace? The Abidjan Accord is silent on this 
question. The ‘moral guarantors’ appointed under Article 28 are not granted any 
substantive power, and their role in ensuring that the agreement “is implemented 
with integrity and in good faith by both parties” appears to re-emphasise a moral, as 
opposed to legal, role.129 Indeed, in a later judicial finding on a similar provision in 
the Lomé agreement, the Special Court for Sierra Leone found that moral guarantors 
did not assume any legal obligation by virtue of their role. Instead, they were to 
ensure the compliance of the RUF, who, as a non-state actor, had no legal standing 
within Sierra Leone.130 The Abidjan Accord thus remains low on substantive 
delegation provisions, which is surprising given the vulnerable condition of the state 
at the time, and the ambitious programme for peace that the agreement set out to 
achieve. 
In the absence of clearly identified and explicitly empowered third-parties, 
the term ‘international community’ is often used throughout the Abidjan Accord as a 
means to feign a feasible peace-making strategy. This is exemplified by the Abidjan 
Accord’s ambitious provisions on funding the peace process, which made the 
agreement reliant on an uncertain amount of funding that had yet to be raised from 
international donors. This was a potentially disastrous oversight that was repeated in 
relation to the provision of unidentified monitors for the demobilization process. 
Article 26 of the agreement seems to recognize this, providing that the government’s 
socio-economic policy will have to take “available resources… into account.”131 This 
disclaimer devalues the obligations undertaken by the government to address some of 
the root causes of the conflict, and reiterates Richards’ claim that neither party 
appeared sincere in negotiating the Abidjan Accord.132  
The Abidjan Accord does feature several peacebuilding standards and 
guiding principles, however, some of which further support the correlation between 
certain legal provisions and agreement sustainability. The provision of strong human 
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rights guarantees complements other peace-making mechanisms set out elsewhere in 
the Abidjan Accord – most notably the provisions on amnesty, national unity and 
reconciliation,133 and the provision of participatory measures as a feature of the 
agreement.134 Yet despite the potential for sustainable peace that these provisions 
bore, they were let down by the sum of the Abidjan Accord’s parts. In the absence of 
more elaborate guarantees, the agreement’s provisions on participation amount to 
little more than token rhetoric. The imprecision that plagued the agreement’s text 
failed to assuage legitimate trust concerns in the immediate aftermath of its 
conclusion, thereby failing to establish a stable security situation in which the 
institutions charged with peacebuilding and conflict transformation could flourish.  
Following an informed historical analysis some 20 years after the 
agreement’s conclusion, the Abidjan Accord now appears low on precision, 
obligation and delegation. Though it employed many of the concepts associated with 
a sustainable peace process, the Abidjan Accord was born into an extraordinarily 
unstable environment that the agreement’s imprecise text did little to change. In 
failing to precisely provide for these often sensitive and contentious issues, many of 
the agreement’s finer details were delegated to weak institutions that were not 
mandated with enough specificity to weather a resumption of hostilities. Such a 
critical shortcoming reiterates the importance of precision in sustaining peace 
agreements, but also highlights the unique challenges of legalized peace agreements. 
In wording these agreements in a precise manner, there is a need to strike a balance 
between short-term objectives, which can be precisely provided for, and long-term 
goals, which may require more flexibility. The Abidjan Accord failed to adequately 
achieve its short term objectives (e.g., a cessation of hostilities, followed by 
demobilization and disarmament), which made the more long-term commitments an 
impossibility. 
With regard to obligation, the Abidjan Accord employs weak and often 
inconsistent language in relation to the signatories’ commitments. In “undertaking to 
comply” with the decisions of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, the 
agreement’s text implied that the parties were merely taking part in the peace process 
on the basis of their own good faith. However, an agreement cannot be implemented 
on good faith alone when serious security concerns and trust deficits divide the 
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former combatants. When the implementation of the agreement became bogged 
down, and the guarantees provided for by the agreement were not forthcoming, the 
rebels—whose role in the implementation of the Abidjan Accord was dependent on 
the process moving forward—were free to reject the obligations that they freely 
‘undertook’ as per the agreement. Similarly, many of the obligations undertaken by 
the government of Sierra Leone were accompanied by disclaimers or limitations that 
substantially undermined the weight of the obligation that the government was 
agreeing to. For example, the government’s unambiguous obligation to withdraw its 
units to barracks was subject to “the security needs of the country.”135 Similarly, the 
principles that are to guide the government in formulating socio-economic policy 
must take “available resources” into account,136 thus rendering many of these 
obligations merely rhetorical. If the implementation of the ambitious Abidjan Accord 
was to be primarily undertaken by the Sierra Leonean government, the agreement 
should have been much more obligating, thereby decreasing the scope for “wiggle 
room to make excuses”137 and the reason for good faith alone.  
Finally, as with many aspects of its text, the Abidjan Accord is wholly 
imprecise with regard to delegation. This is a critical flaw for an agreement that is so 
dependent on the assistance of the ‘international community.’ Particularly sensitive 
issues, such as the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration aspects of the 
agreement—which arguably formed the backbone of the Abidjan Accord—were 
written with the international community in mind, but the agreement did not 
explicitly identify the actor that would provide the monitoring envisioned under these 
provisions. This only broadened the scope for mistrust and disagreement further 
down the line.138 Similarly, the provisions on donor funding and socio-economic 
development are overly reliant on the generosity of the international community. The 
limitations that the agreement imposed on the government’s post-conflict socio-
economic policy could have been avoided had the agreement not so loosely 
delegated the issue of funding to as uncertain an actor as ‘the international 
community.’ 
A final key omission with regard to delegation concerns the expulsion of EO 
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from Sierra Leone. EO’s intervention had bolstered an ill-equipped SLA, pushed the 
RUF back, and brought Sankoh to the negotiating table.139 Having failed to provide 
for an organisation that would be capable of replacing EO and securing the Sierra 
Leonean state, the Abidjan Accord failed outright once EO withdrew and good faith 
was no longer enough to hold the agreement together. It was not until the 
intervention of another external military power, the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), that another peace plan could be put forward. 
 
6. III. B. THE CONAKRY PEACE PLAN (1997) 
The government’s pivot towards EO and kamajor units fostered the belief 
among SLA soldiers “that the threat of elimination of the army as an institution was 
real.”140 Seizing upon the security vacuum created by EO’s departure, these 
disgruntled SLA elements moved against Kabbah’s government and openly revolted 
on 25 May 1997. The rogue elements established a military junta, known as the 
Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), and appointed Major Johnny Paul Koroma as 
its head. Major Koroma had previously fought the RUF on the frontlines of the civil 
war, but was subsequently imprisoned for his part in an attempted coup. Somewhat 
sympathetic to the populist message propagated by the RUF,141 he immediately 
invited the rebel group to partake in a power-sharing arrangement in Freetown.  
The coup was met with outright opposition and criticism from its inception, 
however. In a country where political upheaval was not unusual, Abraham labelled 
the AFRC’s junta as “the most unpopular coup ever staged in the history of Sierra 
Leone.”142 The OAU, whose annual summit meeting occurred just days after the 
coup, granted a mandate for the restoration of the legitimate government for the first 
time in its history.143 The OAU appealed to the geopolitical bloc ECOWAS “to assist 
the people of Sierra Leone to restore constitutional order to the country” and to 
“implement the Abidjan Agreement which continues to serve as a viable framework 
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for peace, stability and reconciliation in Sierra Leone.”144 ECOWAS responded to its 
mandate by deploying its military monitoring group, ECOMOG, which forced the 
AFRC junta to the negotiating table in July 1997. However, negotiations hit a snag 
when Koroma announced a transitional programme for government that would see 
the AFRC in powers for four years.145 After further talks in Conakry in October 
1997, the parties eventually agreed to a six month transitional agreement.  
Bartholomew argues that Conakry Peace Plan is evidence of the lessons 
learned from the failures of the Abidjan Accord, citing the provisions on 
reintegration and peacekeeping as more detailed variations on the issues that had left 
the previous agreement open to misinterpretation and dispute. Though Bartholomew 
notes that the Conakry Peace Plan is “comparatively sparse,” she commends the 
agreement’s short text for its “minimal preamble,” and “functional quality.”146 
Indeed, the preamble explicitly provides for identified peacekeepers and monitors 
and timeframes for implementation. Despite these improvements however, the 
Conakry Peace Plan would also fail “as a result of the parties’ reciprocal mistrust and 
misunderstanding.”147 While this could be attributed to a lack of legal detail in the 
agreement’s sparse text, it was more likely the result of ECOMOG’s prominent and 
inherently political role in implementing the agreement, which could hardly be seen 
as impartial.148 
The Conakry Peace Plan begins with a preamble that sketches out a six-point 
plan and a schedule for its implementation. Article 1 called for a cessation of 
hostilities with immediate effect.149 In contrast to the Abidjan Accord, the Conakry 
agreement established a monitoring and verification regime that explicitly tasks 
ECOMOG and United Nations military observers with monitoring the ceasefire.150 
The ceasefire and verification mechanism was to come into force from the date of the 
agreement and continue until the termination of the peace plan in April 1998. 
Article 2 sets out “a simple and uncomplicated procedure”151 for the 
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disarmament and demobilization of combatants. In order to effectively carry out 
these processes, a thirty day window was envisioned during which military personnel 
could report to designated centres “in order to be engaged in the disarmament 
process.”152 These centres were not explicitly identified under the Conakry Peace 
Plan, nor had they been under the Abidjan Accord. While the disarmament process 
was quite detailed in relation to scheduling and third-party monitoring, it was 
somewhat lacking with regard to obligation. The agreement recognized this, 
acknowledging that “incentives may have to be provided to encourage the voluntary 
participation of combatants in all this process.”153 Accordingly, disarmed combatants 
were to be provided “with either job training to fit them for alternative employment 
or given scholarship and grants for further education.”154 Education at all levels was 
to be made available to ex-combatants, and assistance to facilitate their reintegration 
into their communities would also be provided.155 The agreement recognized that 
achieving these goals would be heavily dependent on funding from the UN, the 
OAU, ECOWAS “and indeed the international community.”156  
The provisions on reintegration reflect the shortcomings of the Conakry 
Peace Plan generally: the plan is ideal in the context of framework agreement, but 
imprecise in the context of implementing a comprehensive settlement. Economic 
rehabilitation and social reintegration were again made dependent on an uncertain 
amount of donor funding, yet the incentives for disarming prioritized former 
combatants in an environment where resources were very scarce indeed. The 
Conakry plan thus failed to take into account the opportunity cost for civilians and 
non-combatants who never took up arms against the state. The tension created by this 
situation could not serve as a long-term solution to the conflict, and would only 
infringe upon an effort to rehabilitate Sierra Leonean society.157 
Humanitarian aid flow was subject to monitoring by ECOMOG and United 
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Nations military observers under the Conakry Peace Plan.158 A mechanism to 
facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance was to be set out “within the context of 
a Security Council resolution,”159 but this was not forthcoming prior to the 14 
November 1997 start date, nor the ultimate collapse of the plan in February 1998. 
The repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons was to begin on 
1 December 1997, in conjunction with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR).160 Despite the provision of these precise timeframes, however, 
the Conakry Peace Plan—like the Abidjan Accord before it—did not elaborate on 
how these objectives could be achieved. In omitting these details, these mechanisms 
assumed the existence of certain preconditions which the agreement did very little to 
create. For example, successfully repatriating refugees and delivering humanitarian 
assistance would require an assured ceasefire and the absence of ongoing fighting 
around the country. While the Conakry text provided for these conditions on paper, it 
did not provide for any confidence-building or cost-increasing measures that might 
have supported and encouraged the implementation of a ceasefire. Accordingly, the 
ceasefire was not strictly adhered to and the provisions on humanitarian and refugee 
assistance never materialised, despite their precise schedules. 
The Conakry text recognized the restoration of President Kabbah’s 
democratically elected government as “the heart of the ECOWAS peace plan.”161 
The text recognized that “for an enduring peace to be restored,” the development of 
“an all-inclusive government” must be ensured.162 To that end, Article 5 set out a 
number of “power-sharing formulae,” recommending “that the new Cabinet should 
be a cabinet of inclusion,” and that civil service appointments should reflect the 
broad national character.163 However, these recommendations are not unlike the 
guiding principles set out under the Abidjan Accord, and in the absence of a precise 
power-sharing formula, there is little detail as to how these changes can be ensured. 
Furthermore, as recommendations of an external actor (ECOWAS), these provisions 
remain subject to the approval of Kabbah’s government, and are therefore low on 
obligation. Finally, Article 8 of the Conakry Peace Plan recognizes it as essential 
“that unconditional immunities and guarantees” be extended to all those involved in 
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the AFRC coup, with effect from 22 April 1998.164 Despite the provision of amnesty 
and the recognition of the need for inclusion, President Kabbah’s eventual restoration 
would be “marred by a personal desire for revenge.”165 
The Conakry Peace Plan is a very short text, bearing similarity to framework 
agreements that anticipate a more comprehensive settlement in the near future. The 
Joint Communiqué issued by both parties upon the conclusion of the Conakry 
negotiations seemed to recognize this, acknowledging the need “to continue 
negotiations towards effective and prompt implementation of the peace plan.”166 
However, this was not to be the case. Within six weeks of the signing of the Conakry 
Peace Plan, the UN Secretary General was reporting on increased military activity 
around the country.167 In February 1998, Koroma conceded “that the Conakry 
Agreement was not being implemented.”168 Events came to a head on 8 February, 
when an ECOMOG vehicle on patrol in east Freetown struck a landmine, 
“whereupon it came under concentrated fire from the junta forces.”169 Convinced that 
the AFRC had reneged on its commitment to the peace plan, ECOMOG launched a 
full-scale offensive and ejected the AFRC/RUF from Freetown on 15 February 1998. 
The Conakry Peace Plan had been cut short by a full two months. The remnants of 
the military junta retreated to Sierra Leone’s dense interior, “excellent guerrilla 
country where fighting could continue indefinitely.”170 In the aftermath of the 
Conakry Peace Plan, the Economist correctly predicted that ECOMOG forces would 
soon find “that Freetown, on a peninsula, is easy to control, while the rest of Sierra 
Leone is a harder prospect.”171 
 Under the legalization framework, the Conakry Peace Plan is medium on 
precision, obligation and delegation. The agreement’s more precise language is 
immediately evident from the provisions on ceasefire monitoring and the 
demobilization of combatants, which explicitly identified UN military observers and 
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ECOMOG units as the monitors for the respective processes. This is a crucial detail, 
given the fact that ambiguity in relation to third-party monitoring was one of the 
major stumbling blocks that brought about the downfall of the Abidjan Accord. In 
other instances, the Conakry Peace Plan is also a much more practical document than 
its predecessor. Instead of the incredibly ambitious programmes for socio-economic 
reconstruction and rehabilitation envisioned under the Abidjan Accord, the Conakry 
agreement proposed small-scale processes supported by incentives and functional 
programmes of implementation. Most striking of these is perhaps the provision on 
the reintegration of combatants. In contrast to the sparse provisions on the 
reintegration of ex-combatants in sectors other than the military under the Abidjan 
Accord, the Conakry Peace Plan set out a programme for training and re-education 
through grants and scholarships in order to incentivise the demobilization of 
combatants. The Conakry Peace Plan is thus more specific than the Abidjan Accord, 
not only as to what its primary objectives were, but as to how these objectives would 
be achieved. Though its short-term focus limits its applicability as a template for 
long-term peacebuilding, the Conakry Peace Plan’s precision and pragmatism is 
instructive of how a peace agreement should transition from the immediate need to 
establish peace, to the more constitutive effort of reconstructing a state. 
Indeed, Bartholomew argues that by drafting the agreement with a higher 
degree of precision than its predecessor, “the authors of the Conakry Peace Plan 
promoted compliance with this second peace agreement.”172 But that was not 
necessarily the case. Bartholomew identifies the provisions on third-party monitoring 
and the reintegration of ex-combatants as being particularly precise, but neglects the 
fact the ceasefire provided for under the Conakry Plan was not adhered to, despite 
being worded in a similarly precise manner. Thus, many of the promising provisions 
on the resettlement of refugees, the provision of humanitarian assistance and the 
reintegration of former combatants, never materialised despite their precise 
timeframes. The successful implementation of many of these sensitive provisions 
was dependent on a total ceasefire throughout the country, which the Conakry Peace 
Plan alone could not enforce. The reality of the situation was best summarised by the 
UN Secretary General, who concluded that the ultimate success of the peace process 
depended “on the creation of conditions that would enable the deployment of 
ECOMOG throughout the country and to begin the demobilization exercise as soon 
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as possible.”173 As later events would illustrate, these peaceful conditions could not 
be guaranteed nor enforced on the basis of the Conakry text alone, but ultimately by 
the forceful military intervention of ECOMOG in February 1998. This suggests that 
the precision in the Conakry Peace Plan did not count for much in the absence of 
more elaborate cost-increasing and/or confidence-building measures, which may 
have supported the implementation of the ceasefire. These omissions also highlight 
the potential downfalls of drafting a peace agreement in an overly functional manner. 
While the Conakry Peace Plan was highly commendable as an immediate solution to 
the political and humanitarian crisis that engulfed Sierra Leone at the time, its goal-
oriented approach failed to consider the social and political nuances that created a 
situation of mutual mistrust around the implementation of the agreement. 
Though the Conakry agreement is written through with language that entails 
legal obligation, there are several irregularities that limited the extent to which the 
agreement obligated its signatories. For the most part, the Conakry Peace Plan was a 
plan of action imposed upon the AFRC: many of the substantive obligations 
prescribed by the agreement were undertaken unilaterally by ECOWAS or 
ECOMOG, e.g., the supervision of demobilization, the monitoring of ceasefire 
violations, and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance. Thus, the Conakry Peace 
Plan was only high on obligation with regard to ECOWAS and its organs. There 
were very few, if any, provisions that explicitly obligate the AFRC or RUF. Indeed, 
the processes of demobilization and disarmament were incentivised under Articles 2 
and 6 of the plan, implying that combatants are not compelled to disarm under the 
agreement—that they did so voluntarily. When these processes never materialized, it 
soon became clear that ECOWAS “lacked mechanisms for enforcing compliance or 
guaranteeing that parties to the conflict ‘will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and 
promises will be kept.’”174  
This begs the question as to ECOWAS’s suitability as a third-party actor in 
the conflict in Sierra Leone. The extensive grant of delegation afforded to ECOWAS 
and its monitoring organ under the Conakry Peace Plan could be interpreted as 
dooming the agreement to failure, “as ECOWAS was hardly perceived by the 
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RUF/AFRC as an impartial mediator.”175 ECOWAS’s active role in fighting the 
AFRC junta can only have contributed to the major trust deficit that existed between 
the signatories and prevented the implementation of the Conakry Peace Plan. As a 
unilaterally obligating peace plan with no explicit trust or confidence building 
measures, the Conakry agreement was not likely to survive in this environment on 
the basis of its text alone: ECOMOG’s subsequent forceful restoration of President 
Kabbah is a testament to this. 
 As a footnote to this analysis of the Conakry Peace Plan, one must consider 
the legality of ECOWAS’s military intervention under the terms of the agreement. 
Within the parameters of this thesis, particularly, it is important to consider 
ECOWAS’s actions in terms of how the Conakry Peace Plan was perceived as a 
political or legal document, and what this means for conflict resolution instruments 
and peace agreements more generally. ECOMOG’s intervention cut the 
implementation of the Conakry Peace Plan short by a full two months, in direct 
contravention of the agreement’s terms and its principles on power-sharing, 
democratic participation and inclusion.176 However, the terms of the Conakry Peace 
Plan had long been breached before ECOWAS used force to expel the AFRC junta. 
Skirmishes between the signatories had persisted throughout Sierra Leone, despite 
the fact that the plan called for a general ceasefire. By February 1998, the two 
foremost provisions of the agreement—the cessation of hostilities and the beginning 
of the demobilization processes—had not been established.177 Because many of the 
Conakry agreement’s subsequent provisions were entirely dependent on the total 
cessation of hostilities, the failure to establish an immediate ceasefire had the effect 
of “crippling the Agreement almost from birth.”178 The Conakry Peace Plan thus 
necessitated military action to ensure compliance with its terms, and this in fact may 
have been the only way to ensure that the broader goals of the agreement were 
accomplished. But though the ECOWAS intervention would provide for Sierra 
Leone’s transition back to democracy under the Conakry plan, it would not serve as a 
resolution of the civil conflict in the country, as events over the following year would 
prove. 
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6. III. C. THE LOMÉ PEACE ACCORD (1999) 
 Over the course of 1998, the RUF steadily reversed the gains made by the 
ECOWAS intervention.179 By the end of the year, the rebels had advanced within 
touching distance of Freetown, “and notwithstanding repeated protestations to the 
contrary by the government, the United Nations chief military observer, and others, it 
became clear that an attack on the city was likely.”180 Freetown was thus ill-prepared 
when the RUF and AFRC jointly launched Operation ‘No Living Thing’ on 6 
January 1999. Over the course of a few days, the rebels unleashed an unprecedented 
wave of violence on the civilian population of Freetown, killing an estimated 5,000-
6,000 people and maiming, raping and abducting thousands more. Though the rebels 
were unsuccessful in capturing Freetown, the violent assault was a critical moment in 
the evolution of the peace process. The violence and barbarity of the attack altered 
the way in which the conflict was perceived socially, politically and militarily, so 
much so that it was perceived that an accommodation with the rebels was the only 
way to resolve the civil conflict.181  
The resulting Lomé Accord was an agreement preoccupied with peace at any 
cost; conceding more to the RUF than the Abidjan Accord and foregoing “issues of 
justice and the fundamental grievances that led to the war.”182 In order to encourage 
his participation in the peace process, the distribution of diamond resources was 
entrusted to Sankoh—the very man who had enriched himself and funded the RUF 
rebellion on illicit diamond trading. Furthermore, the decision to grant amnesty to the 
RUF was the source of much controversy, given the wanton violence that 
characterised the conflict. Such was the international community’s outrage at Article 
IX that the UN added a disclaimer to the Lomé Accord, declaring the amnesty to be 
“outside the bounds of international law and acceptable practice,”183 though the 
disclaimer was added after Sankoh had signed the agreement and it does not appear 
on the text available to the public.184 Thus, while the Lomé Accord can be seen as an 
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extension or elaboration of many of the Abidjan Accord’s key provisions, Rashid 
argues that “its immediate origins” lay in the RUF and AFRC attack on Freetown.185  
From a legal perspective, the Lomé Accord is a much more compelling 
document than its predecessors. Daase commends that the agreement “was drafted in 
a conspicuously legal-looking format, including a preamble and an operative part.”186 
While this is not altogether an unusual feature of the peace process in Sierra Leone, 
what sets the Lomé Accord apart from previous peace efforts is its considerable 
detail and much stronger language in terms of legal obligation. As the lengthiest of 
the three peace agreements, the Lomé Accord was also the longest lasting peace 
settlement to the conflict in Sierra Leone.187 However, the agreement alone did not 
establish an immediate end to hostilities. Military enforcement of the Lomé Accord’s 
ceasefire was necessary over a year after the agreement’s conclusion, and it was 
necessary to supplement the original text with subsequent agreements.188 These 
unanticipated interventions highlight the legal omissions that allowed the Lomé 
Accord to be overtaken by political and military events on the ground , and explain 
why “an answer to the conflict in Sierra Leone cannot be found within the four 
corners of this document.”189 
Part One of the Lomé Accord calls for “a total and permanent cessation of 
hostilities” between the government and the RUF.190 Crucially, Annex 2 to the Lomé 
Accord precisely defines what the parties accept as ceasefire violations,191 
evidencing a very high degree of precision in prescribing what behaviour is 
prohibited under the agreement, and increasing the sense of obligation by compelling 
the parties to refrain from such behaviour. The ceasefire obligates both parties to 
communicate “the terms of the present Agreement, and written orders requiring 
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compliance” to their respective forces,192 and to reveal the strength and location of 
all combatants and all or military hazards to the ceasefire monitoring bodies.193 The 
explicit provision of these orders highlights the high degree of precision and 
obligation with which the Lomé Accord was drafted, and hints at previous instances 
when miscommunications and ongoing skirmishes rendered ceasefires meaningless. 
A Ceasefire-Monitoring Committee (CMC) chaired by the United Nations Observer 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) is given an active field-role in monitoring, 
verifying and reporting all violations of the ceasefire.194  While verification 
mechanisms were provided for under previous agreements, the provisions on 
ceasefire monitoring under the Lomé Accord are unparalleled in their scope and 
detail. Unlike Conakry, the Lomé Accord identifies a neutral monitor in the form of 
UNOMSIL and provides for the representation of the key belligerents in the 
monitoring process.195 However, UNOMSIL’s role as originally envisioned under the 
Lomé Accord was that of an observer only.196 It arguably lacked the enforcement 
measures necessary to implement a rehabilitative power-sharing agreement such as 
the Lomé Accord.197  
Part Two of the Lomé Accord provides for a power-sharing arrangement that 
allows the RUF to share “the responsibility of implementing the peace,”198 at least on 
paper. Article III provides for the transformation of the RUF into a political party,199 
and mirrors many of the “rights, privileges and duties” set out previously in the 
Abidjan Accord, e.g., the freedom to publish, unhindered access to media and 
freedom of association.200 The Lomé Accord displays a greater degree of precision in 
these provisions, tabling the clarification of potentially contentious issues—such as 
RUF appointments to the civil service—for immediate discussion on a specified 
date.201 Article V specifically sets out the appointments that would allow the RUF to 
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take part in a power-sharing government. Sankoh was to become Vice-President of 
Sierra Leone and Chairman of the Board of the Commission for the Management of 
Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD). A further 
senior cabinet appointment, three cabinet positions and four additional Deputy 
Ministerships were also made available to the RUF.202 
Many Sierra Leoneans felt that making Sankoh the Vice President of the 
country and giving him Chairmanship of the CMRRD took the Lomé Accord’s plea 
for “genuine national unity and reconciliation”203 a little too far.204 However, the 
agreement may have been worded so as to give Kabbah’s government “more room to 
manoeuvre than the RUF probably understood.”205 Though the RUF were granted 
significant cabinet positions under the agreement, these positions would be 
terminated at the date of the next general election. This limited the RUF’s political 
tenure to a period of two years.206 Furthermore, though the agreement over-
compensated the RUF in its provisions, the government was able to under-
compensate the Front in the agreement’s implementation.207 Instead of granting the 
RUF “[o]ne of the senior cabinet appointments such as finance, foreign affairs and 
justice;”208 the government assigned the less-senior portfolios of Trade and Industry, 
Land, Housing and Central Planning, Energy and Power, and Tourism and Culture to 
the RUF. When the RUF protested, the government relied on a semantic argument, 
pointing out that the portfolios suggested under Article V should not be construed as 
guaranteed.209 According to their interpretation of the text, the government “could 
therefore designate any posts considered to be of the same standing as those 
indicated.”210 In this manner, the government was able to retain a close grip on the 
implementation of the Lomé Accord and subtly influence its outcome. Such a strict 
interpretation of the text reiterates the importance of how a peace agreement is 
worded and how minor textual and linguistic details can affect the sustainability of 
an agreement. 
A Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) was envisioned as the 
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principle vehicle “for supervising and monitoring the implementation of and 
compliance with the provisions” of the agreement.211 The agreement granted the 
CCP considerable powers over many of the peacebuilding bodies envisioned under 
the agreement, including the right “to inspect any activity or site” connected with 
implementation, and the authority “to organize its work in any manner it deems 
appropriate.”212 Under s.9, the Commission is entrusted with the preparation of any 
protocols that may be required to elaborate upon the Lomé Accord. Furthermore, the 
CCP can make recommendations for improvements to the President of Sierra Leone, 
and bodies that fail to fulfil their duties under the agreement can be brought to the 
attention of the President.213 This is a crucial detail, which allows for a process of 
dispute resolution through the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders, as provided 
for by Article VIII. The composition of the CCP and the duration of its mandate is 
also explicitly set out under Article VI.214 Though the CCP is the same body 
envisioned under the Abidjan Accord, the crucial difference—as with many of the 
Lomé Accords provisions—is the level of detail afforded to it on this occasion. In 
explicitly providing for quasi-legislative powers, consequences in the event of a 
breach or non-compliance, and a form of dispute resolution, the Lomé Accord 
provides for many of the details that were postponed for further discussion under the 
Abidjan Accord, and empowers the CCP as a body capable of implementing the 
agreement with immediate effect. 
A crucial addition in the Lomé Accord’s text is the provision of a dispute 
resolution process in the form of the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders. 
Article VIII provides that “any conflicting differences of interpretation” of the entire 
agreement or any of its implementing protocols may be resolved through that 
body.215 The decisions of the Council were to be binding, provided that there was 
consensus among four members of the Council and that an appeal procedure to the 
Supreme Court was afforded to the aggrieved party.216 The omission of an official 
dispute resolution mechanism had been fatal to previous agreements in Sierra Leone, 
and its provision in the Lomé Accord provided a forum where “potentially explosive 
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misunderstandings could have received special attention.”217 Ultimately, however, 
the government did not opt to establish the Council, “even though its establishment 
would not have been costly.”218 Though the resurgence of the RUF’s military 
campaign throughout 2000 questions the utility of a dispute resolution process, the 
absence of such a mechanism allowed the RUF’s grievances to escalate into 
violence, and the omission of a proper forum remains a “fundamental negligence on 
the part of the government….”219 
Article VII sets out an impressively detailed method of managing Sierra 
Leone’s natural resources through an autonomous public body—the first such 
provision to explicitly address diamonds in any of the peace accords that grappled 
with the conflict in Sierra Leone. A Commission for the Management of Strategic 
Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) is given “full 
control over the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other resources, for the benefit of 
the people of Sierra Leone,”220 and the government is strongly obligated to provide 
for its establishment under s.13 of Article VII.221 The body of Article VII sets out the 
CMRRD’s mandate and addresses a broad range of issues pertaining to illegal 
possession, security and the exportation or local resale of state resources.222 Under 
s.2, the government is obligated to make the “exploitation, sale, export, or any other 
transaction of gold and diamonds” illegal, save for those made by the CMRRD.223 
Furthermore, the CMRRD is equipped with significant powers of enforcement. 
Further to the provisions obligating the relevant security forces to take “all necessary 
measures against unauthorized exploitation,”224 s.7 permits the Government to “seek 
the assistance and cooperation of other governments” to prosecute the illegal 
exploitation of strategic resources.225 This level of detail, taken together with the 
precision afforded to the CCP’s mandate, is evidence of the progress throughout the 
conflict in Sierra Leone to ever more legalized peace agreements. 
Part Three of the Lomé Accord addresses ‘other political issues,’ the most 
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controversial of which was “the absolute and free pardon and reprieve”226 granted to 
the RUF under Article IX. The international community’s reaction to Article IX was 
somewhat surprising, given that blanket amnesties had been a feature of both the 
Abidjan Accord and the Conakry Peace Plan, and their provision had not been a 
cause for as much concern on those occasions.227 While Article IX is clearly 
influenced by Article 14 of the Abidjan Accord, the insertion of the word ‘reprieve’ 
could be construed as “a veiled threat to the RUF leadership”228—a warning that if 
the group did not abide by the agreement, its members would face prosecution for 
their crimes at a later date. That a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a 
Special Court for Sierra Leone were established after repeated violations of the Lomé 
Accord by the RUF somewhat validates this interpretation. In any event, Article XI’s 
contribution to the sustainability of the Lomé Accord is a moot point. Some would 
argue that the amnesty only encouraged the RUF to pursue their goals by violent 
means in the aftermath of the agreement.229 However, omitting the amnesty provision 
would not have counteracted this, nor the myriad factors that nearly felled the Lomé 
Accord in May 2000.230 Though the political development of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone certainly influenced the sustainability of the Lomé process—and the 
vitality of peace versus justice debates—it is unlikely that the wording or inclusion of 
an amnesty was solely responsible for the difficulties that the Lomé Accord endured 
in its implementation. 
The other political issues covered under Part Three of the Lomé Accord 
include a schedule for the next elections,231 as well as provision for a Constitutional 
Review Committee and a new National Electoral Commission. The Constitutional 
Review Committee is tasked with reviewing the Constitution of 1991 and 
recommending amendments so that “no constitutional or any other legal provision 
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prevents the implementation of the present Agreement….”232 Article XII provides for 
a new independent National Electoral Commission, though its provisions replicate 
much of what the Abidjan Accord had to say on reconstituting the Commission, 
without elaborating upon its mandate.233 S.4, however, additionally requests the 
assistance of the UN, OAU, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Nations in 
monitoring the next scheduled elections in the country. In formally identifying these 
actors and annexing their role as monitors to the agreement, the Lomé Accord once 
again displays a higher degree of precision and obligation than its predecessors. 
Part Four of the Lomé Accord addressed the considerable post-conflict 
military and security issues that faced Sierra Leone at the time, and the depth of this 
section evidences some of the lessons learned from previous attempts to resolve the 
conflict. Under Article XIII, the ECOMOG mandate was expanded to include a 
peacekeeping role and to provide protection for UNOMSIL observers and 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration personnel.234 The security of these 
persons was further guaranteed by Article XV, which displays high precision and 
obligation in committing the government and the RUF to the “safety, security and 
freedom of movement” of UNOMSIL staff and property throughout Sierra Leone.235 
The explicit provision of an identified actor (ECOMOG) to provide further security 
as part of the agreement once more evidences a higher degree of precision, obligation 
and delegation in the Lomé Accord than in its predecessors, and highlights the 
difficulties that beset previous agreements in this regard.  
The process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration was to be 
carried out by a peacekeeping force—comprised of ECOMOG and UNOMSIL—and 
coordinated by the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (NCDDR).236 Article XVI avoids previous mistakes in relation to the 
demobilization process, explicitly providing for identified actors to carry out 
disarmament and identifying the kamajor militias and other “paramilitary groups” as 
elements also requiring demobilization.237 The disarmament of civil militias and 
mercenaries was a necessity that had consistently neglected under both the Abidjan 
Accord and the Conakry Peace Plan. Article XVI also obligates UNOMSIL to be 
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present “in all disarmament and demobilization locations to monitor the process and 
provide security guarantees to ex-combatants.”238 The express provision of these 
guarantees, coupled with the security guarantees extended to peace monitors under 
Article XV, set the Lomé Accord apart as a highly legalized document, given that no 
such provisions were included under the Abidjan or Conakry agreements. However, 
Article XVI also reiterates the urgent need for funding, which repeatedly jeopardised 
peace efforts in Sierra Leone. Indeed, despite the fact that the NCDDR received “the 
lion’s share” of external funding, there remained a US$20 million shortfall in 
funding for the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration some nine 
months after the agreement was signed.239 As a result, progress in relation to these 
processes was extremely slow. Suspicion of the disarmament process was also rife 
among the leadership of former combatants. Battalion leaders felt “that only faction 
leaders could really and truly disarm those they had armed, and should therefore be 
entrusted with the wherewithal to do so.”240  
Efforts at reintegrating former rebels into the new SLA were similarly 
poor.241 This is unsurprising, given the lack of detail on the issue in the Lomé 
Accord. The imprecision that plagues Article XVII on restructuring the SLA bucks 
the Lomé Accord’s trend of improving on earlier agreements. Like the Abidjan 
Accord, the Lomé Accord did not establish any criteria for reintegration, and no cap 
was set on the amount of units that may be absorbed into the demobilized military. 
This lack of detail allowed for misunderstanding in relation to post-conflict 
opportunities for ex-combatants. The restructuring of the armed forces is worded so 
as to avoid the mistakes of Abidjan in other respects, however. Under Article XIII, 
the withdrawal of ECOMOG forces is scheduled to be phased in accordance with the 
“creation and deployment of the restructured armed forces.”242 This avoids the 
disastrous consequences of the Abidjan Accord, which precisely provided for the 
withdrawal of EO without providing for an appropriate authority to fill the security 
vacuum left by its departure. 
Part Five of the Lomé Accord addresses the Humanitarian, Human Rights 
and Socio-Economic issues of the conflict. This includes provision for the release of 
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all prisoners of war and abductees under Article XXI, and the repatriation, 
reintegration and security of refugees and displaced persons under Article XXII. The 
influence of the Abidjan Accord is evident in Part Five, with Articles XXIV and 
XXV replicating almost entirely the Abidjan Accord’s human rights guarantees. The 
only significant difference is that the Human Rights Commission originally 
envisioned under Abidjan was now mandated as “an autonomous quasi-judicial” 
body “for addressing grievances of the people in respect of alleged violations of their 
basic human rights.”243 In order to further strengthen the protection of human rights, 
an empowered Truth and Reconciliation Commission was also envisioned to address 
“the question of human rights violations since the beginning of the Sierra Leonean 
conflict in 1991.244  
The ‘carrying over’ of the more commendable aspects of the Conakry Peace 
Plan is evident from Article XXVII, which provides for the delivery and security of 
humanitarian relief in a much more detailed manner than the Conakry document. 
Both obligation and precision rank high throughout this article, with both parties 
guaranteeing the security and freedom of movement of security personnel.245 An 
Implementation Committee is tasked with identifying safe routes for the transport 
and delivery of humanitarian assistance.246 Notably, neither Article XXVII nor 
Annex 4 explicitly identify an appropriate body to “facilitate the implementation of 
these guarantees of safety,”247 which is surprising given the tendency to explicitly 
delegate such tasks to the appropriate bodies elsewhere in the agreement. 
The latter articles of Part Five address critical funding issues, which once 
again prove difficult in the Sierra Leonean context. Like Abidjan, the Lomé Accord 
provides for “financial and technical resources for post-war rehabilitation, 
reconstruction and development,”248 as well as a special fund for the rehabilitation of 
war victims.249 The special needs of women, as well as child soldiers—both of whom 
endured unique experiences of suffering and loss during the conflict—is recognized 
for the first time in the conflict by the Lomé Accord, which provides for their 
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consideration in relation to social reconstruction and reintegration efforts.250 The 
agreement also prescribes the provision of basic education and affordable health care 
for all Sierra Leoneans.251 However, all of these essential provisions are made 
somewhat dependent on (“the support of”) the international community. Funding 
these provisions is thus made difficult under an agreement that pledges dedicated 
resources to almost every aspect of the peace process, making competition for the 
scarce domestic resources “almost anarchical.”252 The ability of the state to deliver 
on these promises is called into question by Article XXXI’s language, which states 
that the government can only “endeavour” to provide free basic education and 
affordable health care.253 These practical realities make the promise and potential of 
the Lomé Accord dependent on the support and capability of the international 
community, which may explain why implementation of the agreement proved so 
difficult. 
The extent to which the Lomé Accord is dependent on the international 
community is codified by Article XXXIV, which provides for “Moral Guarantors” to 
ensure the implementation of the agreement in good faith and integrity.254 The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone later held that Article XXXIV merely made the “non-
contracting signatories” of the agreement “moral guarantors of the principle that… 
‘this peace agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both 
parties.’”255 The moral guarantors assumed no legal obligation as part of this role.256 
Further to the formal role of the moral guarantors, Article XXXV issues a plea for 
international assistance in implementing the Lomé Accord in the same spirit of 
integrity and good faith. Article XXXV is once again evidence of the extent to which 
the implementation of the peace process is almost entirely dependent on external 
actors. The article states that the many states and organizations that supported the 
Lomé process believe “that this Agreement must protect the paramount interests of 
the people of Sierra Leone in peace and security,”257 and reiterates the dire need for 
financial and technical assistance in achieving this goal. However, the unique 
difficulties of implementing peace in an environment where the state institutions of 
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administrative, economic and military power are profoundly weak became apparent 
in the wake of the Lomé Accord once more. 
The final Part Eight of the Lomé Accord provides for its registration, 
publication and immediate entry into force. However, despite the Lomé Accord’s 
comprehensive provisions and considerable detail, its immediate implementation 
proved problematic, and the Accord’s text soon highlighted the peculiar challenges 
to peace-building that Sierra Leone posed. Though the agreement promulgated 
gestures of good faith and a generous power-sharing arrangement, the 
implementation of the Lomé Accord continued to be plagued by mutual mistrust. 
Ongoing clashes between the belligerent parties continued in the provinces, and 
delayed the deployment of the bolstered United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) and the effective implementation of the disarmament and 
demobilization procedures. By late January of 2000, only 13,000 combatants had 
been disarmed, in stark contrast to the 45,000 envisioned by the deadline of 15 
December 1999.258  
The UN forces charged with these procedures under the Lomé Accord also 
proved largely ineffective. On 4 May, 208 peacekeepers were taken hostage by the 
RUF, and their 13 armoured personnel carriers were seized.259 Two days later, the 
number of UN hostages rose to 500, as UN forces under the command of Indian 
Major General Vijay Jetley “apparently surrendered to the rebels without firing a 
shot.”260 Effectively rearmed with UN weaponry, the RUF began to advance on 
Freetown in the captured armoured personnel carriers. Events came to a head when 
civil society groups organised a protest outside Sankoh’s residence in Freetown, 
demanding the release of the UN peacekeepers and a halt to the RUF advance on the 
capital.261 The RUF soldiers guarding the residence opened fire on the protestors, 
killing 21 civilians in the process and causing Sankoh to flee.262 This prompted the 
arrest of all RUF representatives in the government, and upon his capture ten days 
later, the arrest of Sankoh. Less than a year after its signature, the power-sharing 
provisions envisioned under the Lomé Accord had collapsed.263  
The situation inspired British military intervention in Sierra Leone, with the 
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British mission expanding to reinforce the beleaguered UNAMSIL. In November 
2000, under renewed military pressure from the British-backed SLA, the RUF 
entered into negotiations with the Sierra Leonean government once more. This 
process culminated with the Abuja Agreement, which reaffirmed the ceasefire 
provisions and the political process envisioned under the Lomé Accord. UNAMSIL 
forces—which had previously been prevented from deploying in RUF-controlled 
areas—were able to deploy nationwide, and this allowed the implementation of the 
Lomé Accord to properly begin. The adoption of Resolution 1343 (2001) by the UN 
Security Council in March 2001 finally sounded the death knell for the RUF’s 
decade-long campaign by threatening economic sanctions against Charles Taylor’s 
Liberia if it did not desist in funding the RUF and harbouring its members.264 Having 
lost the support that had sustained the group for almost 10 years, the RUF had no 
other option but to enter into the peace process. The RUF soon agreed to a 
simultaneous disarmament with the kamajor militias under a reviewed Abuja 
Agreement.265 At an arms destruction ceremony celebrating the ultimate success of 
the disarmament provisions, the UNAMSIL Force Commander declared the civil war 
officially over on 17 January 2002.266 
The fundamental mistake underpinning the Lomé Accord appears to be the 
flawed assumption that Sankoh and the RUF were genuinely interested in making 
peace. Though there existed “a desperate desire” to make peace with the RUF in 
1999,267 an agreement born of such circumstances could hardly be expected to 
produce a sustainable peace.268 The Lomé Accord appeased the RUF with political 
and personal reward, in the hope that “it would be willing to end the fighting and 
reinvent itself as a legitimate political movement ready to vie for power in a 
democratic context.”269 The Lomé Accord did very little to ensure this outcome, 
however. The agreement lacked mechanisms to deter RUF non-compliance, despite 
the fact that the rebels’ insincerity toward the peace process was evident after the 
Abidjan Accord.270 Concerns about the RUF’s commitment to the peace process 
could have been somewhat assuaged by providing for sanctions or other compliance-
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ensuring measures, but “the agreement’s sponsors and guarantors could not come up 
with credible threats nor mechanisms for triggering effective sanctions for non-
compliance with various deadlines for important steps.”271 Thus, despite the Lomé 
Accord’s high-obligation, the absence of credible threats of enforcement afforded 
Sankoh “enough room to manoeuvre and eventually blow the accords to pieces” once 
the RUF’s commitment to the peace process began to wane.272  
However, if certain legal provisions are to make peace agreements more 
stable and can compel even the most errant of treaty-partners, then blame for the 
failure of the Lomé Accord cannot be laid squarely at the feet of the RUF. Instead, 
we must consider the way in which the agreement is legally written, and how the 
language used may have shaped the implementation of the agreement. The Lomé 
Accord serves as an interesting example of the effects of precision in this context. 
The agreement was written through with precise details of these obligations and 
exact timetables for their accomplishment/implementation, in contrast to previous 
agreements that had omitted these crucial minutiae. However, such precision was not 
necessarily an advantage in the Sierra Leonean context, given the unpredictable 
nature of the RUF and its disregard for the rule of law. For example, the Lomé 
Accord’s detailed provisions on the processes of disarmament and demobilization 
did not have a contingency plan “should the unexpected happen.”273 Given Sierra 
Leone’s history of conflict resolution efforts, the negotiators should have predicted 
that unexpected hurdles would jeopardize the stability of the agreement and provided 
for flexible responses accordingly.274 
The success of the Lomé Accord was further hampered by its extremely tight 
implementation deadlines, very few of which were actually accomplished on time.275 
The deadlines envisioned under the Lomé Accord misunderstood post-conflict 
peacebuilding as a “quick-fix programme” that could be implemented 
immediately.276 In providing for such difficult and ambitious targets to meet, the 
drafters of the Accord failed to consider how “post-war reconciliation and 
consolidation of peace is a drawn-out process that requires sustained commitment 
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without predetermined time frames.”277 The Sierra Leonean experience thus 
reiterates the need to offset precise instructions and detailed obligations against 
flexible provisions and reactionary agreements, and forces us to consider the 
difficulties inherent in maintaining that balance. 
 The use of precision throughout the Lomé Accord further highlights how the 
wording of a peace agreement affects the resulting peace process. Indeed, in their 
analysis of the Lomé Accord’s power-sharing provisions, Binningsbø and Dupuy 
observe that the insertion of several minor provisions allowed Kabbah’s government 
to maintain unilateral control over the implementation of the agreement.278 For 
example, by vowing to facilitate RUF political participation “within the spirit and 
letter of the Constitution,”279 Kabbah’s incumbent government were able to maintain 
the existing political structures enshrined under the Constitution. Because the 
agreement only unilaterally bound the government to enact measures to facilitate 
RUF participation in existing political structures, Kabbah’s government were able to 
“control the appointment of ministries and the structure of the post-accord 
government.”280 Thus, the unilateral implementation of the Lomé Accord was 
arguably an effective strategy in and of itself, allowing the government to achieve its 
ultimate goal: “defeat of its adversary through political marginalisation and eventual 
elimination.”281  
 From a comparative perspective, the Lomé Accord is higher on the 
legalization matrix than any of its predecessors. Even as a more legalized agreement, 
however, it failed to resolve the conflict on its terms, and more forceful methods of 
enforcement where required to make the agreement functional. What does this say 
about our hypothesis that legal guarantees can bridge even the most difficult of trust 
and security scenarios? Can the pen truly be wielded to greater effect than the sword, 
even where a party to a conflict has shown little regard for the cost of life and the 
rule of law? This analysis of such a scenario in Sierra Leone confirms that while 
certain legal provisions have an influence on the sustainability of emerging peace 
processes, these provisions only represent one strand of an incredibly complex and 
slow-burning process, comprising economic, political and deeply social factors. A 
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legally-informed analysis such as this certainly casts light upon that process 
however, even if it does not illuminate the entire picture. In this regard, the Lomé 
Accord reveals a great deal about processes of implementation, and how they can 
fundamentally alter the written content of an agreement.  
For example, the Lomé Accord ranked high on the precision matrix and set 
out a tightly timetabled process, but it failed to provide for the reactive and bipartisan 
bodies necessary to make that process work. During the implementation stage, the 
government neglected to establish the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders—the 
one body explicitly tasked with resolving different interpretations of the Accord. 
This was a crucial omission that represented a clear break from the process 
envisioned under the terms of the agreement. As a result of this neglect, there were 
no appropriate forums or mechanisms to stop any differences of opinion from 
descending into conflict. Implementation thus had a significant impact on how the 
process envisioned under the agreement—which appeared ideal on paper—were was 
to function in reality. 
 The obligation strand of the Lomé Accord could also have been bolstered 
throughout its implementation phase. Though the agreement is much higher on 
obligation than its predecessors both in terms of scope and depth, RUF-compliance 
remained elusive regardless. It was only when punitive and coercive measures—such 
as the revision of UNAMSIL’s mandate and the Security Council’s Resolution on 
Liberian assistance to the RUF—were introduced that the implementation of the 
Accord as envisioned under its terms could proceed. In the absence of these punitive 
measures and a dispute resolution mechanism, the obligations in the Lomé Accord 
remained lacking in legally binding power. Despite the form and protocol they 
adhered to, they did not possess the legal bite necessary to compel a group of proven 
insincerity, such as the RUF.  
 In a similar manner, many of the Lomé Accord’s delegatory provisions 
adopted legal-sounding language, though some of the grants of delegation made 
throughout the agreement were largely ineffective, e.g., the request for international 
involvement, the provision of moral guarantors. Others, as in the case of UNOMSIL, 
were defective. Under the agreement, UNOMSIL was tasked with monitoring the 
ceasefire and disarming the belligerents with the assistance of ECOMOG, but its 
original mandate was not initially robust enough to allow its units to use force to 
coerce non-complying actors. The failure to authorise UNOMSIL appropriately had a 
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significant effect on the way in which the process envisioned on paper panned out in 
practice. When the UN eventually permitted UNAMSIL to engage the RUF 
forcefully, “[t]he rebellion died out, the government stabilized, and the peacekeepers 
went home.”282  
This suggests that the implementation phase of an agreement is absolutely 
crucial to its sustainability, and that errors in this regard can bring down an 
agreement rich in potential and high on legalization, such as the Lomé Accord. Once 
the difficulties of implementation were overcome, the Lomé Accord was utilised as a 
stable foundation for lasting peace in Sierra Leone: a testament to the vision of the 
agreement as it existed on paper. Thus, while an analysis of the legal provisions of 
the Lomé Accord alone may not be enough “to fully comprehend the challenges of 
peacebuilding transitions,”283 such an examination does offer valuable insight into 
how those challenges interact, and the lasting contribution that solid legal 
foundations can make towards sustainable processes of peace. 
 
6. IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 The civil war in Sierra Leone profoundly problematizes one of the main 
hypotheses underpinning this thesis—that providing for proven or ‘ideal’ legal 
provisions in a peace agreement will lead to a more sustainable, and ultimately 
successful, peace agreement. The peace process in Sierra Leone featured many of the 
tried and tested peace-making mechanisms, none of which secured peace by virtue of 
their inclusion alone. The repeated attempts to resolve the conflict offer a powerful 
rebuttal to the arguments that soft accords can serve as a worthy alternative to hard 
power, and that highly legalized agreements can serve as a substitute for peace 
agreements bearing the status of hard law. Yet despite the significant complications 
that it levels against our hypothesis, there remains much to learn from the Sierra 
Leonean experience. In much the same way, the difficulty of making peace in Sierra 
Leone does not defeat our argument, but instead offers valuable insights into making 
peace in seemingly intractable situations. It is to those insights that we now turn. 
 One of the most obvious trends that emerges from a retrospective view of the 
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Sierra Leonean peace process is the tendency towards precision as the process wore 
on. From the initial programme for peace broadly envisioned under the Abidjan 
Accord to the exacting schedule and elaborate detail of the Lomé Accord, attempts at 
resolving the conflict took on a more functional and purposeful tone as the conflict 
raged on.  This is immediately observable when one recalls the imprecision that 
plagues the Abidjan Accord’s otherwise ambitious peace plan. Precision was so 
lacking that even the short-term goals pertaining to security and disarmament failed 
to materialize, putting the long-term sustainability of the process and the viability of 
its institutions in a precarious position. The Conakry Peace Plan evidences an 
awareness of this fact, with its higher degree of precision and its overbearing focus 
on an immediately workable resolution of the conflict.  However, its purpose as an 
immediately workable, short-term solution to the fighting meant that the precision 
necessary to navigate the long-term complexities of a post-conflict society in 
transition was still left wanting. 
 The Lomé Accord thus exhibits the highest degree of precision out of all the 
agreements that emanated from the Sierra Leonean peace process. The agreement 
adopts the long-term ambition of the Abidjan Accord, but elaborates upon many of 
the most promising provisions with a sense of specificity that was lacking in the 
preceding agreements. Similarly, the Lomé Accord borrows from the Conakry Peace 
Plan’s functional quality in providing for a precise means of achieving short-term 
security objectives and humanitarian relief. Though these details did not prevent the 
major setbacks that befell the agreement, the Lomé Accord did boast the dubious 
honour of being the longest lasting peace agreement to the Sierra Leonean conflict, 
and eventually provided a stable foundation upon which the parties could build a 
sustainable peace. Its ultimate success as a process document somewhat substantiates 
the positive correlation between highly legalized peace instruments and more 
sustainable processes of peace. 
 The tendency towards harder legalization and higher precision as the Sierra 
Leonean conflict wore on certainly seems to equate to progress towards more stable 
and sustainable agreements. That this did not result in an immediately successful 
Lomé Accord is of significant import, however. The Sierra Leonean experience 
highlights that all of the complexities and unpredictabilities of making peace cannot 
be accounted for on paper, no matter how precise the terms. Writing agreements 
through with precision therefore entails a careful balancing act between providing for 
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a stable, long-term, framework for peace, and affording that process the flexibility to 
go the distance. This is a balance that stakeholders in Sierra Leone failed to strike. 
For example, the Abidjan Accord entailed both short-term and long-term objectives, 
many of which would provide the basis for the negotiations influencing the Lomé 
Accord. However, precision was so lacking in the agreement that even the most basic 
and immediate pre-requisites to peace, such as a ceasefire and processes of 
demobilization, failed to materialize. The Conakry Peace Plan, on the other hand, 
adopted a higher degree of precision than its predecessor, but it entailed a quick-fix 
solution to the fighting rather than a transitional process of social rehabilitation and 
reconciliation. 
 The Lomé Accord appeared to strike an ideal balance between its two 
predecessors, envisioning an immediately actionable security plan, a comprehensive 
solution to the conflict in the long-term, and a seemingly flexible timeframe that 
varied from precise to open-ended as the process developed. However, the Lomé 
Accord could not maintain this balance in practice, and though its long-term 
objectives were eventually realised, the agreement appears to have over-compensated 
in striving towards a more precise elaboration of the terms initially set forward in the 
Abidjan Accord. The provisions on demobilisation and disarmament, in particular, 
have been criticised as “inflexible,”284 conforming to too strict a timeframe, and 
proving incapable of reacting to unexpected events.285  
The entire experience thus offers valuable lessons with regard to reconciling 
precision and flexibility, two seemingly opposed characteristics of peace-making. 
Precision is to be preferred in legalized agreements, but agreements must also be 
equipped with the flexible means to react to events as they develop. In this regard, 
effective dispute resolution mechanisms—a notable omission from the prolonged 
peace process in Sierra Leone—could have been valuable. Such vital channels of 
communication would have allowed the agreement to evolve as a process and 
transition from short-term to long-term objectives with the input of the stakeholders 
concerned. In the absence of such bodies, agreements in Sierra Leone became static 
instead of reactive, and well-intentioned solutions were often overtaken by events.286 
The Sierra Leonean example speaks to the importance of these bodies during the 
                                                          
284 Bright (n 1) 39. 
285 Alao and Ero (n 11) 125. 
286 Richards (n 252) 18. 
 162  
implementation stage, which marks the transition of the agreement from a perfectly 
written document to a lived-in process and fundamentally influences how the words 
in an agreement are interpreted over time so as to ensure the long-term sustainability 
of the original text. 
Another interesting aspect of the short term/long term discussion is the fact 
that each of the agreements became immediately bogged down in their short-term 
implementation. The fact that the Lomé Accord could not achieve its short-term 
objectives even with its heightened precision calls the sincerity of the signatories into 
question, and is telling of another crucial omission throughout the Sierra Leonean 
conflict: cost-increasing provisions in the event of non-compliance. Despite the 
particularly high levels of mistrust that permeated each of the peace agreements in 
Sierra Leone, none provided for effective punitive measures where parties did not 
abide by their commitments. As a result of this omission, a culture of impunity 
prevailed throughout the Sierra Leonean peace process. This had significant 
ramifications for the way in which the parties’ perceived the peace agreements as 
legal documents: “since there was no cost for the violation of the provisions of the 
various peace accords, the warring factions were therefore emboldened to flaunt 
them.”287 If peace agreements of uncertain legal status are going to serve as effective 
methods of conflict resolution, then strands of obligation must be strengthened with 
cost-increasing provisions that empower agreements with threats of consequence and 
tangible effect. These provisions are essential in conflicts of mutual mistrust and 
proven insincerity, such as Sierra Leone. 
The negative effects of building peace through threats and legal consequences 
could have been mitigated by more specific confidence-building measures, which 
could have fostered genuine participation and inclusivity in the peace process. In the 
absence of such measures, agreements tended to adopt a top-down approach to 
implementation, with the state—or ECOWAS in the case of the Conakry Peace 
Plan—encouraged to pursue a strategy of unilateralism. For example, the state, and 
the incumbent government, was viewed as the primary vehicle for the 
implementation of the Abidjan Accord. A role as an equal partner in peace was not 
envisioned for the RUF under the agreement’s text, which assumes the RUF’s 
participation without providing for incentives should they follow the political 
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process, or consequences should they fail to do so. In much the same way, the Lomé 
Accord overwhelmingly entrusted the task of implementation to the incumbent 
government, despite precisely providing for a power-sharing arrangement. Kabbah’s 
incumbent government was thus able to influence the political narrative shaping the 
emerging peace process and the legal procedures governing RUF participation in 
government, thereby marginalizing the rebels even further. This speaks volumes to 
the detrimental effects of unilateralism on agreement stability, and to the potential 
benefits of inclusive and participatory means of implementation on sustaining 
processes of peace over the long-term. 
Whether a direct consequence of the bilateral nature of negotiations 
throughout the peace process, or the questionable legitimacy of the RUF’s ideology, 
agreements resulting from the civil war in Sierra Leone repeatedly failed to address 
the key issues underpinning the conflict. Though the RUF had originated as a 
battalion-sized instrument of Charles Taylor’s bidding, the rebels enjoyed popular 
support for a time due to its role as a provider in a state void of employment and 
educational opportunity. The agreements themselves did little to substantially 
grapple with these difficult issues that provided the context for the RUF’s campaign. 
The Abidjan Accord, for example, made rhetorical reference to the state’s 
contemporary history of corruption and election fraud, and acknowledged the 
important socio-economic aspects of the conflict. However, the agreement offered 
very little by way of a concrete programme for economic rehabilitation and societal 
development. The Lomé Accord, though commendable in providing for power-
sharing and addressing the illicit exploitation of diamond resources, was 
comparatively sparse with regard to reintegration and rehabilitation efforts, leaving 
many of these issues to be addressed in the volatile implementation phase. Each of 
the agreements thus failed to offer sustainable solutions to the social problems that 
had made conflict a viable way of life for those committed to the RUF’s campaign. 
Many of the conflict’s proximate causes—and the government’s inability to 
substantially address them throughout the peace process—stem from Sierra Leone’s 
peculiarly difficult position as a failing state in the period prior to, and during, its 
civil war.  Funding and resource allocation were constant sources of uncertainty that 
threatened the state’s ability to provide basic services and contribute to post-conflict 
rehabilitation. All of the major agreements that attempted to resolve the civil war 
underscored the need for financial and technical assistance from the international 
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community, yet proceeded to commit the government to a range of socio-economic 
objectives. This created a dangerous precedent whereby many of these objectives 
were guaranteed on paper, but almost entirely dependent on donor funding in 
practice. Indeed, even after the war was officially declared over in 2002, the Sierra 
Leonean economy as a whole remained heavily dependent on donor funding.288 
These features highlight a state in such an advanced state of decline that it could not 
fulfil even the most essential of obligations it had committed to under several peace 
agreements.  
It is difficult to imagine how any agreement—no matter how carefully 
worded, or balanced between short-term and long-term commitments—could survive 
in such an environment. This begs the question as to whether a negotiated settlement 
was ever going to be the optimum outcome of the civil war in Sierra Leone. Though 
the conflict had been allowed to fester due to the weaknesses of state institutions that 
might have contained it, conflict resolution efforts in Sierra Leone repeatedly 
attempted to resolve the conflict through those same weakened political institutions. 
The conflict had erupted in a power vacuum, however, and could only be contained 
when that vacuum was filled, as evidenced by the British military intervention and 
the UN’s nigh-on administration of the country. In a Sierra Leonean context, the 
answer may lie in confronting root causes through imposed solutions focused on 
state-building, rather than containing its symptoms through hamstrung peacebuilding 
bodies. 
Dependence on donor funding, high unemployment, and a persistent lack of 
opportunity in the wake of the Lomé Accord did not give reason for optimism in 
post-war Sierra Leone. Reno, writing in 2000, regretfully opined that the Lomé 
Accord would not usher in democracy and prosperity in Sierra Leone, but “return the 
country to the status of a protectorate in fact, if not in name….”289 However, the next 
decade saw “unprecedented reconstruction, reconciliation and phenomenal growth 
rates,”290 brought about by significant international engagement with the country and 
a national commitment to making peace work. This led UN Secretary General Ban 
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Ki-moon to celebrate the nation’s efforts, citing Sierra Leone as “one of the world’s 
most successful cases of post-conflict recovery, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.”291 
Indeed, despite the many setbacks encountered in the prolonged pursuit of peace in 
Sierra Leone an examination of the peace process offers valuable lessons in the 
context of agreement design, and several interesting counterpoints to the central 
hypotheses underpinning this thesis. Ongoing negotiations involving non-state actors 
in weak or failing states such as Mali, South Sudan and Libya, can learn much from a 
case study of conflict and state collapse in the African context, and recent 
agreements in those countries should be considered in light of the Sierra Leonean 
experience. Furthermore, the transition of Sierra Leone from “test case on state 
collapse”292 to post-conflict success story captures the need for instruments of 
conflict resolution to articulate both short-term and long-term commitments, and 
include institutions that foster both peace and state building. Upon as politically 
unstable a foundation as the Lomé Accord, Sierra Leone managed to make 
“remarkable economic progress,” and transformed itself from a recipient to a donor 
of peacekeeping operations.293 Such an achievement further highlights the 
importance of the implementation stage in sustaining emerging processes of peace, 
and Sierra Leone serves as an ideal case study of success and failure in that regard.
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7. 
A ‘Peace-meal’ approach to peace-making in Sudan 
 
The Sudan falls sharply into two distinct areas, both in geographical area, 
ethnic groups, and cultural systems... [T]here is nothing in common between 
the various sections of the community; no body of shared belief, and above 
all, the Sudan has failed to compose a single community.1 
 
[T]he Sudan has been looking for its soul, for its true identity. Failing to find 
it..., some take refuge in Arabism, and failing in this, they find refuge in 
Islam as a uniting factor. Others... take refuge in separation. In all of these 
there is a lot of mystification and distortion to suit the various sectarian 
interests... [W]e need to throw away all these sectarianisms and look deep 
inside our country and the experience of others... [w]e can form a unique 
Sudanese civilization that does not have to take refuge anywhere.2 
 
7.  I. INTRODUCTION 
 The geographic region of the Sudan is no stranger to violent conflict. From its 
independence and period as the single largest state in Africa, through its division in 
2011 into two separate nations made up of distinct majority and minority ethnic 
groups, conflict has been the norm rather than the exception in the region. This 
history of conflict predates Sudanese independence, and some argue that it was 
woven into the fabric of the nascent Sudanese state.3 As a pawn in the political 
manoeuvres of colonial Britain and Egypt, the Sudan was administered as two 
separate regions, “with political power and control of the country’s extensive natural 
resources, as well as decisions over education, policy, language and cultural identity, 
centered in the north.”4 Inequality between north and south was thus institutionalized 
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long before Sudanese independence or the first flames of civil war. Following 
independence, the government in Khartoum drew on colonial policy in pursuit of 
stability in the new Republic of Sudan, and adopted it as “an essential term of 
reference” in response to growing social tensions in the south.5  Faced with “glaring 
inequalities” in terms of economic opportunity and political parity,6 the South took 
up arms against the central Sudanese state, initially as a myriad coalition of tribes 
and later, under John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A). The resulting intrastate conflicts—particularly the First Civil War (1956-
1972) and the Second (1983-2005)—caused the deaths of at least 2.3 million 
civilians.7 Successive governments in Khartoum actively targeted the southern 
civilian population by mobilizing tribal militias as proxy forces of the Sudanese 
state.8 Civilians also fell victim to famine and disease—the results of an abandoned 
social infrastructure and a devastated rural economy that was often another target of 
Khartoum’s war of attrition against the South.9 Indeed, the vast majority of casualties 
in the Sudanese conflicts were not the combatants themselves, but southern civilians 
who perished due to the conditions imposed by a protracted state of conflict.  
The Sudanese civil wars thus confronted every form of rule in Sudan,10 and 
survived a range of peace agreements aimed at preserving the unitary Sudanese state.  
Though Africa’s longest civil conflict was resolved with the conclusion of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, many of the symptoms of state 
collapse persist—including a lack of effective state control over considerable 
swathes of territory—and the failures of peacebuilding remain evident. The Republic 
of Sudan is still plagued by civil strife in the Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Darfur 
regions, while South Sudan is engulfed in an ethnically-charged civil conflict of its 
own. These characteristics make the North-South conflict in Sudan a particularly 
novel case study within the parameters of this thesis. A critical retrospective of the 
North-South peace process highlights the conflict dynamics unique to the ongoing 
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conflicts in the Sudan, and thus advances a more informed approach to resolving 
them. 
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the popular narratives used to 
frame the North-South conflict in Sudan. Section II elaborates on Sudan’s colonial 
experience under Anglo-Egyptian rule, and how this period fostered the political, 
economic, and cultural differences that led to the outbreak of the First Civil War 
upon independence in 1956. The agreements that attempted to resolve Sudan’s 
recurring civil wars are analysed in Section III. The valuable lessons imparted by the 
Sudanese experience of peace-making—on the applications and limitations of highly 
legalized peace agreements and autonomous arrangements—are discussed in Section 
IV. 
The debate on the causes of Sudan’s civil wars is—much like the Sudanese 
conflicts themselves—“divisive and far from settled.”11 The effects of religious 
differences, economic exploitation, and colonial intervention have all played their 
part in fuelling the conflict, “but none, by itself, fully explains it.”12 The northern 
Sudanese elite, for their part, perceived the conflict as a local rebellion confined to 
the south; a regional mutiny instigated by conspiring international actors,13 and thus, 
a southern problem. The Khartoum regime neither recognized the conflict as a civil 
war, nor a national crisis, and its approach to peace-making lacked any real sense of 
urgency.14 South Sudanese people, on the other hand, have largely perceived the 
conflict as one rooted in ethnicity and religion.15 Sudan itself has been described as a 
religious battleground between the Arab-Islamic north and the African-Christian and 
Animist south, and any attempt to discount this aspect of the conflict “yields an 
incomplete and distorted picture of the country.”16 From independence onward, the 
central government repeatedly pursued aggressive policies of Arabization and 
Islamization in order to create an ethnically-distinct Islamic nation state in Sudan. 
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Rather than unifying the country, these policies only served to alienate southerners 
and accelerate “the very centrifugal forces it sought to restrain.”17 The southern 
rebellion thus represented a fierce resistance to the systematic oppression of their 
identity, and a demand for a secular ‘New Sudan,’ or alternatively, an independent 
South. 
However, the simplicity of this clash of cultures discourse belies the 
complexity of the North-South conflict, upon which a number of factors were 
brought to bear. El-Battahani explains the fighting in Sudan as a conflict between the 
centre and the periphery, arising from “economic, resource-based, ethnic, cultural, 
religious and international”18 concerns, all of which were exacerbated by the 
centralized government’s “crisis of legitimacy and its utility as a vehicle for 
economic exploitation.”19 Indeed, power was entirely centred in northern Khartoum 
and in the hands of a northern, Arab-Islamic elite whose vision rarely extended 
beyond the borders of its own political constituency and power base in ‘the golden 
triangle’ between the Blue and White Niles.20 In the eyes of this elite, the south was 
seen only as “an afterthought, an appendage, and a marginalized section of 
society.”21 Southern leaders soon realized that the chronic underdevelopment and 
cyclical violence in the south was the product of the northern elite’s high-handed 
policies “and their resolve to retain their grip on the region.”22 When the SPLM/A 
emerged following the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983, it 
successfully reframed the conflict as one between the centre and the periphery.23 The 
movement was able to popularly articulate how processes of “political 
marginalization, economic underdevelopment, and cultural domination” in the south 
had become institutionalized under rule from Khartoum.24 For the SPLM/A, this 
abuse of the democratic process made the realization of a ‘New Sudan’ or an 
independent South Sudan an imperative.25  
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Even prior to the North-South negotiations that culminated with the CPA, 
commentators noted that a successful agreement would require “a genuine change in 
the perception of the roots of the conflict.”26 A peaceful end to the North-South 
conflict proved particularly difficult for that very reason: confronting the root causes 
of the civil war would necessitate a radical reframing of Sudanese society. As 
Connell surmises, the conflict did not lend itself to simple solutions, because every 
issue carried significant political, cultural and economic value—“from the definition 
of what it means to be a citizen of Sudan to who controls the country’s newfound oil 
wealth….”27 This represented a particular challenge for the central government in 
Khartoum, which had, up unto this point, maintained a privileged position with 
regard to these key aspects of Sudanese society. The state’s reluctance to confront 
these contested ideas of state and society can be readily observed in the peace 
process, which has time and again omitted or neglected key issues, and “largely 
explains why many peace agreements have been dishonoured or not sustained.”28 For 
example, the political implications of land ownership are so acute that peace 
agreements have declined to address it in any substantive or legal manner, “deferring 
much of the work to the post-agreement phase.”29 In sacrificing such a key issue in 
the interests of political expediency, negotiators secured the short-term goal of an 
immediate cessation of hostilities.30 However, the long-term implications of that 
sacrifice were shown up in Abyei in the years following the CPA, and continue to 
play out in South Sudan and the contested regions of the Republic of Sudan. A 
retrospective analysis of the Sudanese peace process thus offers an opportunity to 
further muse on the transition from the short thrift of words on paper to the long view 
of implementation, and the failure to learn from previous efforts, as per Gopalan.31 
While the North-South conflict represented a prolonged and violent 
expression of political grievance, it “was just one part of a broader web of conflicts 
involving competing claims… to land, water, natural resources, political power or 
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cultural identity.”32 A study of the North-South conflict thus only reflects one reality 
in this regard. The conflict in Darfur, for example, was not only a reaction to state-
led cultural oppression, but an attempt to force Khartoum to confront the region’s 
systematic neglect, and to “give the people some control over their own futures.”33 
Similarly, the ongoing conflict in the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile regions 
shares many of its root causes with those of the broader North-South conflict, 
including “religion, race, resource distribution, and political marginalisation.”34 
While the interconnectivity of these conflicts is acknowledged, this chapter adopts 
the North-South conflict as its exclusive focus. This reflects the “piecemeal regional 
approach” taken to peace-making by Khartoum,35 which prevented the myriad rebel 
groups from mounting a significant challenge to Khartoum’s privileged position and 
downplayed the national appeal of the SPLM/A.36 Furthermore, because the North-
South peace process spanned 40 years and represents the longest paper trail of 
conflict resolution instruments in Sudan, it affords the opportunity to hypothesize on 
the centrality of certain provisions to conflict resurgence or peace sustainability. 
Indeed, the most fruitful product of the North-South process, the CPA, has become 
the legal standard to which other rebel groups have aspired.37 A critical analysis of 
Africa’s longest civil war is thus central to unpacking the lessons learned from the 
Sudanese experience and the consequences they might have for the ongoing conflicts 
in the region. 
7. II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
7. II. A. COLONIZATION & THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE 
 In his account of the region, Natsios compares Sudan’s history to the sudden 
and deadly sandstorms native to the Sudanic plain: “sporadic and unexpected 
upheavals [that] sweep violently across its vast human landscape.”38 Christianity was 
introduced to Sudan as early as the sixth century, though the Islamic faith slowly 
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expanded through cultural exchange with the Arab world and often through 
conquest. This resulted in the development of several Sultanates throughout the 
country and the emergence of merchant kingdoms along the Nile River.39 These 
political entities, together with the hundreds of Arab and African tribes that 
populated the rest of Sudan, were collectively amalgamated into one nation-state 
under the colonial rule of Ottoman-Turkish Egypt and Britain, laying the unstable 
foundation upon which the modern Sudanese Republic was built.40 Egypt was the 
first to do so, having conquered Sudan by 1821.41 A lasting legacy of this period of 
Egyptian rule was the development of the Nile valley, much to the detriment of the 
other areas.42 What emerged in lieu of effective governance in these peripheral 
regions was “a pattern of economic exploitation.”43 Thus, even a century before an 
independent Sudan, a clearly unequal pattern of development and exploitation had 
been established.44  
 By the mid to late 19th century, the opening of the Suez Canal piqued colonial 
Britain’s interest in Egyptian affairs, and control over the headwaters of the Nile 
increased Sudan’s strategic value. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1899 ushered in a 
period of joint rule, whereby Britain recognized Egypt’s legal claim to Sudan and 
administered the country on behalf of the King of Egypt.45 However, in the 60 years 
that followed and culminated with Sudanese independence, Egyptian influence 
waned and Britain demonstrably asserted its authority over Sudan.46 Any armed 
opposition to British administration was brutally suppressed, shaping the formative 
Sudanese state into “a militarist and highly centralized mould.”47 The post-colonial 
state’s over-developed “organs of violence” would later contribute to the advent of 
military coups as a means of political transition, and the mentality that the conflict in 
the south was merely a mutiny.48  
While the British did make lasting contributions to political institutions and 
transport infrastructure during this time, most of its development projects were 
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focused on the Nile River valley.49 Colonial policy openly reflected this glaring 
inequality in perception, economy and opportunity. Southerners were barred from 
working on a number of notable developments in and around Khartoum—including 
what was then the largest irrigation project in the world.50 The “discontinuities of 
19th century development” thus accelerated under Anglo-Egyptian rule, and the 
disparity between the centre and the periphery grew even more extreme.51 On the eve 
of Sudanese independence, the country existed as two wholly different economic 
systems: one “was relatively well developed and the other was one of the least 
developed parts of the British global empire.”52 This institutionalized pattern of 
underdevelopment and neglect was to be maintained by post-independent regimes in 
Khartoum, and would haunt Sudan for its entire 20th century history.53 
 Following the conclusion of the First World War, the question of Britain’s 
dominion over neighbouring Egypt became more heated and debates about Sudan’s 
independence began to gain traction. Sudanese nationalism had been fostered by an 
emerging, educated northern-Arab elite that had long viewed Britain’s policy of 
native administration as “a subtle way of consolidating power and disempowering” 
the native population.54 This northern elite would come to dominate the nationalist 
agenda in the final days of colonial Sudan, paving the way for an Islamic state that 
did not reflect the needs and wants of its diverse society. Southerners wanted a voice 
within an independent Sudan, but the north’s two major religious parties—the Umma 
party and the Democratic Unionist Party—dismissed their input as neither Islamic 
nor Arab, and therefore, of little importance to their vision for Sudan. Southerners 
also felt that Sudan should be a secular state, as did communists, socialists and 
secularists in the north.55 However, the major Islamic parties in the north insisted on 
a state based on the teachings of Islam, and given their centrality to the independence 
movement, the emerging Sudanese state came to reflect their influence. State and 
society remained contested within post-independent Sudan, however, and these 
issues continued to dominate the ensuing North-South conflict from Sudan’s 
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independence in 1956 up until the conclusion of the CPA in 2005. 
With the British administration departing Sudan throughout 1955, hundreds 
of northerners travelled south to fill the resulting vacancies.56 Of the 800 posts 
advertised to replace the colonial administration, 40 were guaranteed for native 
southerners, though they were received as little as six junior posts.57 Social unrest 
spread as the south began to worry about its place within a northern-dominated 
Sudan. Events came to a head in August 1955, when southern troops from the old 
British Equatorial Corps mutinied in Torit. Though the mutiny was soon supressed, 
300 people—two-thirds of whom were northern Sudanese—were killed as a result of 
the violence.58 The declining situation caused the British to accelerate their departure 
from the country, “since officials there still had responsibility with little 
corresponding control.”59 This resulted in the premature proclamation of the 
Republic of Sudan on 1 January 1956, though it lacked the necessary political 
infrastructure and many of the features of statehood. In their haste to get out of 
Sudan, the British had left the country with only a temporary constitution that did not 
address two of the most sensitive issues confronting the independence movement: the 
status of the south within Sudan and the role of Islam in national politics.60 Born into 
civil war, the fledgling state underwent a trial by fire which saw several governments 
come and go. It was not until 1972 that this tumultuous period was brought to an end, 
and Sudan enjoyed a period of relative peace under the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
 
7. II. B. THE FIRST SUDANESE CIVIL WAR (1955-1972) 
The temporary constitution that Khartoum inherited from colonial Britain 
declared Sudan a secular republic, which reflected the country’s highly diverse 
population of some 500 tribes and over 150 languages.61 Successive administrations 
in the newly independent Sudan proved ineffective at managing these differences in 
practice, however, and attempted to impose a singular Sudanese identity throughout 
the country to consolidate control. The dominant Arab-Islamic identity was thus 
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employed by Khartoum’s northern Arab elite as a central tenet of state-building,62 
and institutionalized policies of Arabization and Islamization became a feature of the 
new republic.63 However, far from creating the unified identity that the Arab elite 
visualized for Sudan, these policies often had the opposite effect: “they created a 
fierce reaction which in many ways solidified and cemented identities along ethnic 
and cultural lines rather than creating one hegemonic identity.”64 Fleeing from state-
oppression, arbitrary detention and torture, increasing numbers of southerners 
followed their political leaders into exile in neighbouring countries.65 It was in exile 
that southern leaders were able to ferment a “simmering southern insurgency” under 
the banners of the Anyanya—a rebel movement which took its name from the ethnic 
Madi word for ‘snake poison.’66 By 1964, the Anyanya had a force of about 5,000 
irregular troops that continued to cause a security concern in south Sudan, but did not 
pose a major challenge to the North’s effective control over the region.67 
The initial Anyanya campaign was beset by difficulties, however. From a 
military and strategic point of view, the movement did not possess a single 
personality “with the moral authority, experience, intellectual capacity, or fighting 
ability” to unite the various southern tribes in pursuit of a common goal.68 The 
movement was plagued by southern tribal rivalries that encouraged political 
competition among the Anyanya leaders and prevented the formation of a unified 
command structure and a coherent plan to defeat the north.69 The central government 
would later manipulate these southern rivalries throughout the Second Civil War to 
divide the southern movement. However, the political and military capabilities of the 
Anyanya improved dramatically in 1967, when Joseph Lagu—Chief of Staff to the 
movement’s President—formed a bloodless coup and united the various southern 
tribes under his command. Lagu was able to do so by securing a deal with the Israeli 
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government for the provision of modern weapons systems and military training.70 
Significantly bolstered by these developments, the Anyanya was able to mount a 
conventional military campaign against the North, thereby increasing the pressure on 
Khartoum to come to a political settlement of the ‘southern problem.’  
Political instability in the capital throughout the 1960s made the pursuit of a 
diplomatic solution ever more remote, however. Sudan suffered a series of 
“ineffective and short-lived” civilian governments,71 though the processes of 
Arabization and Islamization continued unabated. Meanwhile, the military continued 
to stoke the flames of civil war, harassing the southern political elite and perpetrating 
acts of violence against the civilian population.72 The sustained paralysis of 
successive civilian administrations provoked military intervention in May 1969. 
Colonel Gaafar Nimeiry’s bloodless coup was largely based on the secular, socialist 
and pan-Arab ideals of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, which had brought Abdel 
Nasser to power.73 Soon after taking power, Nimiery announced his intention to 
resolve the conflict in the south through negotiated settlement, and set about devising 
a system of decentralized government for the south.74 It was becoming increasingly 
clear that a military solution to the southern conflict was unlikely.75 Though 
Anyanya’s attempts to take key garrison cities in the south were repeatedly repulsed, 
the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) were proving incapable of defeating the 
movement in rural areas (a pattern that would re-emerge during the Second Civil 
War).76 By suing for peace, Nimiery could thus present himself as a peacemaker in 
the south, and consolidate his tenuous political support in the north. However, while 
Nimiery’s political pandering secured the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, it would 
also be responsible for its deconstruction in the ensuing decade. 
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7. III. THE AGREEMENTS 
7. III. A. THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT (1972) 
 The Addis Ababa Agreement was heralded as ‘an African achievement’77 that 
could inspire hope for the reconciliation of a broader African problem: the 
relationship of the Arab communities of northern Africa to the native population of 
the sub-Sahara.78 At an initial meeting in Addis Ababa in January 1971, the 
indicators of a potential peaceful settlement were encouraging: Nimiery declared a 
unilateral ceasefire, while Lagu vowed to constrain military action on the part of his 
commanders.79 The two did not meet again until February 1972, once more in Addis 
Ababa. After only 12 days of talks, Nimiery and Lagu were able to initial a peace 
agreement. Talks had nearly broken down over one key issue—whether the South 
would be permitted to retain its own army. Indeed, Alier alleges that this was the 
grounds upon which the real struggle for power between the belligerents was 
fought.80 However, with the careful mediation of Haile Selassie, Emperor of 
Ethiopia, the parties were able to move past this contentious issue.81 The SAF was to 
remain united under one government, but with a regional southern command 
comprised of both southerners and northerners. However, in omitting to confront the 
issue of religion and its relationship with the state, Nimiery had paved the way for its 
undue influence over the peace process in the years to come. Furthermore, in 
granting the South an elected regional assembly, Nimiery permitted the region to 
enjoy a degree of autonomy unavailable anywhere else in the authoritarian state.82 
This upset the natural balance of Nimiery’s regime, prompting a significant shake-up 
when the odds became stacked against him in the years that followed. 
 The Addis Ababa Agreement was essentially a legal mechanism to devolve 
autonomous powers to south Sudan, in realization of Nimiery’s stated intention to do 
so upon acceding to power in 1969. The agreement itself recognized this, describing 
the agreement as an organic law of the national assembly to be confirmed by a 
referendum in the South.83 The agreement created a self-governing ‘Southern 
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Region’ of the provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile,84 as well as 
any other areas “that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern 
Complex as may be decided by a referendum.”85 The Agreement recognized the 
territorial integrity of the whole of Sudan, however, and obligated both parties to 
“strive to consolidate the unity of the Sudan and respect the spirit of the National 
Constitution.”86 The conception of the Southern Region reflected the socialist 
aspirations of Nimiery’s Sudan, guaranteeing equal opportunity of education and 
employment, and prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of “race, tribal origin, 
religion, place of birth, or sex.”87 An Appendix on Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms elaborated further on the rights that should be protected by the 
Constitution of the Republic of Sudan, including freedom of religion and cultural 
freedom for minorities. Though these acknowledgments settled the ethno-religious 
disputes that had fuelled the civil war in theory,88 they would not be enough to 
sustain the conflict’s resolution in the long term. Functional political institutions that 
could bridge the economic divide between the two Sudans would be required, and it 
is unclear whether the Addis Ababa Agreement delivered in this regard. 
Under the Agreement, legislative authority was vested in a People’s Regional 
Assembly.89 The Regional Assembly could legislate in key areas, including 
administration of regional finance, public health, and natural resources, “without 
prejudice to the right of the Central Government in the event of the discovery of 
natural gas and minerals.”90 However, in other vital areas, including education, 
policing, regional infrastructure and land use, legislation had to conform to “National 
Plans,”91 thereby rendering the Regional Assembly’s autonomy somewhat 
ambiguous.92 The Assembly possessed many of the features of a liberal democratic 
government, however, including the power to relieve any member of the Executive 
from office for reasons relating to the public interest, and could petition the President 
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to postpone any law—or withdraw any bill, pending the views of the Regional 
Assembly—that could adversely affect the welfare, interests or rights of the peoples 
of the Southern Region.93  
Executive authority was vested in the High Executive Council, which was 
headed by a Regional President and exercised its power on behalf of the President of 
Sudan. The Executive Council was charged with directing the various departments in 
the Southern Region and initiating the laws for the creation of a Regional Public 
Service.94 However, the President of the Republic retained significant control over 
the Regional Executive, having the power to appoint and relieve the President of the 
Executive and any member of the High Executive Council.95 Indeed, in the 11 year 
period of peace following the Addis Ababa Agreement, Nimiery interfered in every 
election for President of the High Executive Council,96 suggesting that the southern 
autonomy espoused on paper was perhaps more restricted than it appeared. 
Chapter VII of the Agreement addressed finance and funding for the Southern 
Region, and permitted the Regional Assembly to levy regional taxes as the primary 
source of revenue for the Southern Region.97 However, as Ladouceur notes, the tax 
base in the area was so small that the regional government was rendered dependent 
on subsidies from the national treasury and external donors.98 The central 
government did undertake to make contributions to a number of development 
projects in the South, including contributions towards agricultural and industrial 
projects, and grants for the establishment of education institutions.99 However, by 
1976, the government had only delivered on a fraction of its obligations in this 
regard.100 Unspecified funds were also made subject to a vote by the National 
Assembly and the “requirements of the region” under the agreement,101 calling the 
idea of southern economic autonomy into question once more.  
Though the Southern Region was not granted its own military, the Agreement 
provided that southern citizens would be integrated into the national military “in such 
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reasonable numbers as will correspond to the population of the region.”102 
Accordingly, the SAF presence in the Southern Region was to consist of a 12,000-
man Southern Command, comprised of 6,000 southern citizens and 6,000 men from 
outside the region.103 A Joint Military Commission, comprised of three senior 
military officers from each side, was to oversee the recruitment and integration of the 
southern detachment, and disagreements were to be referred “to the respective 
authorities.”104 The bilateral and precise nature of these arrangements allowed the 
deployment of the Southern Command to take place in “an atmosphere of peace and 
confidence,”105 but the agreement had failed to provide for those who were not 
assimilated into the meagre vacancies offered by the regional force. This omission 
would later lead to social unrest and violence during implementation of the 
agreement. 
The Addis Ababa Agreement concludes with ceasefire and transitional 
arrangements that evidenced a high degree of precision and obligation, and ensured 
the successful implementation of many of the agreement’s short-term objectives. 
These included provisions for an Interim High Executive Council—which would 
establish the regional civil service and make arrangements for the establishment of 
the Regional Assembly106—an amnesty for those who took part in any act of mutiny, 
rebellion or sedition in southern Sudan,107 and a concrete and structured plan for the 
repatriation of internally displaced persons and regional refugees.108 A precise and 
inclusive ceasefire mechanism with investigative and dispute resolution measures 
ensured an appropriate security environment for the implementation of the 
agreement; so much so that by June 1972, southern citizens were in complete control 
of regional administration.109 The initially successful implementation of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement was most likely the result of the agreement’s embedment in the 
Sudanese legal system. Nimiery himself ratified the agreement by executive decree 
on 3 March 1972,110 transforming the peace deal into ‘The Regional Self-
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Government Act for Southern Sudan.’111 A year later, the agreement was 
incorporated into Nimiery’s secular and socialist Constitution. By 1976, the 
Agreement had firmly established “the rules for post-war politics in the South and 
appeared to be gaining a permanent and functional role in the political system of 
Sudan.”112 
In the years following the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement, hopes 
remained high that the agreement had laid the foundations for a sustainable peace. 
Ladouceur, writing in 1975, praised the agreement’s text as a compromise “between 
unworkable federalism and disintegration on the one hand, and between centralism 
and repression of local and regional aspirations on the other.”113 Two years later, 
Kasfir noted that both of the parties remained committed to making peace work 
through the institutions envisioned under the Addis Ababa Agreement, but conceded 
that the long-term viability of the process would remain in doubt “for some time.”114 
A number of indeterminable variables threatened the delicate implementation of the 
agreement, principal of which was the text’s over-reliance on President Nimiery. The 
period of stability that the Southern Region enjoyed in the wake of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement was entirely dependent on Nimiery remaining in power and relying on 
the south for political support. By 1975, the mounting opposition to Nimiery was 
already becoming a significant threat to the burgeoning peace process,115 and some 
were worried that Nimiery could affect a policy-shift towards the Arab world to 
shore up his political position. Violent incidents in major southern cities—including 
the capital, Juba, in 1974—served as a reminder that that conflict between two 
distinct ethno-religious identities had not been resolved by “a single dramatic 
gesture,”116 and proved “an ominous warning” of things to come.117 
The resurging tension between North and South was complicated further by 
declining Sudanese economy and the discovery of oil in the Southern Region in 
1978. Though Nimiery had embarked on a series of large scale development projects 
in the years immediately after the Addis Ababa Agreement—including the 
modernisation of road, rail and telecommunications infrastructure—the projects were 
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largely ineffective, and the income they were supposed to generate did not 
materialize.118 With the nation in rapid economic decline, Nimiery’s regime moved 
to take control of the south’s abundant oilfields.119 When Nimiery introduced 
proposals to re-draw the North/South border—which had been explicitly delineated 
in the Addis Ababa Agreement—he found his proposal blocked by the regional 
assembly. Nimiery’s response was to simply divide the Southern Region into three 
smaller units, thereby abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement entirely, and returning 
the South to the way that it had existed prior to the agreement.120 Republican Order 
Number One, issued on 5 June 1983, replaced the regional assembly in Juba with 
three weaker legislative bodies with no independent fiscal autonomy, vested the 
election of governors in Nimiery alone, removed the proportional representation of 
southern citizens in the SAF Southern Command, and reinstated Arabic as the 
official language.121 “The final nail was driven in the coffin of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement” in September 1983, when Nimiery introduced the infamous September 
laws.122 These laws established Sharia law as the basis of the Sudanese legal system, 
and underscored the alienation and estrangement of southern Sudan from the 
Islamized North,123 triggering the outbreak of the Second Civil War under the 
banners of the SPLM/A. 
The collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement was not readily observable upon 
its conclusion in 1972. The Agreement was precisely worded and appeared to 
guarantee a democratic regional government with considerable autonomy that could 
exist in tandem with Nimiery’s vision for a secular Sudan. However, there is textual 
and structural evidence to suggest that the Agreement was never intended as a 
national accord that would endure in the long run.124 Though Nimiery was certainly 
eager to bring the civil war to an end, “[h]e had no intention of giving up indirect 
control over budgets, appointments, natural resources, policy, or military forces 
deployed in the South.”125 This is reflected by the Addis Ababa Agreement, which 
placed significant limitations on the Southern Region’s autonomy with regard to 
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these key areas, and allowed Nimiery to directly interfere with the autonomous 
organs in practice. Precision was thus a means of appeasing the South with the 
promise of autonomy, “while creating enough ties to bind the region into Sudan as a 
whole.”126 Though at first glance, the document appears to be a very generous and 
legally compelling compromise, the unilateral control bestowed upon Nimiery under 
the agreement’s terms reveal the process not as an effort to resolve the conflict on 
mutually agreeable terms, but to consolidate control over the whole of Sudan under 
one autocratic regime. 
Several other commentators attribute the Addis Ababa Agreement’s demise 
to the chronic underdevelopment and economic neglect of south Sudan over an 
extended period of time. Beswick, for example, maintains that the Agreement was 
“doomed in advance because the prevailing social and economic conditions in the 
South were such that any democratic government would probably have failed.”127 
Economic rehabilitation of the south was something which the Addis Ababa 
Agreement very much took for granted. The long-term viability of the agreement was 
largely dependent on the Southern Region’s ability “to make substantial progress on 
economic development” in a short space of time.128 However, the Southern Region’s 
limited tax base made the region dependent on national and international funding, 
which was inadequate in both cases.129 The agreement also failed to consider how a 
systematic process of exploitation had resulted in the South’s chronic 
underdevelopment. The central government did little to address the North-South 
divide, contributing only a fraction of its obligations towards development of the 
South,130 and continuing to locate development projects in the North.131 Those who 
returned to the South expecting an autonomous government with an equitable share 
in the nation’s resources found unemployment, starvation and poor medical care 
instead.132 Anyanya soldiers, neither demobilized nor reintegrated, roamed the 
Southern Region, frustrated with the lack of progress achieved by the peace deal. 
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Violent incidents followed in Juba (1974) Akobo (1975) and Wau (1974 and 
1976),133 and crime rose to unprecedented highs.134 The social unrest destabilized the 
Addis Ababa Agreement, and culminated with the outbreak of the Second Civil War 
in 1983. 
The Addis Ababa Agreement—as the product ultimately of a domestic 
legislative process—was an example of hard legalization. The Agreement’s text 
evidenced a high degree of precision in particular, setting out the composition, 
powers and procedures of the Southern Region’s autonomous organs in considerable 
detail, and securing a stable post-conflict environment through detailed and inclusive 
bodies that would oversee a ceasefire and the repatriation of refugees. Moreover, the 
Agreement guaranteed a compromise on the South’s most pressing concern—i.e., 
southern proportional representation in the SAF—and appeared to offer a concrete 
plan for economic development of the region. However, the limitations imposed 
upon southern autonomy by the text’s carefully constructed provisions rendered the 
process vulnerable to the political manipulation that ultimately derailed the Addis 
Ababa Agreement. Though the agreement’s high precision secured an autonomous 
Southern Region within months of the Agreement’s conclusion, it ensured that that 
polity would function on terms exclusively and wholly dependent on Nimiery. As 
soon as it became politically and legally difficult to manoeuvre within the framework 
of the Addis Ababa process, he simply abrogated the entire agreement. 
At best, the Addis Ababa Agreement can be described as a palliative 
solution,135 an experiment in conflict containment rather than conflict resolution. If 
such an outcome was made possible by what was provided for by the Agreement, it 
is all the more worth noting those provisions that were omitted. Given that the 
maintenance of a southern military was of the utmost importance to the Anyanya, it 
is surprising that the Addis Ababa Agreement did not espouse a more concrete plan 
for the reintegration of southern ex-combatants who were not absorbed into the 
Southern Command. The Agreement made no reference to the social rehabilitation, 
education or retraining of these ex-combatants, and this inhibited the growth of a 
sustainable process under the Agreement’s terms. Indeed, several authors note that 
unemployed Anyanya soldiers comprised one of the most significant threats to peace 
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in Sudan at the time.136 It is also surprising that the Agreement did not call for the 
gradual demobilization of Anyanya forces in tandem with the integration of southern 
citizens into the SAF. Given the widespread dissatisfaction with the Addis Ababa 
process as time wore on, the maintenance of an armed rebel group posed a threat to 
the Agreement’s stability even in its early years, and remained one of the major 
factors that led to a resumption of hostilities in 1982.137 Finally, the failure to 
recognize the ethno-religious factors underpinning the conflict contributed to the 
Addis Ababa Agreement’s status as a palliative, rather than a progressive, accord. In 
failing to explicitly address the prominent role that religion had played in Sudanese 
state and society up unto 1972, the Agreement had no contingency plan in the 
inevitable event that it would return as a basis for political power. When Nimiery 
adopted a more Islamic outlook in the mid-1970s, the unresolved antagonistic 
relationship between African and Arab Sudan resurfaced, revealing the Addis Ababa 
Agreement as a mere interval in the overarching conflict between North and South. 
The unrealized potential of the Addis Ababa Agreement led to the outbreak 
of the Second Civil War in 1983, and the emergence of a resurgent southern 
campaign under the banners of the SPLM/A. Under John Garang’s leadership, the 
SPLM/A were able to successfully unite the various southern tribes in their bid “to 
create a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, secular state and a new political culture for the 
country or failing that, secede and form an independent state.”138 In May 1983, 
Garang and some 3,000 other defectors from the Southern Command withdrew to 
Ethiopia, where they regrouped with the remnants of the Anyanya rebellion and 
received support from the Ethiopian Government.139 On 31 July 1983, Garang 
announced the creation of the SPLM/A, and instated himself as Commander-in-Chief 
of its military wing. By 1985, Garang had a fighting force of 10,000 troops, with a 
further 20,000 trained in Ethiopia.140 By the end of that year, the SPLM/A exerted 
control over most of the Southern region, with the exception of the major garrison 
cities which were occupied by some 60,000 SAF troops.141 
By 1990, the SPLM/A’s military campaign had peaked. Over the course of 
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the next year, however, the movement’s fortunes began to turn. The Mengistu regime 
in neighbouring Ethiopia collapsed in May 1991, effectively depriving the SPLM/A 
of “its main operating base, its primary military and financial supplier and most of its 
military momentum.”142 Meanwhile, internal dissent was fermenting over Garang’s 
refusal to delegate power within the movement. In August 1991, three senior 
commanders—Riek Machar, Lam Akol, and Gordon Kong—announced a coup in 
the hope that a significant number of Garang’s followers would join them.143 Support 
for the self-appointed ‘Nasir faction’ was not forthcoming however, and the 
opportunistic government of Omar al-Bashir moved quickly to exploit the split in the 
southern movement.144 Bashir’s government provided the Nasir faction with aid and 
arms and encouraged them to attack their former allies.145 The SAF also took full 
advantage of the SPLM/A’s disarray, and captured its headquarters in Torit in July 
1992. Garang and the SPLM/A retreated to the Sudd Marshes in the South, which the 
SAF could not easily penetrate.146 It would be years before it could mount another 
successful offensive against Bashir’s regime. 
 
7. III. B. THE SUDAN PEACE AGREEMENT (1997) 
Having failed to successfully depose Garang, the Nasir faction were forced to 
turn increasingly towards Khartoum in their struggle for the SPLM/A leadership.147 
The splinter groups’ deepening relationship with the central government intensified 
the fighting between the rival southern groups, prevented a united opposition to 
Bashir’s regime, and added an ethnic dimension to the regional violence in the 
south.148 By October 1994, Riek Machar had emerged as a frontrunner for the 
leadership of the Nasir faction, and renamed the faction the South Sudan 
Independence Movement (SSIM). Seeking to co-opt Machar’s political clout in the 
war against the SPLM/A, the Bashir regime initiated a self-mediated peace process 
entitled ‘Peace from Within.’ The process sought to satisfy international concern 
about the conflict while avoiding the restrictions of an externally brokered peace 
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agreement.149 In reality, ‘Peace from Within’ was just an extension of the Bashir 
regime’s efforts to keep the southern Sudanese opposition movements divided. The 
strategy successfully delayed the emergence of a united opposition, and produced the 
Sudan Peace Agreement—a one-sided, unmediated and imposed settlement “that 
achieved nothing positive for peacemaking in Sudan.”150 
In April 1996, the dissident SPLM/A officers concluded a ‘Political Charter’ 
with Khartoum that identified a federalized system of governance as a potential 
solution to the North-South conflict.151 The Charter also espoused respect for cultural 
diversity and freedom of religion.152 In April of the following year, the charter was 
expanded into a more comprehensive settlement, the Sudan Peace Agreement, which 
provided for a range of constitutional guarantees, fundamental rights and freedoms, 
wealth and power sharing, and a special administrative status for the South pending a 
referendum on self-determination after a four year interim period. The Agreement 
brought the plethora of southern factions that had broken ties with Garang together 
under the umbrella of the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) and its military 
wing, the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF). Garang’s SPLM/A—having been 
excluded from the negotiations leading to the Agreement—duly rejected it as neither 
a sincere nor sustainable solution to the conflict.  
Despite Garang’s protestations, el-Affendi contests that the Agreement was 
initially welcomed “in Africa and beyond” for its rhetorical vision of a secular and 
multi-ethnic Sudan.153 Commentary in Europe noted that, on paper, the accord 
satisfied “virtually all the demands made by the southern rebels since 1983.”154 The 
political process that had brought about the Agreement had also appeared legitimate 
enough to warrant “a senior American official scurrying to Khartoum in July to test 
its sincerity.”155 But the true motives behind Khartoum’s quest for peace were soon 
revealed in the months that followed. To a large extent, the Sudan Agreement was 
merely a means to appease southern aspirations by assimilating Riek Machar into the 
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Muslim-dominated government.156 Moreover, Machar—as an ethnic Nuer—was the 
key to unlocking the Nuer populated and oil-rich Unity State in southern Sudan. 
Having been co-opted into the central state, Machar’s SSDF allowed northern 
interests to move in and develop the oil industry in the region. The SSDF would 
subsequently play a central role in defending the resulting oilfields from attacks by 
the main southern opposition groups.157 This security role would ultimately 
destabilize the Sudan Agreement as the myriad southern armed movements vied for 
control of the oilfields. The resulting factionalism would cause Riek Machar to 
withdraw his support for the Agreement in December 1999. 
The Sudan Peace Agreement begins with the parties’ recognition that only a 
process “based on justice, equality, democracy, and freedom can… assist in the 
solution of the fundamental problems of the people of Sudan.”158 As a result, the 
Agreement is considerably detailed in relation to a number of Constitutional 
guarantees, democratic principles, and fundamental freedoms. The Agreement 
espouses a new national vision of Sudan as “a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-
cultural and multi-religious society,” where “freedom of religion, belief and worship 
shall be guaranteed,” and “no citizen shall be coerced to embrace any faith or 
religion.”159 Though Sharia is recognized as a source of legislation, the Agreement 
affirms that rights and duties are bestowed as a result of citizenship rather than 
religion.160 Furthermore, the parties agree that laws based on common principles will 
apply throughout the federal system, with States possessing the power to enact 
complimentary legislation on matters peculiar to them.161  
The Agreement states the Constitution shall enshrine many of the principles 
of a liberal democratic society, including the presumption of innocence, protection 
from arbitrary punishment, provision for judicial review, and access to the courts.162 
These principles were indeed incorporated into the 1998 Sudanese Constitution,163 
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evidencing the highly legalized process afforded to certain aspects of the Agreement. 
Similarly, many of the basic human rights espoused by the 1997 Agreement were 
given legal effect by the 1998 Constitution, including the right to life and 
inviolability of the human person, the right to equality and equal treatment, freedom 
of religious worship, of expression, of the press, and of association and assembly.164 
The Agreement guaranteed full participation in the political and constitutional 
processes of state, and planned to realize this through “congresses and national 
convention or conference.”165 In this vein, the Agreement was also mindful of the 
need for further balanced representation in the federal organs of state, and provided 
that a public recruitment office would be based in the capital of the Southern 
States.166 
Under the Agreement, south Sudan was to enjoy a special administrative 
status for four years, at which point, it would exercise its right to self-determination 
by referendum.167 The right to self-determination is explicitly affirmed under the 
Agreement as “the right of the people of Southern Sudan to determine their political 
aspirations and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development….”168 To 
those ends, southern citizens could choose either unity with the Sudanese state or 
secession from it.169 In the four year period preceding the referendum, south Sudan 
would be administered by a Coordinating Council which would oversee the 
implementation of the Agreement, the social and economic rehabilitation of war 
affected areas in the south, and the “mobilisation of the people therein for the 
referendum.”170 The Coordinating Council retained many of the procedural powers 
granted to the High Executive Council under the Addis Ababa Agreement, including 
the right to adjourn any legislation tabled in the National Assembly if it adversely 
affected the interests of the Southern States,171 and the power to remove any Minister 
of the Coordinating Council or member of the State governments from office.172  
However, the central government still retained close control over the internal 
workings of the southern administration. Throughout the provisions establishing the 
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Coordinating Council, ultimate control over the appointment and removal of any 
member of the southern administration is clearly vested in the President of the 
Republic. This includes the position of the President of the Coordinating Council, 
right down to the composition of the State assemblies.173 It is thus unsurprising that 
the central government’s failure to cede power to the South posed immediate 
problems for the implementation of the Agreement. When Riek Machar was elected 
President of the Coordinating Council, his nomination for Governor of Unity State 
was blocked by the central government, which supported Paulino Mantieb, a 
dominant military leader in that region.174 When Mantieb broke with Riek’s 
leadership in 1998, it weakened Riek’s already tentative hold over the Southern 
States, and fomented further fragmentation in the southern movement.  
The Coordinating Council exercised executive and legislative authority over 
the Southern States in areas including regional security and public order, foreign 
capital investment, and commercial development.175 The Coordinating Council also 
exercised concurrent powers with the central government on matters pertaining to 
state elections, the public service in the South, and cultural planning.176 In key areas 
associated with the expression of autonomy, however, the Coordinating Council’s 
authority was curtailed “in accordance with national policies.”177 For example, the 
central government retained competence over federal budgeting, economic 
development, mining, national security, and education policy. Similar restrictions 
beset the southern state assemblies. States were granted executive and legislative 
powers in areas including local government, state taxes, industrial and commercial 
development, and health care, among others.178 However, in key areas of economic 
and cultural autonomy, e.g., state economic development and planning, and 
education management, state power was limited in accordance with “Federal 
Planning.”179 These restrictions legally limited Southern autonomy in the same way 
that many of the Addis Ababa Agreement’s provisions had done 25 years previously.  
In order to “bridge the gap between the various States” and achieve “parity in 
                                                          
173 ibid at Chapter Five, s7(1)(c) and 7(1)(f). 
174 Young (n 157) 431. 
175 The Sudan Peace Agreement (n 158), Chapter Five, s(7)(3). 
176 ibid at Chapter Five, s(7)(4). 
177 ibid at Chapter Five, s(7)(3)(a) and (c). 
178 ibid at Chapter Three, s(3)(3)(B)(1), (4),(5). 
179 ibid at Chapter Three, s(3)(3)(B). 
 191  
provision of basic needs…,”180 the Sudan Agreement proposed an equitable 
redistribution of federal revenue and natural resources. Major development projects 
and natural resource refineries were to be considered national wealth and managed 
accordingly, provided that the State in which the project was located received an 
equitable share of the returns from the project, and the citizens from that State were 
recruited to participate in the project.181 A commission would later recommend an 
appropriate revenue sharing formula for the entire country.182 However, the 
government’s unilateral efforts in that regard appear largely rhetorical. Under the 
terms of the Agreement, the Southern States were to generate revenue through state 
taxes, excise duties and licences, and each respective state’s share in the economic 
activities conducted within its territory.183 These provisions repeated many of the 
Addis Ababa Agreement’s flawed provisions on financing the Southern region. 
Without explicit and exacting guarantees on how the nation’s revenue was to be 
shared, the Sudan Agreement rendered the Southern States’ economic sovereignty 
largely dependent on funding from the Federal government and “foreign sources,”184 
in the same way that the 1972 Agreement had done. The government pledged to 
establish development projects, just as it had done in 1972,185 but again, the Sudan 
Peace Agreement exhibited little detail as to how this would guarantee a more 
sustainable solution to the conflict. Given how the 1997 Agreement mirrors many of 
the 1972 Agreement’s ineffective provisions on paper, it is difficult to envision how 
it could have effected an alternative outcome in practice. Having postponed genuine 
agreement on revenue and wealth sharing, and having failed to delegate any 
substantive control over natural resources to the South, the Sudan Peace Agreement 
could not effect a change in the complex economic and cultural relationships that 
characterised Sudan’s civil war. 
The Agreement remained ambiguous with regard to sourcing the necessary 
funding for post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. Despite the 
Agreement’s emphasis on achieving southern self-reliance, the Southern States were 
repeatedly tasked with sourcing development assistance and donations from foreign 
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sources.186 For its part, the Federal Government was to create a special fund to 
finance “crash development programmes,”187 and assist in the development of the 
South by encouraging the establishment of “public sector institutions, development 
corporations and specialised banks.”188 The Federal Government also vowed to 
launch a plan for “the reconstruction, rehabilitation, repatriation and development of 
the Southern States,”189 but what this entails remains ambiguous. Under the Chapter 
on interim arrangements, rehabilitation programmes will be provided with assistance 
“from the national, regional and international humanitarian agencies.”190 Given the 
Sudan Peace Agreement’s form as the product of a domestic legal and political 
process, it is surprising that the agreement was so largely dependent on the good will 
of the international community. With retrospect, this detail was telling of Khartoum’s 
strategy to sell the Sudan Peace Agreement on the international stage as a genuine 
attempt to bring peace to the country—all whilst retaining unilateral control over an 
unmediated peace process. 
Chapter Six of the Agreement established the security arrangements that 
would transition Sudan to a functioning post-conflict society. The Agreement granted 
a general amnesty to all members of the SSDF,191 and provided for the discharge of 
all prisoners and detainees, and their freedom of movement within Sudan.192 The 
SSDF itself would remain in existence as the defence force for the Southern States, 
with responsibility for security and public order throughout the region. Personnel 
working in these sectors would be drawn from the southern States themselves.193 The 
SSDF would remain separate from the national army,194 and the SAF would be 
gradually demobilized in accordance with the needs of a peacetime force “once 
peace is established.”195 The Agreement did not specify a timeframe for when peace 
might be established, however, nor did it envision what peace might look like in a 
nation engulfed in several intra-regional conflicts. This omission should have called 
                                                          
186 ibid at Chapter Three, s(7)(e) and s(6)(a). 
187 ibid at Chapter Three, s(5)(e). 
188 ibid at Chapter Three, s(10). 
189 ibid at Chapter Three, s(6)(a) and (b). 
190 ibid at Chapter Six, s(9)(xii). 
191 ibid at Chapter Six, s(9)(ix). 
192 ibid at Annexe 2 – General Amnesty Proclamation Order 1997, Article 4 & 5. Under Chapter Six, 
s(9)(xi) of the Agreement, A Joint Amnesty Committee and Special Amnesty Tribunal would be 
responsible for implementing the amnesty and dictating who would be covered by its terms. 
193 ibid at Chapter Six, s(9)(ii). 
194 ibid at Chapter Six, s(9)(i). 
195 ibid at Chapter Six, s(9)(ii). 
 193  
the long-term viability of the Agreement into question from the outset. 
The Agreement did establish committees that would oversee and supervise 
the security and ceasefire arrangements during the transitionary phase, however. 
Annexe 1 called for “a total cessation of all forms of hostilities,” and obligated the 
parties to refrain from any policies that might conflict with processes of peace,196 
including hostile military operations, acts of violence against civilians, and 
interference with the free movement of the civilian population.197 The ceasefire was 
to be enforced and consolidated by a Joint Ceasefire Commission, comprised of 10 
officers from each of the belligerent parties,198 with the authority to investigate 
alleged breaches and “to take appropriate measures” in response.199 Local 
commissions, comprised of military personnel, local chiefs and community leaders, 
would support the work of the Joint Ceasefire Commission.200 Parties were obligated 
to communicate the details of their troop movements to the ceasefire commissions, 
and were obliged to carry the necessary departure orders for these manoeuvres on 
their person.201 Despite the precision evident in the Annexes to the Sudan 
Agreement, however, the text displayed little substantive power to compel. The 
Agreement recognizes the Annexes as guidelines to be considered “with a degree of 
flexibility,”202 thereby stripping the Agreement’s more precisely worded provisions 
of their obligatory language. Without an established timeframe for the peace process 
to follow, this degree of flexibility left the Agreement’s fate to be decided 
unilaterally by the central government. 
A Joint Military Committee served as the oversight mechanism for all 
military manoeuvres during the transitionary period, and it had ultimate control over 
the movement of the armed parties.203 The Committee was representative of both of 
the belligerent parties,204 and decisions of the Committee were to be made 
unanimously.205 Crucially, the Joint Military Committee was headquartered at the 
SAF Army General Headquarters, which would coordinate the provision of training, 
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armaments and facilities for the SSDF.206 SAF military intelligence prevented the 
movement from developing any cohesive command structure or substantive political 
clout, however.207 This grossly undermined the SSDF’s capacity to participate in the 
peace process—much like the text of the Sudan Peace Agreement had done—and 
prevented the movement from applying any political pressure that would ensure the 
implementation of the Agreement’s key provisions.208  
As a result, the peace process emanating from the largely rhetorical 
Agreement came under significant strain when the provisions it espoused on paper 
failed to materialise in reality. In December 1999, Riek Machar resigned from his 
position as President of the Coordinating Council and withdrew his support for the 
Sudan Peace Agreement, throwing the south into open conflict once more. Some 
SSDF commanders—including Machar himself—eventually returned to the 
SPLM/A, while others remained committed to the Agreement because of the 
financial benefits, or “the conviction that they alone were committed to southern self-
determination.”209 With the escalation of violence and the return of southern in-
fighting after the Agreement’s collapse, a Sudanese government official reflected 
that “[i]t was the right agreement but the wrong party as far as peace in Sudan was 
concerned.”210 
However, the tendency to attribute the Sudan Peace Agreement’s failure to 
the SSDF’s lack of political clout211 obscures a more nuanced understanding of how 
the Agreement’s text reflected Khartoum’s political manipulation of the process. 
Moreover, the Sudan Agreement was far from ‘the right agreement’ for resolving the 
North-South conflict in any sustainable manner. Granted, the Agreement appeared to 
satisfy southern aspirations on paper: it provided for freedom of religion and belief, a 
more equitable distribution of wealth and power, further representation in the federal 
government, and regional self-government pending a referendum on secession from 
northern Sudan. However, the Sudan Agreement stopped short of taking full account 
of almost all of these issues, and ultimately failed to deliver on many of them.  
For example, even though the Agreement established the Coordinating 
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Council as the principal organ of southern self-government, the central government 
retained competence in key areas including economic development, mining, and 
education policy. While this is not an unusual feature of power-sharing agreements 
(as one can see from the Philippine example), Khartoum’s control over the internal 
workings of the Coordinating Council appeared to compromise southern self-
government entirely. The central government retained ultimate control over the 
appointment and removal of any member of the southern administration, and 
misused this power to appoint individuals that would further northern interests. This 
is evidenced by the central government’s support for Paulino Mantieb as Governor of 
Unity State. The appointment of Mantieb directly contravened Riek Machar’s 
nomination, and stirred the tensions that would ultimately lead to Riek’s resignation 
as President of the Coordinating Council.  
As such, the Coordinating Council’s ability to pursue its greater political and 
economic aspirations was inhibited by the Agreement’s text from the outset. Despite 
its appearances as a legislative act devolving power to an autonomous southern 
government, the Agreement had actually bound the Coordinating Council to 
Khartoum, much in the same way that the Addis Ababa Agreement had done with its 
High Executive Council. Indeed, the Sudan Agreement’s approach to resolving the 
North-South conflict largely mirrors that of the Addis Ababa Agreement, despite the 
25 years that separated the two. Both agreements adopted similar provisions on 
regional self-government, finance, development, and freedom of belief. Given that 
both agreements also relied on good faith and little else, it is unsurprising that the 
Sudan Agreement failed to produce a better outcome than its predecessor. The Sudan 
Agreement did provide for a referendum on southern self-determination, but by 
omitting to delegate unilateral control of the Agreement from Khartoum, the 
referendum became one of many features that never materialized. Indeed, Riek 
Machar himself noted that in securing a referendum for the South, the Sudan 
Agreement conceded an Islamic centre in Khartoum: “That model clearly failed. If 
we don’t change the Centre, and end the dominance of a minority clique, then there 
is little hope for a sustainable peace in the South.”212 The lessons Machar learned in 
this regard would significantly influence his outlook upon his return to the SPLM/A, 
and the ensuing negotiations that would culminate with the CPA. 
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As an agreement that was bound to the domestic legal system, the Sudan 
Peace Agreement—like its predecessor—exemplifies hard legalization. The 
Agreement itself recognized its origins as an organic law, endorsed by the National 
Assembly with the effect of a constitutional decree.213 Similarly, the 1998 
Constitution of the Republic of Sudan incorporated the key terms of the Agreement, 
namely a referendum on self-determination, preceded by an interim regional 
government for the southern States.214 The Sudan Agreement exhibited high 
precision with regard to a number of key provisions, including the duties, functions 
and composition of the Coordinating Council, its competences, the interim 
arrangements on ceasefire and security, and the fundamental rights and freedoms that 
comprised a new Sudanese polity. In the absence of a more precisely defined 
timeframe, however, the Agreement remained low on obligation, and was vulnerable 
to political influence like the Addis Ababa Agreement before it. The Agreement 
provided for a politically weak Coordinating Council that could not further the peace 
process, and was bound to Khartoum on any issue that could potentially further 
southern aspirations. The entire Agreement was dependent on Khartoum 
implementing it unilaterally, in its own good time and in good faith. Given that the 
Sudan Peace Agreement was much more effective as a means of dividing the 
southern movement than it was as a means of resolving the North-South conflict, it is 
doubtful whether that good faith ever existed in the first place. 
With regard to the delegation limb of the legalization matrix, the Sudan Peace 
Agreement did delegate interpretive and enforcement authority to the judicial, 
military and police organs of state. The Agreement could be interpreted by the 
Supreme Court and amended by the National Assembly in consultation with the 
Coordinating Council.215 However, this grant of delegation only contributed to 
Khartoum’s unilateral control over the Agreement’s implementation. Furthermore, 
Khartoum insistence on brokering ‘peace from within’ did little to attract 
international support for the Agreement, and this was critical to its failure.216 The 
lack of support was mainly due to the efforts of Garang’s SPLM/A, which actively 
pressured the international community to denounce and reject the Sudan 
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Agreement.217 Garang’s vision of a secular Sudan in which religion was a personal 
preference resonated with successive US administrations,218 and established the 
SPLM/A internationally as the legitimate representative of southern aspirations.219 
The SSDF was duly left to ponder “why their deal with the government was 
perceived as a sell-out for the South… while the various agreements the SPLM 
signed with northern political parties [were] justified as advancing southern 
interests.”220  
SSDF dissatisfaction is understandable, given that the Sudan Peace 
Agreement served in many ways as a model for the CPA concluded by Khartoum 
and the SPLM/A some 8 years later.221 Indeed, many of the key provisions agreed 
upon in 1997 went on to occupy a central and celebrated role in the CPA, including 
the provisions on a secular Sudan, an interim period governed by a regional southern 
government, and a referendum on self-determination. However, as the SSDF itself 
later conceded, the single and telling difference between the two agreements was that 
the CPA enjoyed international support while its predecessor did not.222 Realizing that 
this would be crucial to any lasting and functioning settlement, the Bashir regime 
agreed to a peace process mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) in 1998. That process would eventually culminate with the 
CPA, which finally brought an end to almost 50 years of war in Sudan. 
 
7. III. C. COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT (2005) 
 The IGAD peace process grew out of the organization’s annual summit in 
1993. Peace negotiations were officially launched in Nairobi in March 1994 and in 
May of that year, the IGAD delegation had issued a Declaration of Principles (DoP) 
“that would constitute the basis for resolving the conflict in the Sudan.”223 The DoP 
stipulated that the people of south Sudan had a right to exercise their self-
determination if the central government did not embrace secularism and democracy, 
and recognized the need for extensive rights of self-government throughout the 
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nation; the separation of State and religion; and an equitable distribution of wealth 
among the multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural peoples of Sudan. The 
SPLM/A readily accepted the DoP as a basis for negotiations, but Bashir’s regime 
was not prepared to accept self-determination nor secularization as preconditions to 
further talks in 1994.224 
 Increasing oil revenues in the years immediately thereafter convinced the 
central Sudanese government to reconsider its position on these issues. Though 
substantial oil deposits had been discovered in Sudan in the 1970s, the essential 
infrastructure needed to extract and export oil was not operational until the late 
1990s.225 The central government’s new found wealth inspired a policy U-turn with 
regard to the south. Southern self-determination within a unified Sudan suddenly 
became a more attractive option than secession and loss of several profitable 
oilfields.226 As oil replaced religious expansion as a reason for war, and the war itself 
inhibited further oil exploration, peace became the logical policy for Khartoum.227 
With international pressure mounting—and the government’s ‘peace from within’ 
strategy failing to alleviate it—Khartoum returned to the IGAD table in October 
1997, and finally agreed to negotiate on the basis of the DoP in May 1998. 
Initially, the IGAD initiative struggled to achieve anything of importance. 
During negotiations in June 2002, it became clear that any meaningful progress 
would be subject to the resolution of two major issues:  the relationship between 
religion and the State, and the right of South Sudan to self-determination. The 
breakthrough came in July 2002 when the parties concluded the Machakos Protocol, 
“without which it would have been impossible to deal with the remaining 
outstanding issues.”228 The Protocol recognized the southern right to self-
determination,229 while striving to “redress the grievances of the people of South 
Sudan” within a framework that upheld the unity of the nation.230 Accordingly, the 
parties agreed to work together to make the unity of the Sudan an attractive option to 
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the people of South Sudan.231 The Machakos Protocol sought to achieve this by 
recognizing Sudan as “a multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and 
multi-lingual country,”232 in which religion would not be used as a divisive factor. 
The National Government vowed to take into account the religious and cultural 
diversity of the Sudanese people in all its laws,233 and the application of Sharia law 
“only in respect of the states outside Southern Sudan” was affirmed.234 For their part, 
the people of South Sudan would exercise their right to self-determination through an 
internationally-monitored referendum that would be held after Pre-Interim and 
Interim Periods.235 The Pre-Interim Period would last six months, and would allow 
for the establishment of the bodies and mechanisms necessary to implement and 
monitor a comprehensive settlement.236 An Interim Period of six years would follow, 
during which time the people of South Sudan would enjoy the advantages of a 
unified and secular Sudan, before exercising their right to secede from or remain in 
it. 
 Chapter I of the CPA incorporates the Machakos Protocol into the agreement, 
and recognizes “all the obligations and commitments specified” therein as binding.237 
The Agreement’s chapeau also notes the parties’ commitment to implementing the 
text “fully and jointly,”238 and is the first agreement to explicitly acknowledge a 
peacebuilding role for the people of South Sudan in over 50 years of conflict. Aptly 
following the parties’ commitment to a bilateral implementation is the Protocol on 
Power-Sharing set out under Chapter II. Under the Agreement, Sudan would be 
governed by a National Government that would protect and promote the national 
sovereignty of Sudan;239 and possess exclusive Legislative and Executive Power over 
National Defence, Citizenship, Foreign Affairs, the Constitutional Court, the Central 
Bank, and others.240 A Government of South Sudan (GoSS) would exercise authority 
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over the territory of South Sudan as it existed on 1 January 1956;241 and have 
unprecedented and exclusive powers over the adoption of its own Constitution; 
legislation pertaining to its structures of governance; planning for regional services 
including health, education and welfare; and developing financial resources for the 
region.242 States would exercise power at state level and in areas including social 
welfare, health care, education, and others.243 The parties formally agreed to respect 
the autonomy of each organ of governance, and to abstain from encroaching on each 
organ’s respective powers or functions.244  
 The CPA’s power-sharing formulae equitably represented the main political 
parties of the North and South and reflected the political realities of the conflict.245 
The GoSS enjoyed a significant role in the National Executive, with the President of 
the GoSS serving as the Republic’s First Vice-President.246 The Agreement called for 
a “collegial decision-making process within the Institution of the Presidency,”247 
particularly in relation to declarations of war and states of emergency, Presidential 
appointments under the Peace Agreement;248 and the establishment of a National 
Government.249 Appointments to the National Executive were to be shared equitably 
by the two parties to reflect “the need for inclusiveness, the promotion of national 
unity… and the respect and implementation of Peace Agreement [sic].”250 Crucially, 
the GoSS’s executive organ—the Executive Council of Ministers—remained 
independent of Khartoum’s influence. Though the Executive Council was obligated 
to assign 15% of its seats to Bashir’s National Congress Party,251 the CPA explicitly 
states that the President of the GoSS appoints his/her ministers to the Executive, and 
the Executive is ultimately accountable to him/her alone.252 Given the extent to 
which successive regimes in Khartoum had previously interfered with government 
appointments in the South, this agreement on power-sharing reflected a much more 
participatory and sustainable approach to making peace in the Sudan. 
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 The agreement on power-sharing also displayed remarkable precision with 
regard to the functions of government at all levels. For example, the CPA established 
a 30-day deadline for the formation of a Government of National unity;253 and 
outlined the composition of the various executive and legislative organs during the 
interim period.254 Moreover, the CPA provided for several contingencies, should any 
untimely events threaten the implementation of the painstakingly crafted Agreement. 
For example, the Agreement clarifies how the Institution of the Presidency shall 
function should a southerner win the national Presidential election,255 and provides 
detailed instructions and exact timeframes in the event that the posts of the President 
of the Republic of Sudan, the First Vice-President of the Republic, or the President 
of the GoSS should fall vacant.256 Obligation and precision duly combine here to 
make the implementation of the Agreement a priority in the minds of the parties—to 
keep the peace process on track in the event of a contingency, and to shelter it from 
any political fallout that might result. These provisions proved crucial just months 
after the CPA was concluded, when John Garang—the first President of the GoSS 
and inaugural First Vice-President of the Republic of Sudan—was killed in a 
helicopter crash. 
In addition to executive and legislative organs, the CPA provides for judicial 
organs at every level of governance. At the National and GoSS levels, Supreme 
Courts and Courts of Appeal shall be established.257 A Constitutional Court would 
have ultimate authority over the various levels and organs of government, and will 
uphold the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the 
Agreement.258 This included the right to life, to personal liberty, to vote, to a fair 
trial, the equal rights of men and women, freedom of thought, expression, and 
assembly, and freedom from discrimination.259 The CPA further obligated the 
Republic of Sudan to comply with the international legal framework on political, 
economic, social, cultural and human rights.260 
The Constitutional Court was also tasked with upholding the Interim National 
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Constitution which “shall be the Supreme Law of the land.”261 A National 
Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) would prepare an interim Constitution 
based on the terms of the CPA within six weeks of receipt of the agreement.262 The 
NCRC would also be responsible for preparing any other legal instruments necessary 
to give effect to provisions and institutions of the CPA.263 The CPA further obligated 
the parties “to implement the Agreement and to give legal and constitutional effect to 
the arrangements agreed therein.”264 Disputes among the various institutions 
emanating from the peace process could also be referred back to the Constitutional 
Court.265 By tying the provisions of the CPA to the Sudanese Constitutional 
framework in this manner, the Agreement displayed the compelling language and 
precise instruction of a truly substantive legal document. Non-compliance was 
discouraged because such hard legalization made abrogation “tantamount to 
constitutional disorder with dire repercussions for the unity of the Sudan.”266 
 Chapter III of the CPA sets out the Protocol on Wealth-Sharing. The parties 
pledge to share the wealth of the nation equitably, “so as to enable each level of 
government to discharge its legal and constitutional responsibilities and duties.”267 
The agreement also recognizes “[t]hat revenue should reflect a commitment to 
devolution of power and decentralisation of decision-making in regard to 
development, service delivery and governance.”268 This statement is crucial as it 
distinguishes the CPA’s provisions on wealth-sharing from those of its 1997 
predecessor, and is symbolic of the extent to which the CPA devolved genuine 
political power to the GoSS. While the Agreement recognized that South Sudan, and 
the Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei state had a pressing need to perform 
basic government functions and fund post-conflict reconstruction,269 the CPA also 
recognized that there was a practical limit on how much national resources could be 
mobilized for these tasks.270 The GoSS revenue stream is largely dependent on 
regional and state taxes, including income tax, excise tax, licences, and levies on 
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tourism and border trade.271 Accordingly, the Agreement issues a formal plea for the 
international community “to play a strong and constructive role in providing post-
conflict construction/reconstruction assistance to Sudan….”272 A Southern Sudan 
Reconstruction and Development Fund shall be established to solicit and utilize 
funds from domestic and international donors for this purpose.273 A similar fund—
the National Reconstruction and Development Fund—shall be established by the 
National Treasury to develop war affected areas outside South Sudan.274  
 In contrast to its predecessors, the CPA provides a detailed formula for the 
redistribution of oil revenues—one of the financial cornerstones of South Sudan’s 
transition to a functioning polity under the Agreement. Indeed, the text acknowledges 
that sharing wealth from the nation’s oil resources “should balance the needs for 
national development and reconstruction of Southern Sudan.”275 Accordingly, net oil 
revenues derived from Southern oil wells will be split 50-50 between the GoSS and 
the National Government as of the beginning of the pre-interim period.276 The 
National Government further pledges to allocate 50% of the national revenue 
collected in Southern States to the GoSS “to partially meet the development costs 
and other activities during the interim period [sic].”277 In order to guarantee the 
appropriate sharing of financial resources and the transfer of funds in accordance 
with the agreed formulae, the CPA mandates the formation of a Fiscal and Financial 
Allocation and Monitoring Commission.278  
 National oil resources were to be managed with due regard to the national 
interest, the public good, the affected regions, the local populations and the relevant 
environmental policies.279 A National Petroleum Commission was mandated to 
manage oil exploration and development in the Sudan in accordance with these 
principles.280 The CPA provides binding arbitration where disagreement arises 
between members of the Commission itself,281 or where individuals holding rights in 
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land wish to contest the award of an exploration contract.282 The CPA precisely 
provides for separate National and South Sudan Land Commissions, with authority 
to arbitrate between contending claims over land.283 
Chapters IV and V of the CPA were aimed at resolving the unique 
peculiarities of the conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Both states 
occupied territory that fell within the Republic of Sudan border under the CPA, but 
both identified readily with the southern states that had been neglected and 
marginalized by the central government. Accordingly, the CPA attempted to 
accommodate the concerns of both states within a National framework based upon 
human rights and cultural freedoms.284 Both states would have executive, legislative 
and judicial organs, and possess exclusive powers in religious and cultural matters, 
traditional and customary law, education administration up to third level, and the 
drafting and adoption of a State Constitution.285 Both states would have their own 
respective State Land Commissions,286 and both were to receive 75% of the total 
National Reconstruction and Development Fund.287 Furthermore, both states were 
permitted to recruit personnel for the public service and security sectors locally, 
subject to National standards and training.288 The CPA was to be made subject to the 
will of the people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and Chapter V explicitly 
recognized a process of popular consultation as “a democratic right and mechanism 
to ascertain the views of the people” of both states in that regard.289 
 Abyei—an oil-rich region within the state of South Kordofan that straddles 
the border between Sudan and South Sudan—also received its own particular 
arrangement under the CPA. For the duration of the interim period, Abyei was to 
remain a part of both Kordofan in the Republic of Sudan and Bahr el Ghazal in South 
Sudan.290 The region would be administered by an Executive Council which would 
have responsibility for administering necessary services, maintaining security in the 
region, and making proposals to the National Government regarding development 
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and urbanization projects for the area.291 Abyei was not empowered with legislative, 
executive and judicial organs under Chapter IV, but this was to be determined at a 
later date by the Presidency of the Republic.292 As an oil-rich region, Abyei’s wealth-
sharing provisions were explicitly specified. The region was entitled to its respective 
share of the national revenue (as specified in the CPA), its own tax revenue, and 
equitable shares of both the South Sudan and National Reconstruction and 
Development Funds.293 Furthermore, revenue from oil produced in the region was to 
be specifically shared, with 50% going to the National Government, 42% to the 
GoSS, and the remaining 8% being divvied up among the states of Kordofan and 
Bahr el Ghazal, and the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya nomadic people that inhabited 
the region.294 
 Within the first two years of the interim period, an Abyei Boundaries 
Commission was to define and demarcate the precise boundaries of the area.295 At 
the end of the interim period—and in tandem with the South Sudanese referendum 
on self-determination—Abyei was to have its own referendum on either retaining its 
special administrative status in the north or becoming part of Bahr el Ghazal in the 
South.296 However, the particulars of the protocols on the conflicts in Abyei, 
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile never came to be. The CPA was not subjected to 
the process of popular consultation promised under Chapter V, yet the peace process 
moved forward regardless. When South Sudan ultimately voted to secede from the 
Republic of Sudan, tensions flared in Southern Kordofan, and fighting broke out in 
the state one month before South Sudan’s independence. The conflict spread to Blue 
Nile several months later, and remains deadlocked in March 2018. Similar tensions 
in Abyei prompted the National Government to forcibly seize control of the area 
immediately prior to South Sudan’s declaration of independence. To date, the people 
of Abyei have not had the opportunity to exercise their ballot on the future status of 
the region. The lack of progress on these key aspects of the CPA is indicative of the 
fact that the bilateral mechanisms that facilitated SPLM/A participation in 
implementing the peace process throughout South Sudan did not extend north of the 
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border.297 Indeed, even a cursory glance at the implementing modalities of those 
Protocols reveals that local actors possessed very little power to force key issues, 
e.g., the referendum on Abyei. The CPA’s failure to deliver on these key provisions 
highlights one of its most debilitating flaws: that it engineered a North-South 
oriented solution to what it perceived to be a North-South conflict exclusively. In 
doing so, it fomented the narrative that each of Sudan’s bloody conflicts were 
isolated and unrelated.298 That narrative has persisted to this day, with disastrous 
consequences for peace-making efforts in the Republic of Sudan.  
 The security arrangements that would govern Sudan during the interim period 
and beyond were detailed exhaustively in Chapter VI and Annexure I, which 
provided for a phased withdrawal of combatants from their positions north and south 
of the border.299 The army of Sudan would be comprised of both SAF and SPLM/A 
units, but the two forces would remain separate during the interim period.300 Chapter 
VI envisioned the creation of Joint Integrated Units, comprised of both SAF and 
SPLM/A officers, which would serve as a symbol of national unity during the 
interim period and provide the “nucleus of a post-Interim Period future army of the 
Sudan should the vote of referendum confirm unity.”301 The Agreement envisioned a 
permanent cessation of hostilities within 72 hours of the conclusion of the 
agreement,302 which prohibited any act that contravenes the Agreement, any 
unauthorized movement of troops, any unauthorized recruitment or mobilization, 
unauthorized replenishment of supplies, violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law, and the recruitment of child soldiers.303 In the event of a violation, a Ceasefire 
Joint Military Committee is empowered to determine appropriate disciplinary 
measures, such as shaming the guilty parties, “severe punishment in event of [sic] 
grave violations,” or referral to civil, criminal, or court-martial procedures.304 The 
explicit prohibition of these acts and the provision of punitive measures in the event 
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of a breach ranks the Agreement’s security arrangements high on precision and 
obligation. In addition, the parties are required to furnish the ceasefire mechanisms 
with maps, sketches, and detailed lists revealing the particulars of their troops and 
detailed data on their inventories and stocks.305 As a result, the CPA’s security 
measures evidence hard legalization in a manner that its predecessors did not. 
 Annexure I also details the institutional infrastructure necessary to oversee 
and verify the implementation of the highly legalized CPA. The Ceasefire Political 
Commission—a senior political decision-making body—was to be responsible for 
monitoring the implementation of the Agreement, negotiating any operational details 
as they arise, settling deadlocks arising out of implementation of the ceasefire, and 
determining disciplinary measures in the event of a violation.306 Joint Ceasefire Joint 
Military Committees were envisioned at national, regional and local levels.307 These 
bodies would have responsibility for overseeing the parties’ compliance to their 
obligations, ruling on unresolved ceasefire violations, and crucially, serving as a 
channel of communication between the parties in the tense post-conflict security 
environment.308 Each body is specifically comprised under the Annex, and includes 
representation from UN, SAF and SPLM/A staff from the appropriate 
political/military background and rank.309 Notably, both the Ceasefire Political 
Commission and the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee—the most senior political 
and military bodies tasked with implementing the Agreement—are required to reach 
their decisions by consensus.310 Both of the belligerent parties are thus granted an 
active role in implementing the CPA through the bipartisan implementation 
mechanisms espoused under the Agreement. This level of precision and inclusion is 
unprecedented in Sudan’s turbulent history of conflict resolution documents. 
 Under the Agreement, the parties request the deployment of a United Nations 
Peace Support Mission in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter (on the 
pacific settlement of disputes). Upon the ceasefire taking effect, the UN mission was 
to assist with coordinating the de-mining effort throughout the Sudan,311 and 
monitoring the withdrawal of all weapons from within range of the respective 
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parties’ assembly areas.312 Annexure I further obligates the parties to furnish the UN 
mission with “detailed lists of size and location of their forces in each area,”313 and 
grants the Special Representative of the Secretary General and the Force Commander 
of the UN Mission positions on the senior political and military implementation 
mechanisms.314 Article 15.4 of Annexure I prompted a Status of Forces Agreement 
that represented an act of delegation hitherto unprecedented in Sudan’s peace-
making efforts. The provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement were standard fare, 
granting the UN mission freedom of movement, and several immunities and 
privileges within the country.315 However, the fact that the Sudanese state was 
willing to cede some of its authority to a third-party actor is indicative of a 
significant shift in its negotiation strategy up to that point, and reflects the CPA’s 
trend towards delegation, and thus, legalization.  
That said, the extent to which the act of delegation to the UN Mission can be 
attributed to the terms of the CPA must be qualified. UN Security Resolution 1590 
followed just two months after the conclusion of the CPA, giving the UN mission 
authority to use force to protect civilians and UN personnel in the face of imminent 
danger,316 and granting legally binding effect to the Agreement’s requests for UN 
assistance with monitoring ceasefire, redeployment and de-mining.317 In addition, the 
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, requested the 
Sudanese government and the UN Secretary General to conclude the Status of Forces 
Agreement within 30 days of the resolution’s adoption.318 As a legally binding 
instrument, one may reason that the obligation to conclude a Status of Forces 
Agreement weighed more heavily on the Sudanese government because of 
Resolution 1590, rather than the terms of the CPA itself. While such an obligation 
may have arisen independently of the peace agreement, the resolution’s 
complementary provisions still contributed to the perception of the CPA—which 
formed the resolution’s “raison d’être”319—as a legal document. 
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 The CPA also displays a greater degree of detail with regard to processes of 
Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-Integration (DDR)—features that had been 
notably absent from previous agreements on the North-South conflict. The CPA 
displays a political and practical awareness of this omission, acknowledging that 
DDR processes “are crucial components for a secure and peaceful Sudan….”320 The 
CPA also recognizes the importance of national ownership of DDR processes, and 
calls for the establishment of a DDR institutional infrastructure to coordinate DDR 
activities at national, regional, and state level.321 The CPA exhibits significantly less 
detail as to what the DDR process might actually entail, however. Ex-combatants are 
to be “empowered by provision of training and information to voluntarily choose 
their path to reintegration,”322 and the GoSS undertakes to absorb demobilized 
southerners from the SAF and the SPLM/A into various institutions of the Southern 
State service.323 However, these provisions remain a significant improvement on the 
DDR details that were seriously lacking in the Addis Ababa and Sudan Agreements. 
When considered with the expansive peace-building bureaucracy and international 
support envisioned under the Agreement,324 the CPA’s DDR provisions provide a 
roadmap more conducive to sustainable peace than any of its predecessors. 
 Despite the exhaustive detail and exacting timeframe put in place by the 
CPA, implementation of the Agreement did not proceed to the letter. The precision 
evident in the Agreement’s implementing modalities provided an initial burst of 
momentum that secured a functioning GoSS polity and an appropriate security 
environment in the early days of the peace process.325 Immediately thereafter, 
progress began to stall, and the parties missed a number of deadlines “on what was 
admittedly a very challenging time schedule.”326 The SAF withdrawal from South 
Sudan—which was supposed to occur in 2007—did not occur until 2009.327 The 
nationwide general elections—scheduled for the end of the third year of the interim 
period—did not occur until 2010, as the parties sought political dominance in the oil-
                                                                                                                                                                    
Journal of International Law 373, 394. 
320 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (n 237) Annexure I, Preamble.  
321 ibid at Annexure I, Part III, Article 25.1.1-25.1.3. 
322 ibid at Annexure I, Part III, Article 24.6. 
323 ibid at Chapter VI, Article 3(d). 
324 ibid at Annexure I, Part III, Article 24.12., which calls on the international community to mobilize 
financial support for the DDR process. 
325 Thomas (n 297) 16. 
326 Natsios (n 7) 179. 
327 Lovise Allen, ‘Making Unity Unattractive: The Conflicting Aims of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement’ (2013) 15(2) Civil Wars 173, 184. . 
 210  
rich regions along the North-South border.328 In the absence of any substantive 
progress on these issues, the South Sudanese referendum on self-determination came 
to be seen as the CPA’s “centre-piece,”329 and secession became a much more 
attractive option than continued engagement with a highly centralized government 
seemingly acting in bad faith. The people of South Sudan duly voted for secession in 
January 2011, and on 9 July, South Sudan became an independent state. 
However, secession—much like the CPA itself—was only a means “of 
reframing the problems of uneven development in Sudan, not a solution for them.”330 
While the CPA correctly identified the North-South conflict as the natural 
consequence of an exploitative centre-periphery relationship, it actually served to 
recreate those inequities by premising the agreement around bipartisan political 
forces and interests.331 By granting Bashir’s National Congress Party and the 
SPLM/A a majority share in their respective assemblies, the CPA allowed them to 
retain “a grip on power,”332 much to the detriment of the myriad of constituents that 
comprised Sudanese society, including women.333 The CPA thus reflected a southern 
incarnation of the toxic centre-periphery relationship that Sudan had suffered since 
independence, with Juba as its new centre.334 Voices of opposition within the GoSS 
claimed that the Agreement had “inadvertently sowed the seeds for one-party rule...  
and undermined the development of multi-party democracy.”335 Tribal and ethnic 
inequality also continued to play a significant role in the politics of South Sudan’s 
transition. In fact, anxieties about economic issues such as land ownership often led 
to conflict, and tribal violence actually increased post-agreement.336 Given the extent 
to which the CPA had re-created the inequalities that had characterised Sudan since 
independence, it is not surprising that South Sudan descended into its own civil war 
in December 2013. 
 Though these criticisms impart valuable lessons about the negative effects of 
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certain legal mechanisms, their alternatives surmise the elusiveness of a perfect 
peace. Had the CPA embraced a broader process of inclusion rather than the bilateral 
negotiations it entailed, it ran the risk of not producing any agreement at all.337 Allen 
notes that attempts to include northern opposition parties in the initial IGAD 
negotiations in 1994 were a non-starter, while the attempt to consolidate several 
southern splinter groups into a viable political party under the Sudan Agreement in 
1997 arguably did more harm than good to the prospects of lasting peace.338 The 
CPA—on the other hand—succeeded where its predecessors had failed, affecting a 
cessation of hostilities between North and South, and crucially, bringing respite to 
the untold suffering of the civilian population.339 But a perfect peace should be more 
than just the absence of war.340 The CPA itself recognized this; pledging to replace 
war in Sudan “not just with peace, but also with social, political and economic justice 
which respects the fundamental human and political rights of all the Sudanese 
people.”341 The parties’ failure to deliver on this promise produced a negative peace, 
marked by the periodic absence of war rather than the creation of transformative 
political and social practices. This has allowed cycles of violence to regenerate in 
South Sudan. 
 All things considered, the CPA remains the most highly legalized agreement 
in Sudan’s history of conflict, and its legal character is closest to that of ‘hard law.’ 
The Agreement was incredibly precise, setting out a transformative political 
framework for addressing the key issues that underpinned the conflict, and providing 
for the institutional infrastructure and resources necessary to resolve these issues in 
exhaustive detail. The explicit provision of exact formulae for sharing power and 
redistributing wealth within the Agreement’s text is a feature unique to the CPA—its 
predecessors opted to postpone agreement on this issue to the post-agreement phase, 
thereby jeopardizing the momentum of implementation and risking further dispute 
and conflict. Indeed, the CPA’s exacting detail seizes upon the momentum generated 
by the Agreement’s conclusion, and provides for several contingencies should any 
unforeseen circumstances threaten its timely implementation. Such specific terms 
were notably absent from previous agreements aimed at resolving the Sudanese 
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conflict. 
The CPA also exhibited a higher degree of obligation than its predecessors. 
The Agreement’s text was tied intrinsically to the Sudanese constitutional 
framework, an act of incorporation that ensured the parties’ compliance with key 
aspects of the CPA in order to ensure legal continuity during the post-conflict 
transition. The Agreement’s annexes explicitly prescribed the parties’ obligations, 
the means by which they should fulfil them, and the timeframe in which they should 
comply,342 refining the obligatory language used throughout the body of the main 
text. What is perhaps most notable of the CPA is that it is the first truly bilateral 
agreement to emanate from the North-South conflict. The CPA legally obligates both 
parties to implement the Agreement fully and jointly, and delegates significant power 
to the Southern institutions in order to achieve this. The delegation of such political 
power to the southern institutions was central to forcing the issue of southern self-
determination by the end of the interim period, given Khartoum’s reluctance to 
address the more contentious aspects of the CPA. Had the Agreement not enshrined 
bilateral obligations, nor granted the southern institutions the power to implement 
them, the CPA might have gone the way of the Addis Ababa and Sudan Agreements. 
Finally, the CPA delegated the authority to enforce and interpret the terms of 
the Agreement to multilateral and international organs that had been absent on 
previous occasions. Many of the peacebuilding institutions with monitoring and 
enforcement duties were multilaterally composed with representatives from the 
belligerent parties, and some provided for UN and IGAD membership. By explicit 
provision, decisions were to be made by consensus, and several bodies—including 
the Ceasefire Political Commission and the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee—
were to serve as dispute resolution mechanisms and channels of communication. 
Failing resolution at this level, disputes among the various peacebuilding organs 
could be referred up to the Constitutional Court of Sudan, which had ultimate 
interpretive authority over the CPA. The Agreement also provided for the most 
significant grant of delegation in the Sudan’s history of conflict-resolution by 
authorising the UN to undertake a key role in stabilizing post-conflict Sudanese 
society. That the CPA ranks high on every matrix of the legalization framework sets 
it apart from its predecessors, and grants the Agreement an international dimension 
that challenged the central government’s once absolute authority over the peace 
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process. 
It remains uncertain what effect the CPA’s hard legal character had on the 
peace process. Highly precise and obligatory provisions that shared power among the 
belligerent parties and instructed them on the issues they had to address—and when, 
and how—did not seem to bridge the trust divide that separated North and South. 
Though the CPA ultimately delivered on the promise of southern self-determination 
in January 2011, it failed to deliver on other key aspects of the Agreement, including 
the status of the Abyei region, and the resolution of the conflict in Southern 
Kordofan and Blue Nile. To date, the highly legalised nature of the CPA has not 
served as a basis for challenging the Republic of Sudan’s de facto control of Abyei. 
Its provisions have not served as a model for resolving the conflict in Southern 
Kordofan and Blue Nile, as was once predicted.343 Nor has the democratic and highly 
devolved GoSS envisioned under the terms of the CPA materialized in the wake of 
independence. South Sudan—like its northern neighbour—remained highly 
centralized politically. Power was concentrated in the hands of a southern elite that 
did not reflect the South’s ethnic diversity, and the resulting tensions lead the 
fledgling nation into civil war in December 2013. The failure to implement some of 
the core principles of the CPA in both of the Sudanese states thus suggests that peace 
agreement implementation remains rooted in the realm of politics, where political 
expediency outweighs legal certainty. The fault lies not with the provisions of the 
CPA itself, which was “not really an overambitious peace agreement, but the fact 
that sustainable peace for Sudan is an enormously ambitious political project that 
demands more commitment than it has so far been given.”344 Accordingly, if peace 
agreements are to sustain peace, maintain security, and prohibit the use of force in 
the international arena, then international lawyers have much to do to ensure that 
peace is an obligation, rather than an option. 
 
7. IV. CONCLUSIONS 
A case study of the Sudan provides a unique cross-section of the relationship 
between certain legal mechanisms—and the manner in which they are detailed and 
composed—and the ensuing peace process they produce. A retroactive perspective 
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such as this may offer an appropriate lens through which to view the interconnected 
conflicts that continue to ravage the geographic span of the Sudan. Despite an 
ongoing process of national dialogue, violence remains the principle means of 
communication in the contested political space that divides centre and periphery in 
the Republic of Sudan. Similarly, the tentative peace established by an August 2015 
‘Compromise Peace Agreement’ on South Sudan serves only as “an imperfect 
solution” to the other fault-lines that permeate the new nation,345 much as the CPA 
itself had done for the whole of Sudan. All of the Sudan can thus benefit from the 
North-South experience of the CPA, and the lessons inherent in South Sudan’s fall 
from newly liberated grace into resurgent internal conflict.  
A notable feature of North-South peace-making is the trend towards harder 
legalization as the conflicts wore on. From the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 to 
the culmination of the second civil war in 2005, each of the North-South peace 
agreements were drafted with a formal legal aesthetic, and tied to Constitutional 
processes and methods of domestic ratification. Despite these legal processes, 
however, the 1972 and 1997 peace agreements did not give rise to legal remedies 
upon breach, nor recourse to judicial procedure when they went unimplemented. 
Their abandonment can be attributed to the fact that key provisions required further 
legislative action or legal clarification, which weakened their strands of precision and 
their overall legalization in turn. Both Agreements were also lacking in delegation: 
the 1972 Agreement made no reference to a neutral or interpretive power that could 
clarify ambiguous terms or enforce their implementation, and the central government 
retained control over appointments to the only Court in the land that could interpret 
the 1997 Agreement.  
It was only when the parties reinforced the 2005 CPA along all of its 
dimensions that the peace process produced legally compelling obligations. The CPA 
explicitly stated the formulae for sharing power and resources—contentious issues 
that had not been definitively settled upon the conclusion of the previous agreements. 
The CPA also ranked much higher in terms of delegation, subjecting its ceasefire to 
UN monitoring and verification. The CPA was intricately tied to the Sudanese 
Constitution in ways that its predecessors was not. Moreover, the terms of the 
Agreement could be interpreted by a Constitutional Court with authority to 
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adjudicate on disputes between the various levels and organs of government. All of 
these legal mechanisms combined to produce a much more sustainable process that 
provided for recourse to dispute resolution and further negotiations, if necessary. 
These channels of communication and legal adjudication were lacking from previous 
agreements, providing no viable alternative to violence and inviting their collapse. 
Increasingly legal mechanisms also played a pivotal role in securing the 
short-term objectives of successive peace agreements in Sudan, and often generated 
the momentum that sustained the process beyond the agreement itself. For example, 
the bilateral ceasefire brought about by the Addis Ababa Agreement ensured the 
rapid implementation of some of its key aspects, including the installation of a 
regional government in southern Sudan within 6 months of the Agreement’s 
conclusion. Similarly, the high precision and exacting timeframe that characterised 
the CPA’s transitional provisions ensured the installation of a functioning GoSS in 
the immediate aftermath of the CPA’s conclusion, which proved crucial to forcing 
progress on other aspects of the agreement in the latter years of the process. In this 
respect, the Sudanese experience epitomises the value of highly legalized instruments 
in regulating post-conflict environments governed by trust and security concerns, at 
least in the short-term. Though the processes emanating from the Addis Ababa 
Agreement and the CPA experienced setbacks as they wore on, the short-term 
objectives achieved through their technically specific and legally compelling 
provisions arguably sustained those processes beyond the texts that bore them. 
The 1997 Sudan Peace Agreement also established a thorough and 
technically proficient ceasefire mechanism that ensured that the South Sudan 
Coordinating Council was established as per the terms of the Agreement. However, 
the Agreement’s other key provisions inhibited the growth of good faith and the 
development of a long-term peace process from the outset. The Coordinating Council 
remained bound to Khartoum in areas of key competence, and this prevented the 
SSDF from developing into a cohesive entity capable of forcing the implementation 
of other aspects of the Agreement. The central government’s ultimate control over 
the mediation, negotiation and implementation of the Sudan Peace Agreement thus 
served as a major impediment to its long-term viability, and a reminder of the need to 
delegate and devolve power in order to sustain a bilateral commitment to 
peacebuilding. 
Autonomy was the principal vehicle for supporting this commitment over the 
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course of the Sudanese civil wars. Throughout the conflicts, peace agreements 
devolved increasingly generous grants of autonomy to southern polities in order to 
assuage southern grievances. The manner in which these arrangements were legally 
framed, however, had a significant impact on how southern self-determination 
played out in practice. The Addis Ababa Agreement, for example, espoused a 
regional southern government with executive and legislative power, but these powers 
were limited by the degree of control that the central government retained over 
education, economic and social development, and regional planning. Furthermore, 
the Addis Ababa Agreement made the appointment or removal of any member of the 
southern executive dependent on the President’s approval. This further limited the 
southern government’s ability to challenge the North-South divide and pursue its 
own aspirations. The 1997 Sudan Peace Agreement bound the southern Coordinating 
Council to the central government in much the same way. Though the Agreement did 
grant the south a means of exercising its right to self-determination, the Coordinating 
Council was not granted the political power to force a referendum on the issue, nor 
affect a radical change in the centre’s relationship to its peripheries. While southern 
political institutions were established under these autonomous arrangements, the way 
in which they were legally framed ensured they were hollow as organs of 
governance. 
The CPA, in contrast, created a truly autonomous GoSS, capable of 
exercising southern self-determination and forcing the issue when the 
implementation of the agreement began to falter. Though the central government 
exercised authority over issues of Sudanese sovereignty, the GoSS had 
unprecedented authority over the territory of South Sudan, competence to adopt its 
own Constitution and to legislate on matters pertaining South Sudan’s political, 
cultural and economic future. In contrast to previous agreements, the President of the 
GoSS has independent authority over appointments to the Executive Council. Given 
how Khartoum’s interference in southern political appointments had marred previous 
peace processes, the grant of autonomy bestowed under the CPA marked an 
unprecedented step towards southern self-determination. The CPA’s protocol on 
wealth sharing also demonstrated a commitment to southern autonomy through the 
provision of practical revenue sources. The North and South’s equal share of the 
country’s oil reserves during the interim period reflected this commitment, with oil 
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revenues furnishing 98% of the GoSS’s operating budget in 2011.346 Under the more 
highly legalized terms of the CPA, South Sudan was thus empowered with the 
political and financial means to pursue its self-determination to an extent that had not 
been possible previously. 
Though autonomy has been the harbinger of a newly independent South 
Sudan, the devolution of political power along a North-South divide has not brought 
about the cessation of violent conflict in the Sudan. The CPA failed to resolve the 
overarching centre-periphery relationship that has haunted the Sudan for half a 
century, and merely created a new centre in South Sudan at the expense of other 
peripheral regions.347 The concentration of power in the SPLM/A has bred intra-
factional fighting along ethnic and tribal lines, as various actors vie for political 
control of the new centre. This, in turn, has prevented the growth of a pacified 
political environment and the emergence of viable opposition parties in South Sudan. 
Furthermore, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of 
South Sudan—which continues to tentatively govern post-conflict South Sudan—has 
repeated the mistakes of the CPA, concentrating political power among the actors 
that dominated the centre before the South Sudanese civil war, and leaving very little 
space for civil society groups and other parties to contest this power.348 If South 
Sudan is to escape its own history of conflict, it should consider the political and 
legal structures it has erected in the past, and avoid recreating the inequitable 
relationships that have made violence a more effective form of politics than dialogue 
has up until this point. 
Despite the hard legal character of the CPA and the substantial political 
power it ceded to the southern movement, the negative aspects of the Agreement’s 
legacy are readily observable in the increasing fragmentation of the region and the 
erosion of state authority in both Sudan and South Sudan. The Republic of Sudan 
must confront “the core questions of its identity, system of rule, wealth and power 
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sharing, and its relationship with South Sudan,”349 complex issues that the nation has 
not been able to resolve through Khartoum’s process of ‘national dialogue.’350 South 
Sudan, too, suffers violence fuelled by local grievances and competition for “land, 
grazing rights, water, and even oil.”351 Only a political process of broad-based 
participation can address these issues, which lie beyond the elitist competition for 
control at the centre, and have greater implications for the future of the South 
Sudanese state. South Sudan’s saving grace may yet be “its newness.”352 The 
blueprint laid out by the 2015 Agreement may yet provide a watershed moment for 
South Sudan “to try new approaches to statecraft,”353 approaches that avoid the errors 
visited upon the region by colonial nation-building and unilateral peacebuilding. 
Elsewhere, Khartoum’s piecemeal approach to peace-making appears likely to 
continue, at the expense of the lessons learned over 50 years of conflict, and the 
lessons yet to come. 
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8. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
A bad peace is even worse than war. 
 – Tacitus 
 
8. I.  OVERVIEW 
 This thesis set out to identify legal features and mechanisms that are central 
to sustainable peace. Abbott et al’s theory of legalization provided an appropriate 
method for the examination of peace agreements with ambiguous legal status, and 
allowed agreements to be broken down into their respective parts so as to isolate the 
peacebuilding mechanisms that worked (and those that did not). Deep engagement 
with the socio-political, cultural, and historical factors that informed the conflicts in 
the Philippines, Sierra Leone, and Sudan allowed me to suggest qualitative, tentative, 
causative links between certain provisions and the sustainability of peace agreements 
in those countries. However, if this thesis is to advance a broad theoretical 
framework for sustainable agreement design, it must provide evidence of 
mechanisms that are resilient to conflict in a wider sense. This is not easily nor 
lightly done: ceasefire mechanisms in Sierra Leone (1999) and Sudan (2005) were 
worded similarly, but effected varying degrees of success – can these differing 
outcomes provide lessons that might apply to a difficult contemporary context such 
as Ukraine? Autonomy has been used as a potential vehicle for conflict resolution in 
both Sudan (2005) and the Philippines (2014), but do these examples provide a 
useful model for managing the fragmentation of Syria? In attempting to extract 
general lessons from previous efforts, one risks losing sight of the complex political 
factors that inform conflict elsewhere, when it is well settled that “no one pattern 
suits all.”1 
 While it may not be possible to apply whole provisions to emerging conflicts 
without due regard to their particular contexts, this does not preclude us from 
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identifying patterns as to how these provisions are drafted and the outcomes they 
produce. Indeed, by focusing on how these provisions are designed, as opposed to 
whether they are ‘successful’ or not, we can better understand the purpose and 
effects of particular provisions so that they may be tailored to specific contexts. 
Hundreds of reports by the International Crisis Group provide general advice in this 
regard: agreements are more likely to succeed if they provide mechanisms for the 
redress of key issues, including processes for equitable political participation and the 
redistribution of wealth.2 Similarly, a review of the UN’s conflict prevention and 
resolution activities has produced guidelines that stress the importance of precision in 
peace agreements, including specific modalities for implementation and timeframes.3 
This thesis elaborates on these guidelines in a more technically specific manner, 
detailing the manner in which legal provisions shape these guidelines in practice, 
thus impacting on their utility as principles of conflict resolution. Aside from the 
political considerations recommended by policy documents, this thesis reaffirms 
previous research by Bell and Gopalan4 and makes important advancements in 
building on their work, particularly in the context of agreement design where the 
parties are non-state actors or states with little central authority. Furthermore, the 
parallels between this thesis and Fortna’s work triangulates the importance of highly 
legalized instruments in a conflict resolution context,5 and points to the role of both 
law and politics in achieving mutually beneficial goals. Thus, while the findings 
detailed herein do not purport to establish the foundations of a prototypical peace 
agreement, they do provide lessons as to agreement design generally and the 
mistakes that negotiators and policymakers continue to make in that regard. It is to 
those lessons that we now turn. 
 
8. II. THE ROLE OF LEGALIZATION IN THE SHORT-TERM 
What is perhaps most striking about this study is the manner in which highly 
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legalized provisions produce stable institutions that can contain conflict and sustain 
agreement. Precision becomes one of the more prominent limbs of the legalization 
framework in this context, often equating itself with the very language of law by 
prescribing authorized and prohibited behavior,6 particularly in relation to short-term 
commitments. This is best exemplified by the highly legalized ceasefire 
arrangements set out under the North-South peace process in Sudan, and the Abidjan 
and Lomé Accords in Sierra Leone. All of these agreements explicitly prohibited the 
commission of activities that might jeopardize a burgeoning peace process, thus 
narrowing the scope for military mis-encounters between the parties and easing the 
security dilemma that occurs in the immediate aftermath of open conflict. Yet despite 
the fact that each agreement had highly legal ceasefire arrangements in common, 
they did not affect similar outcomes. Ceasefires in Sudan in 1972 and 2005 generally 
held, but the ceasefire envisioned under the Sudan Peace Agreement failed to assert 
itself. Likewise, ceasefires in Sierra Leone in 1996 and 1997 struggled from the 
outset, and the collapse of a tentative ceasefire arrangement under the Lomé Accord 
in 1999 necessitated military intervention before it was forcibly restored in late 2000. 
Though the instability of ceasefire arrangements in Sierra Leone can be 
somewhat attributed to the RUF’s disregard for the political process,7 the case studies 
examined herein suggest a more general causative relationship between ceasefire 
arrangements and the oversight bodies prescribed to manage them. The more 
successful oversight mechanisms were accompanied by highly legalized provisions 
that established and mandated them. Sustainable ceasefires prescribed under the 
Addis Ababa (1972) and Comprehensive Peace (2005) Agreements in Sudan were 
accompanied by bipartisan oversight bodies that had their investigative powers and 
membership precisely set out under those agreements. Though these bodies were not 
independent of the parties, and were thus low on delegation, they were empowered 
with obligatory language that enabled them to dictate punitive measures and 
authorize troop movements during the ceasefire. These bodies could thus serve as 
important dispute resolution forums when ceasefire violations presented themselves, 
thereby preventing skirmishes from descending into open conflict and contributing to 
a stable security environment in which those agreements could be implemented. The 
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Abidjan Accord (1996) and the Conakry Peace Plan (1997) in Sierra Leone, in 
contrast, failed to provide the monitoring infrastructure necessary to support a 
ceasefire. As a highly functional document that was only supposed to govern a six 
month period, the Conakry Peace Plan did not elaborate upon the exact parameters of 
a ceasefire, nor what the technical aspects of a verification and monitoring 
mechanism might entail. Similarly, many of the bodies tasked with monitoring and 
verification under the Abidjan Accord were not explicitly mandated or comprised, 
and the principle body for implementing the agreement lacked the obligatory power 
to compel compliance and contain violent incidents. Imprecision with regard to the 
demobilization and disarmament of combatants, and delegation to neutral third-party 
monitors, further exacerbated the existing security dilemma and inhibited the 
establishment of bipartisan bodies that could contain conflict in the post-agreement 
period.  
The role of legalization in providing for these bodies and securing a stable 
environment for implementation is thus evident from the peacebuilding experiences 
in Sudan and Sierra Leone: when agreements lacked more legally compelling 
provisions, implementation became difficult, and the agreement would ultimately 
come apart. The Sudan Peace Agreement (1997) and the Lomé Accord (1999) 
provide further insight in this regard. Both agreements prescribed highly legalized 
ceasefire arrangements, with the Lomé Accord even providing for UN monitoring, 
supported by a Security Council resolution. Yet the ceasefire enshrined under the 
Lomé Accord was frequently violated within the agreement’s first year, despite its 
highly detailed provisions and delegated mechanisms for verification. While this is 
attributable to the RUF’s resumption of full-scale hostilities by mid-2000, defects in 
the UN’s mandate and the composition of the ceasefire monitoring bodies reveal 
structural flaws that prevented the Lomé Accord from reacting to violations of the 
agreement. Furthermore, valuable forums for dispute resolution, such as the Council 
of Elders and Religious Leaders, were not established during the implementation 
phase, despite their explicit provision under the Accord. Similarly, the Sudan Peace 
Agreement’s elaborate ceasefire mechanisms failed to contain conflict following the 
conclusion of the agreement. This is partly due to the fact that the SSDF lacked the 
political standing to unite the various southern factions under its remit, but also 
because the Sudan Peace Agreement delegated very little power to the group to 
influence the agreement’s implementation. The Sudan Peace Agreement, like the 
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Lomé Accord, envisioned the state as the primary vehicle for implementation and 
viewed its non-state signatory as a passenger in that process. Ceasefire mechanisms 
responsible for conflict management remained subject to the overbearing influence 
of SAF headquarters, which prevented the SSDF from developing any significant 
political power to influence the agreement’s implementation, and kept the southern 
movement divided.  
All of this serves to underscore the importance of delegatory provisions 
through which weaker parties can exert their influence on the peace process. Hard 
legalization plays a key role in guaranteeing these bodies by explicitly providing for 
their establishment, their membership, and their mandate. We see a particularly clear 
example of this in the context of the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the 
Bangsamoro (CAB), which envisioned an expansive peacebuilding infrastructure and 
enshrined a key role for the MILF in both short-term (ceasefire monitoring and 
demobilization) and long-term processes (formulation of fiscal policy, 
intergovernmental relations). What remains notable here is not just the provision of 
these bodies, but the degree of precision adopted by the CAB in contrast to other 
agreements. Precision has cemented the role of these bodies in the politics of 
transition: in the aftermath of a military confrontation between rogue MILF elements 
and the AFP in January 2015, the parties restored peace through the bilateral bodies 
charged with maintaining the ceasefire under the agreement. The CAB’s 
unprecedented delegatory provisions manifested themselves in the actions of the 
Third Party Monitoring Team (comprised of two representatives of Philippine NGOs, 
two representatives of international NGOs, chaired by Alistair MacDonald, former 
EU Ambassador to the Philippines), which was also active on the ground to restore 
the parties’ mutual ceasefire. Despite the generally static condition of the peace 
process since March 2016, several of the bilateral bodies envisioned under the CAB 
have continued to carry out their mandates, thereby maintaining the military 
ceasefire and the political process. We can thus observe the key role that hard 
legalization plays in overcoming the security dilemma and fostering the parties’ 
commitment to the political process post-agreement, across the case studies 
examined here. 
Other studies affirm the importance of these bodies and the degree of 
legalization with which they are drafted. Fortna has found that the most effective 
mechanisms for maintaining peace in the aftermath of interstate conflict include 
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specifying the ceasefire terms and providing for joint commissions for the resolution 
of disputes.8 Fortna argues that efforts to ‘strengthen’ ceasefire arrangements 
between India and Pakistan in 1949 and 1965 decreased the likelihood of conflict in 
the region,9 thus reaffirming Gopalan’s finding that more highly legalized 
agreements bore more sustainable periods of peace in that same conflict zone.10 
Conversely, weak ceasefire agreements between Israel and Syria fell apart quicker 
than their ‘stronger,’ or more elaborate counterparts.11 Indeed, Fortna’s research 
highlights how, in the context of ceasefire agreements, specificity has positive 
implications for agreement stability.12 In her 2003 study of ceasefire agreements, 
detailed agreements were followed by periods of lasting peace; moderately detailed 
agreements had mixed success; and less-detailed agreements tended to fail quickly.13 
This reiterates the need for more precise agreements, particularly in the context of 
short-term commitments and pressing security concerns. Fortna has also found that 
the likelihood of conflict decreases dramatically where the parties establish joint 
commissions to work out disputes as they arise,14 which the supports the argument 
advanced above vis-à-vis delegation to bodies that can channel dispute resolution and 
contain conflict, and the degree of specificity with which they are drafted.  
Precision can make a particularly positive contribution in the post-agreement 
phase by clearly stating what is immediately required of the parties. This can provide 
a surge of momentum that drives the implementation of the agreement’s short-term 
goals, such as establishing a ceasefire, or passing implementing legislation. If these 
initial objectives are successful, implementation of the agreement can proceed on the 
force of its own momentum; as we can see in Sudan in 1972 and 2005, and the 
Philippines in 1996 and (perhaps) 2014. Despite the difficulties these agreements 
encountered, their precise terms demanded immediate legislative action and the 
devolution of political power to previously marginalized constituencies. The 
empowerment of these actors in the immediate post-agreement phase generated a 
positive sense of anticipation that subsequently drove the political process forward. 
Werner has highlighted how this initial burst of momentum normalizes compliance 
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with the terms of the agreement, to the point that honoring the agreement merely 
requires maintenance of the status quo.15 As the peace agreement becomes accepted 
as a course of dealing between the parties, it serves as both a fulcrum for 
implementation, and a barrier to violent conflict.16 Thus, precision can play a crucial 
role in transforming the black letter text of an agreement into a self-sustaining 
political process. This has been more recently observable in the context of the 
Colombian peace process. As the longest peace agreement to any intrastate conflict 
to date, and the most detailed in the context of the Colombian conflict,17 the revised 
Final agreement of November 2016 has made it possible for the parties to proceed 
with implementation, despite the political challenges they face. By July 2017, the 
FARC had successfully disarmed its personnel under UN supervision, and 3,600 ex-
FARC combatants had been granted amnesty, paving the way for their transition to 
civilian life under the terms of the agreement.  
 That being said, some critics would suggest that rigid, highly legalized 
features—such as precise ceasefires and delegated dispute resolution procedures—
are only effective where the parties display the political will to make them work.18 
Indeed, Bell argues that dispute resolution procedures can be ineffective, as they 
require levels of inter-communal co-operation that the very need for dispute 
resolution demonstrates to be missing.19 This largely explains why a highly legalized 
agreement like the Lomé Accord failed to ensure peace on the basis of its terms 
alone. Fortna concedes that certain agreements may be somewhat epiphenomenal: 
only those who intend to be bound will consent to highly legalized agreements.20 
Agreements between more adversarial actors will thus be in greater need of 
mechanisms that ensure and encourage cooperation.21 Unfortunately, the security risk 
involved in agreeing to restrictive ceasefire agreements or binding arbitration often 
outweighs any functionalist logic, leading to the conclusion of weak agreements 
between parties most in need of highly legalized mechanisms.22 Yet even where trust 
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is lacking, highly legalized mechanisms have a confidence-building effect in and of 
themselves. By credibly signalling the parties’ intentions, highly legalized 
agreements allow parties to anticipate certain behaviour from their adversary, thus 
helping the parties to overcome the security dilemma.23 A willingness to work within 
legitimate dispute resolution forums and bilateral implementation bodies signals a 
good-faith effort to avoid conflict as a means of achieving political outcomes, which 
in turn, builds confidence between former belligerents.24 Conversely, the collapse of 
these bilateral mechanisms tends to reflect increasing tensions and a possible return 
to hostilities.25 The former can be readily observed in contemporary Mindanao, 
where the MILF has continued to work within the political process, despite some 
significant setbacks; while the latter underscores the critical omission of the Council 
of Elders and Religious Leader during the implementation of the Lomé Accord. 
 While precision plays a central role in securing and sustaining a peaceful 
environment within which the implementation of an agreement can take place, the 
text of an agreement can only go so far.26 Short-term successes such as a cessation of 
hostilities must be accompanied by tangible benefits and political processes that 
addresses the parties’ grievances if a peace agreement is to sustain itself. The case 
studies provide ample evidence in this regard. The Abidjan Accord’s lack of a 
cohesive reintegration strategy provided little incentive for the RUF to abide by the 
terms of its ceasefire, and dissatisfaction with the advantages of the political process 
eventually drained support for the agreement. Similar problems beset the Final 
Agreement in the Philippines, which immediately delivered on its promise of an 
autonomous region for the Moro people, but failed to counter the protracted effects 
of chronic underdevelopment in Mindanao. While the precise mechanisms enshrined 
under the 2014 CAB continue to maintain the peace in Mindanao, non-progress of 
the agreement threatens further disillusionment with the political process, and an 
increasing shift towards Islamic extremism. Thus, despite their advantages in the 
short term, highly technical peacebuilding mechanisms—such as ceasefires and 
demobilization processes—cannot lead a political process by themselves. As UN 
special envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, has reiterated, any reduction in violence 
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cannot be sustained unless there is a political horizon in sight.27 Negotiating this 
transition from conflict management to post-conflict transformation and 
reconstruction is something that peace agreements must accommodate, but words 
cannot definitively prescribe. 
 
8. III. TRANSITIONING TO LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS 
 One of the more difficult aspects of agreement design is being able to strike a 
balance between the need for technical precision in the short-term, and consultative 
peacebuilding in the long-term. Indeed, the difficulty of this task largely explains the 
disparity between agreement quantity and quality identified from the outset of this 
thesis. Peace agreements can precisely provide for short-term commitments, giving 
parties a reasonable expectation of what they can initially expect from the agreement 
on paper, and allowing them to tentatively commit to a peace process, so long as it 
proceeds as planned. There is thus no shortage of peace agreements being concluded. 
However, as implementation proceeds, the agreement provides less and less detailed 
instructions for the parties, sometimes necessitating deviation from the agreement’s 
terms and duly accounting for the frequency with which agreements break down 
during implementation. If the parties are to achieve a sustainable, non-violent 
process, then the agreement must eventually transition from overly prescribed 
instructions, to reactive processes of dialogue and consensus-building. 
Precision is not always conducive in this regard: where agreements provide 
exact deadlines for the completion of certain tasks, they frequently fail to provide 
contingencies where those deadlines are not met. Precision can thus exacerbate 
existing tensions around implementation if certain aspects of the agreement do not 
proceed to plan. This is exemplified by the Lomé Accord in Sierra Leone and the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, both of which were criticised for their 
overly rigid timeframes. Furthermore, precision can inhibit the growth of long-term 
processes of peacebuilding by establishing the agreement as a permanent point of 
reference for the parties and the principle vehicle for change, when in practice, a 
political process is more appropriately sustained through the reformed political and 
legal structures that the agreement provides for. Bell refers to this as the 
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‘constitutionalization’ of the peace agreement, which is better achieved by 
constructively ambiguous language involving symbolism, shared values, and appeals 
to nationhood.28 We see this ‘constitutionalization’ of peace agreement commitments 
used to great effect in Sudan in 1972 and 2005, and to less successful extents in the 
Philippines in 1996 and Sierra Leone in 1999. In these instances, we can observe 
how autonomy/power-sharing arrangements guaranteed by domestic constitutions 
and guided by normative principles such as human rights and socio-economic 
equality gave rise to political processes that developed beyond the literal boundaries 
of their peace agreements. Thus, the long-term goals of peacebuilding may be better 
served by strong normative guarantees that indicate a general direction for the peace 
process to follow, rather than precisely prescribed instructions that cannot predict the 
environment in which they will be brought to bear.29  
However, it should be noted that processes of legalization retain a key role in 
shaping this normative ‘direction.’ Throughout this analysis, hard legalization is 
shown to have played a key role in guaranteeing equality of participation and 
inclusion (through delegation), and the redistribution of political power (through 
precision and obligation); all of which influence the domestic political landscape 
beyond the limits of the peace process itself, and allow long-term goals to be 
addressed through reformed political institutions. As shown in Section II of this 
Chapter, precision and delegation also play key roles in mandating and comprising 
bilateral bodies, which facilitate political transition by promoting consensus-building 
and sustained dialogue. These features complement each other in such a way as to 
maintain an appropriate security environment in the short-term, while leaving enough 
texture for the “coherent holistic development” of “a more lasting constitutional 
discourse.”30 
The Sierra Leonean experience reveals much about the limits of precision in 
this regard. The Abidjan Accord envisioned an expansive peacebuilding bureaucracy 
that was supposed to deliver on a number of ambitious socio-economic goals. The 
socio-economic aspects of the agreement were to be informed by ‘guiding principles’ 
set out under the agreement, indicating the general direction that the agreement 
should take in the long run. However, the agreement’s imprecision with regard to a 
                                                          
28 Bell (n 5) 169. 
29 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press 2009) 11. 
30 Bell (n 5) 173, 174. 
 229  
ceasefire, the provision of third-party monitors, and the composition of many of the 
bodies tasked with implementing the agreement failed to secure a stable political 
environment from which the more broadly defined socio-economic goals could 
follow. Conversely, the Conakry Peace Plan was focused on the technical aspects of 
ceasefire and demilitarization, with a view to restoring President Kabbah’s 
government within a six month timeframe. The agreement’s focus on short-term 
precision came at the expense of any sustainable resolution of the conflict, and failed 
to pave the way for long-term processes or confidence building measures that would 
entrench political dialogue between the parties. In any case, the Conakry Peace 
Plan’s overly functional and technical manner neglected the contextual nuances of 
the conflict in Sierra Leone, causing the agreement to fail irrespective of its short-
term precision or long-term potential.  
While these agreements teach us the obvious lesson that the failure to 
appropriately provide for short-term procedures and mechanisms will be to the 
detriment of long-term goals, the Lomé Accord is evidence that precisely prescribing 
both short-term and long-term objectives is not the solution. Indeed, while this thesis 
concludes that agreements that are highly legalized are more sustainable than those 
that are not, legalization alone does not guarantee sustainable peace. The Lomé 
Accord was the most highly legalized agreement of the Sierra Leonean conflict, and 
boasted a detailed annex with implementing modalities and timetables. On paper, it 
provided for the mechanisms that should have facilitated a transition to post-conflict 
governance. However, the agreement’s precision rendered the agreement too rigid to 
respond to real-time events as they occurred, and the elaborate peacekeeping 
infrastructure envisioned under the terms of the agreement was perhaps too technical 
for the Sierra Leonean state apparatus to support. The Sierra Leonean experience is 
thus particularly illustrative of how difficult it is to marry the immediate cessation of 
conflict to the development of a self-sustaining political process within the confines 
of a single text. 
In particularly difficult contexts, it may be more conducive to view the peace 
agreement not as a single static document, but as a basis for recurring legal 
processes—a Constitution of sorts. In his key work, Fen Olser Hampson concludes 
that peace agreements are imperfect roadmaps to peace.31 Hampson’s study reveals 
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how frequently agreements are revised to reflect difficult or impossible deadlines, or 
amended to accommodate new challenges to the existing agreement.32 Wagner too 
views the myriad goals of a peace agreement as a series of contracts, “that are subject 
to continued negotiation and renegotiation.”33 Likewise, a study by Hoffman and 
Bercovitch emphasised the process element of peacebuilding, and concluded that if a 
peace process is to endure, it must be renegotiated on an ongoing basis, using the 
initial peace agreement as a framework.34  
The Lomé Accord is evidence of this approach. After renewed hostilities 
during the agreement’s troubled implementation, the parties to the Lomé Accord met 
in Abuja in November 2000 to reaffirm their commitment to the Lomé process, 
clarify elements of the ceasefire, and revise the timeline for implementation. The 
Abuja Agreement thus supplemented the original Lomé Accord, allowing the process 
envisioned under the original agreement’s terms to take hold. We have more recently 
seen the pragmatic renegotiation of a ‘final’ settlement in the context of the civil 
conflict in Colombia. Following the rejection of the government-FARC peace deal in 
a national referendum in October 2016, the parties chose to revise and expand the 
terms of their existing agreement, rather than abandon the process and start anew. 
Despite the fact that the government chief negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, insisted 
that the original agreement was “the best deal possible,” he later conceded that the 
revised agreement was better.35 Lead FARC negotiator, Iván Márquez, also 
acknowledged the importance of revising the agreement to include key stakeholders 
that had been absent from the original negotiations.36 These examples suggest that it 
is not always conducive to peace to view an agreement as a final settlement of the 
conflict, or a static legal document that must be enforced to the letter. While the 
agreement should of course prescribe the basic terms of the parties’ peacetime 
relationship, an agreement is best viewed as a “living document” that the parties 
must renegotiate continuously when implementation proves difficult or impossible.37 
The phased negotiation of peace agreements may also prove a more 
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sustainable method of managing the transition from short-term to long-term 
peacebuilding. The agreements in Sudan in 2005 and the Philippines in 2014 were 
preceded by framework agreements that sketched out the basis of more 
comprehensive settlements, without being immediately actionable in and off 
themselves. Following these landmark agreements; detailed annexes, formulae, 
timeframes, and transitionary mechanisms were agreed by the parties, and added to 
the original framework agreement as implementing protocols. It is possible that 
negotiating the agreement in this manner fostered mutual trust between the parties, 
normalizing sustained dialogue as a basis for prospective peacebuilding. Indeed, 
though the ‘success’ of the 2014 CAB will need to be evaluated more fully with 
time, the process appears to have at least normalized non-violent engagement on the 
issue of Moro self-determination as between the parties—though whether it will 
deliver on that issue in the long term remains to be seen. In Sudan, the negotiation of 
separate protocols on power and wealth-sharing allowed the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement to deliver on its promise of southern self-determination, even when 
progress on the unique status of the Abyei region stalled. Though the status of Abyei 
remains contested as of August 2017, the delivery of a politically viable South Sudan 
under the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement may yet offer a diplomatic 
opportunity to resolve the now-interstate dispute independent of the agreement. 
Comprehensive agreements that are built upon the skeleton of an initial framework 
agreement may thus provide another means of managing the transition from short-
term to long-term peacebuilding, but further research is necessary in this regard. 
 
8. IV. HOW THE LAW SHAPES DEVOLUTION 
Throughout this analysis, we have seen how various forms of devolution are 
utilized as a means of conflict resolution. Devolution is particularly useful in the 
context of conflicts involving marginalized political constituencies, ethnic, or 
religious groups, as it enables these constituents to address key issues and local 
grievances that the central state has failed to resolve hitherto.38 However, as both 
current practice and this analysis show, the majority of devolution arrangements are 
either implemented poorly, or not at all.39 Even where devolution takes place, these 
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arrangements are often undone when the central state asserts its power beyond the 
delicate balance enshrined in autonomous or power-sharing arrangements.40 The case 
studies presented herein provide several examples of these shortcomings. While the 
1976 Tripoli Accord envisioned an autonomous region in the southern Philippines, 
considerable ambiguities in the agreement’s text fostered disagreement when the 
parties tried to clarify the finer elements of implementation, and hastened the 
collapse of the agreement. The legislation charged with establishing the 1996 Final 
Agreement’s ARMM omitted crucial details pertaining to the independent funding of 
the autonomous institutions, thereby limiting the ARMM’s ability to challenge the 
factors that brought about Mindanao’s chronic underdevelopment.  
If Mindanao highlights how autonomous arrangements are often 
unimplemented, or implemented poorly, then Sudan serves to highlight how they can 
be undone by the central state encroaching on a region’s new found autonomy. The 
highly legalized Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 enabled the establishment of an 
autonomous regional government in southern Sudan within 6 months of the 
conclusion of the agreement. While the autonomous region embedded itself in the 
Sudanese political system for the 11 years that it existed, it remained dependent on 
the central state’s approval with regard to funding and political appointments. When 
the southern regional assembly blocked President Nimiery’s proposal to redraw the 
north-south border in contravention of the 1972 Agreement, Nimiery simply 
abrogated the autonomous arrangement entirely, triggering the outbreak of the 
Second Sudanese Civil War. The autonomous Coordinating Council envisioned 
under the 1997 Sudan Peace Agreement was hampered by similar tethers to the 
central government. The government’s control over political appointments to the 
Coordinating Council allowed the regime in Khartoum to keep the southern 
movement divided, thereby preventing it from developing any political clout to force 
the implementation of the other aspects of the agreement. 
It is only when autonomous arrangements bestow genuine political power 
upon the devolved polity that such arrangements become sustainable. We see this in 
the context of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan. The agreement 
bestowed unprecedented independence on the Government of South Sudan by 
preserving southern control over political appointments, and granting legislative and 
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executive power over economic and cultural matters. The agreement specifically 
detailed a southern government with significant power, which enabled the fledgling 
South Sudan to surge ahead with the implementation of the agreement when progress 
stalled. That South Sudan used its new-found autonomy to secede from Sudan rather 
than remain within the unitary state may dissuade state actors from conceding such 
generous grants of autonomy in their own respective conflicts, however. Yet the 
Sudanese experience underscores the importance of striking a balance between 
competing interests with regard to self-determination and territorial integrity: 
southerners may have been more amenable to remaining within the Sudanese state 
had the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan Peace Agreement not provided such 
a negative impression of autonomy in action. Indeed, autonomy need not devolve 
power equal to that of the central state in order to be workable, but it must enable the 
devolved entity to address the key issues that have fuelled its grievances up unto that 
point. The Final Agreement in the Philippines is evidence of this: the MNLF were 
willing to accept an autonomous arrangement within the territory of the Philippines 
and the limits of the Constitution, but if they could not challenge the socio-economic 
factors that had fuelled the conflict hitherto, the agreement could not serve as a 
sustainable solution. This remains a pertinent lesson to contemporary Mindanao, 
where the 2014 CAB has yet to deliver on the promise of autonomy enshrined under 
its terms. Any subsequent arrangement that facilitates Moro autonomy must match 
the degree of self-determination espoused in the CAB, or it risks suffering the same 
fate as its predecessors. 
While there appears to be a link between significant devolution and 
sustainable conflict resolution, sophisticated autonomous arrangements can also cut 
off a host of legal options for accommodating non-state actors in complex, 
multilateral internal conflicts. We see this most strikingly in Sudan, where the North-
South conflict was just one in a series of conflicts pertaining to the central 
government’s relationship to its peripheral regions. Though the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement set a benchmark for autonomy to which constituents in eastern 
Sudan, Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Darfur have aspired, it remains unlikely that 
the central government will consent to further power-sharing arrangements, given 
their perceived “negative returns” on the 2005 agreement.41 Attempts to cede power 
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to the peripheral regions in recent years have been symptomatic of Sudan’s previous 
peace-making efforts, with core provisions going unimplemented and the constituent 
parties possessing little power to compel Khartoum to comply.42 Any future 
agreement on Sudan’s internal conflicts must duly reflect the achievements and 
limitations of the CPA, and accommodate the central government’s interests within a 
highly legalized framework that cedes power away from the centre while upholding 
the territorial and political integrity of Sudan. The Philippine government may also 
have to grapple with the enormous compromise embedded in the 2014 CAB as it 
attempts to placate a communist insurgency that has been ongoing for 50 years. 
Likewise, the complex compromise reached between Colombia and FARC may limit 
the extent to which the Colombian state can accommodate the demands of other 
insurgent groups. Negotiators should thus consider how the creation of asymmetric 
political structures might affect other parties in multilateral conflicts, and thus impact 
upon the resolution of broader cycles of conflict in those regions. 
Just as precision can be used to shape autonomous structures that are 
conducive to sustainable processes of conflict resolution, so too can it shape 
structures of inequality and exclusion that exacerbate than rather ameliorate conflict. 
Unanticipated deviations from an agreement’s terms are not always the product of 
political manipulations: they often have their roots in legal concepts and terms that 
the agreement clearly specifies, but the parties interpret to reflect their intentions and 
aspirations. Indeed, Bell notes that the peace process is little more than a non-violent 
extension of the political conflict between the belligerents, played out in the 
reconstruction of political and legal institutions of the state.43 As such, anyone 
involved in drafting, implementing, or interpreting an agreement is caught up in that 
conflict in some way.44  
We can observe how former belligerents use legal language to assert control 
over the ensuing political process in several of the case studies examined in this 
thesis. Southern autonomy under the Sudan Peace Agreement was largely ineffective 
due to the ties that bound the Coordinating Council to the central government. As an 
unmediated agreement, it represented a political effort to appease the southern 
movement within existing state structures, and the agreement’s text largely reflects 
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this. The SSDF had very little power to influence the implementation of the 
agreement due to a lack of bilateral structures that might have supported the political 
process. Of the few joint commissions envisioned under the agreement, the bilateral 
Joint Military Committee was headquartered at the SAF HQ, where Sudanese 
military intelligence could exert undue influence over the SSDF and prevent it from 
developing into a capable military and political force. Taken together, these 
provisions reveal the means by which the central state retained control over the 
Coordinating Council, which were hidden in plain sight in the agreement’s text. It is 
often difficult to distinguish between measures implemented in bad faith and 
reasonable limitations on asymmetric devolution, however. For example, the 1996 
Final Agreement in the Philippines promised Moro autonomy on paper while trying 
to preserve a balance between the competences of the central Philippine state and the 
ARMM. Because the legislation charged with implementing the agreement had to be 
passed through existing political structures, it was subject to significant ‘watering 
down’ that the MNLF was powerless to influence or control. The legislation appears 
to have been an attempt to implement the Final Agreement in good faith, but the 
political compromise it entailed effectively deprived the MNLF of any significant 
power to challenge the status quo, and pacified the group as a military threat. The 
Philippine government was thus able to defeat their enemy through legal processes, 
though the structural biases of these processes did not ensure a sustainable resolution 
of the conflict. It is possible that this process is repeating itself in the Philippines 
today, given the current challenges to the legislation charged with implementing the 
CAB. 
The Lomé Accord is perhaps a more obvious example of how negotiating in 
bad faith can allow for the unilateral implementation of a peace agreement. By 
maintaining rather than reforming existing Constitutional structures, the Lomé 
Accord allowed President Kabbah’s incumbent government “to keep both hands on 
the steering wheel when the agreement’s provisions were to be implemented.”45 The 
government duly controlled the legislative process and pace at which the RUF were 
assimilated into the body politic. Furthermore, in granting the RUF a senior cabinet 
appointment and three further cabinet positions, the agreement strategically used the 
words “such as” to suggest rather than guarantee certain portfolios that might be 
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regarded as senior. The exacting precision and careful wording of the agreement duly 
allowed the central government to contain the RUF “by allocating weak ministries… 
and diluting cabinet power through expanding the number of ministers.”46 It may be 
argued that such legal manoeuvring was necessary in order to contain a group such 
as the RUF, who had no legitimate political mandate and who had given reason not 
to be trusted. However, it is submitted that this could have been more effectively 
achieved through the explicit provision of penalties for breach, such as sanction, 
prosecution, or military action. Structural isolation of the RUF was counter-
productive to sustainable peacebuilding, as it disincentivised participation in the 
political process from the outset, immediately undermining confidence-building 
measures and hastening the resumption of hostilities. A more equitable or effective 
power-sharing arrangement, supported by the credible threat of costs in the event of 
breach, might have brought affected a better outcome, either by sustaining the 
process for a longer period, or hastening the adoption of punitive measures against 
the RUF.47  
In any event, the case studies presented herein reveal how the law can be 
manipulated to produce paper polities instead of genuinely autonomous constructs. 
Autonomous half-measures do not contribute to sustainable peace processes: at best, 
they can manage the effects of conflict; at worst, they lead the parties back to war. 
Agreements must thus be scrutinised to prevent these outcomes ex ante, and should 
be supported by interpretative bodies and multilateral bodies capable of shaping and 
challenging the unilateral interpretation of certain terms and concepts. The findings 
of this thesis would suggest that a legalization framework is useful for scrutinizing 
agreements in this manner, as it reveals how the agreement’s constituent provisions 
and institutions relate to each other, how these relationship produce particular legal 
structures, and how these structures relate to sustainable systems for resolving 
conflict. 
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8. V. INCLUSION AND THE KEY COMPLIANCE COMMUNITY 
Negotiators can further limit the scope for unilateralism by pursuing broad 
based consultative processes during negotiation, and providing for inclusive 
participative structures that support the implementation of the agreement. The 
research presented here suggests that peace agreements that guarantee the rights and 
input of marginalized groups and civil society actors are more sustainable than those 
that do not. The Philippine example is particularly illustrative of this point. The 2014 
CAB recognized the political participation of women and other marginalized 
constituencies as a necessity, and their representation in the regional assembly and a 
multilateral Council of Elders was enshrined under its text. The agreement 
recognized the need to focus development programmes on women as victims, as well 
as participants in conflict, with due regard to the female auxiliary forces of the 
MILF. Furthermore, the CAB was negotiated on the government’s behalf by a 
woman, Teresita Quintos Deles. Women have thus been at the vanguard of a broader 
movement towards inclusivity and civil society engagement in the Philippines.48 We 
can see this in the CAB’s unprecedented recognition of the rights of indigenous 
peoples, provision for their political participation, and the provision that their needs 
be considered when formulating development programmes and the Bangsamoro 
justice system. This is in stark contrast to previous agreements, which repeatedly 
neglected the input of Christian and non-Moro communities and failed to address 
their relationship with the Moro people. While concerns remain about the politics of 
inclusivity will play out in practice,49 the stability of the peace process thus far 
suggests that the move towards inclusivity has had positive implications for peace in 
Mindanao. 
The link between inclusion and sustainable peace is not so clear in the Sierra 
Leonean example. Civil society groups such as the Women’s Movement for Peace 
and the Inter-Religious Committee influenced the negotiation of the Abidjan and 
Lomé agreements,50 and led the calls for amnesty and power-sharing provisions prior 
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to the Lomé Accord.51 Though the Lomé Accord’s implementation was difficult, it 
eventually produced a lasting peace process marked by civil society participation in a 
Human Rights Commission and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Both of 
these bodies identified and abated many of the structural factors that initially had led 
to civil war. With regard to gender inclusivity, the Lomé Accord was the only 
agreement in Sierra Leone to recognize the specific needs of women and children in 
post-conflict development programmes. However, the needs of female combatants 
were neglected in favour of males during the disarmament and reintegration 
processes envisioned under the agreement.52 Furthermore, the Lomé Accord failed to 
guarantee women’s participation in its power-sharing provisions, despite the 
prominent role that women played in advocating for peace in the country. Despite 
this, the Lomé Accord has produced a lasting political process which has moved 
towards a more gender inclusive model (due in no small part to the recommendations 
of civil society groups, in which women play a key part).53 
The link between gender inclusivity and agreement sustainability may thus 
appear indeterminate to some commentators. However, the case studies analysed in 
this thesis suggest that the importance of women is often exemplified by their 
absence rather than their presence. Indeed, Valerie M Hudson has argued that 
agreements that exclude women collapse faster than those that include them.54 Thus, 
while agreements that provide for inclusivity may still suffer structural setbacks, 
agreements that fail to acknowledge major stakeholders rarely succeed. Sudan 
provides interesting examples in this regard. While the 1972 Addis Ababa 
Agreement did not provide any specific gender inclusive provisions, the strong 
human rights guarantees enshrined under the agreement and the secular environment 
in which it was implemented affected a significant change in Sudanese socio-
political culture. Equal citizenship rights led to the emergence of strong female 
leadership in the post-agreement period, and 25 women were democratically elected 
to the southern regional assembly.55  
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However, this inclusive political culture did not last. Despite Constitutional 
rights to equality, the 1997 Sudan Peace Agreement did not contain any gender 
inclusive provisions, nor did it prescribe gender quotas. Despite playing a major role 
in the SPLM/A military campaign, women were largely excluded from the 
negotiations that informed the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with only two 
women serving nominally as negotiators for the movement.56 The 2005 agreement 
did provide a quota of 25% in regard to women’s representation in structures of 
governance, but the agreement largely treated women as victims of war, rather than 
participants; and even at that, the agreement failed to meet the particular needs of 
women.57 Despite the prescription of a gender quota under the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, it has not been practically implemented, and South Sudan remains a 
male-dominated polity like its northern neighbour. The region’s recurring cycles of 
conflict are thus indicative of Hudson et al’s claim that the best indicator of a state’s 
peacefulness is not its wealth, democracy, or tolerance of ethnoreligious identity, but 
its treatment of women.58 These examples duly illustrate the need to encourage 
gender inclusivity as a normative standard by prescribing stronger human rights 
guarantees in peace agreements. Furthermore, agreements should institutionalise 
women’s participation not only in national and regional assemblies, but in 
multilateral implementing mechanisms and dispute resolution procedures, which 
might affect cultural change at community levels. 
From a sustainability perspective, all of the relevant stakeholders must be 
included if the political process is to support itself in the long-term. From a 
compliance perspective however, peacemakers must negotiate with the non-state 
actors that are able to implement their obligations within the territory they control, 
and maintain the political will of their supporters. The trade-off inherent in 
accommodating both of these perspectives means that certain armed groups and 
interests are excluded from the peace process, particularly in conflicts where a 
number of armed groups are competing for power and legitimacy. This can have a 
destabilizing effect on agreement sustainability which the agreement must contain or 
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address in some way. The 1997 Sudan Peace Agreement failed to do this. Following 
the split between the SPLM/A and its Nasir faction, the Sudanese government moved 
to exploit the division by making peace exclusively with the Nasir faction. However, 
the movement failed to unify the various armed groups under its remit, and could not 
establish a coherent command structure capable of implementing the agreement 
throughout the south. Moreover, the Nasir faction and the subsequent SSDF did not 
enjoy the political support that the SPLM/A had garnered regionally and 
internationally. The agreement did not attempt to accommodate the SPLM/A in any 
way, nor did the SPLM/A wish to work within the framework of the agreement. It 
had thus failed to engage what Gopalan refers to as “the key compliance 
community,”59 the party capable of delivering on the agreement’s promise—in this 
case, the SPLM/A. As such, the Sudan Peace Agreement could not serve as a 
sustainable solution to the North-South conflict. 
The challenge of identifying ‘the key compliance community’ is exacerbated 
in conflicts where a number of armed groups are privy to the conflict. In such a 
context, each group’s power to implement their obligations is somewhat diluted, as 
indeed may be their legitimacy, or their interest in peace. The Sierra Leonean 
example is instructive in this regard. Despite the fact that “a plethora of actors” had 
contributed to the conflict in Sierra Leone over the course of a decade,60 the Lomé 
Accord was a strictly bilateral agreement between the government and the RUF. The 
agreement duly underestimated the significant influence that key stakeholders—
including the kamajors and the SLA units that had sided with the AFRC—could 
exert on how the peace process developed. This is highlighted by the assumption 
underpinning the agreement: that the government would be able to carry the 
kamajors along in the peace process and the RUF would do the same for the 
AFRC.61 The Lomé Accord suggests that such arrangements are not sustainable: 
marginalized actors are not likely to be ‘brought along’ by other armed groups unless 
their participation in political processes is incentivised or ensured under the 
agreement.62 This is an important lesson for conflict resolution efforts in Syria, 
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where peacemakers have been prone to grouping moderate non-state actors together 
in a bid to present a ‘key compliance community’ where none exists. Again, the 
Lomé Accord suggests this approach is not sustainable. Indeed, the RUF’s 
commitment to the peace process was questionable from the outset, and Sankoh 
exerted little centralized authority over the group towards the end of the conflict. In 
such trying circumstances, it is difficult to account for the law’s role in 
peacebuilding. Absent a broadly consultative political process or a decisive military 
victory, the normative power of the law may be of little use where there are is no 
‘key compliance community’ to exert or respect it. 
The Bangsamoro peace process offers a long view of the effects of exclusive 
negotiations, as evidenced by the wax and wane of the MILF and MNLF, 
respectively, as representatives of the Moro people. Indeed, one Filipino journalist 
likened the relationship of the MNLF and the MILF to that of two security guards 
with alternating schedules: “[w]hen one takes a nap, the other takes over.”63 The 
failure to include dissenting voices in the Tripoli Accord and the Final Agreement 
ruled them out as sustainable conflict resolution instruments, with the 1976 
agreement fostering division in the Moro movement, and the 1996 agreement 
neglecting the differing political and cultural aspirations advanced by both groups. 
The 2014 CAB reflected the Philippine government’s recognition of the MILF as the 
region’s ‘key compliance community,’ to the detriment of the MNLF’s influence 
over that agreement. Crucially, however, the CAB provides for a broadly inclusive 
political process that accommodates MNLF participation and recognizes their gains 
to date. For example, the MNLF is to be represented on the Bangsamoro Transition 
Authority, and its members are encouraged to run for election in the forthcoming 
Bangsamoro entity. Though extremist elements remain violently opposed to peace in 
the southern Philippines, the CAB limits the range of activities that these spoiler 
elements can claim to be legitimate by prescribing inclusive political structures 
within which competing interests can be accommodated. Such an approach remains 
unique to the characteristics of the conflict in Mindanao, and even at that, it has yet 
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to be seen how the politics of inclusivity will play out in practice.64 Nevertheless, on 
paper, the CAB provides a more sustainable method of engaging ‘the key compliance 
community’ and other major stakeholders than can be observed in the other case 
studies.  
 
8. VI. THE ECONOMICS OF PEACE AGREEMENTS 
Funding, resource management, and revenue generation are other crucial 
factors that significantly affect agreement sustainability. Post-conflict reconstruction 
and development efforts require complex economic arrangements, but these are often 
limited in peace agreements to wealth-sharing formulae or rhetorical appeals to 
international donors. Rather than define key priorities and provide adequate 
resources to meet them, some agreements espouse lofty socio-economic programmes 
that may be ill-conceived or unlikely to be implemented.65 As a result, finite financial 
resources can be spread thin, reducing the agreement to a wish list rather than a post-
conflict settlement.66  
We can see this very clearly in Sierra Leone. Though the Abidjan Accord 
acknowledged that socio-economic rehabilitation would be limited by available 
resources, the agreement committed an ambitious post-conflict development 
programme to paper. In the absence of precise programmes for job creation, 
education, and reintegration, however, these goals were unlikely to be achieved. 
Moreover, the agreement was heavily dependent on funding from the international 
community, further limiting the viability of its strategy for economic rehabilitation. 
The Lomé Accord was similarly hampered by poor fiscal design. It stressed the need 
for international financial support as a matter of urgency, but guaranteed free health 
care and education in an environment where resources were remarkably scarce. The 
consequences of such poor financial planning manifested themselves in the 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes envisioned under the 
agreement. Though those processes received the majority of external funding, they 
remained woefully under-resourced. Given the extent to which institutional capacity 
in Sierra Leone had diminished over the course of the conflict, the Lomé Accord 
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should have chartered a more instructive course towards economic (and agreement) 
stability. 
Indeed, institutional capacity is something that peace agreements largely 
assume of the states within which they are implemented. New political structures are 
often established on the foundations of weak institutions imposed by previous central 
or colonial authorities, with the consequence that revenue generation and effective 
government spending may be inhibited in the early years of the peace process.67 As 
such, the provision of revenue generating powers is not always enough to finance 
ambitious autonomous arrangements, as evidenced by the Addis Ababa Agreement 
and the Final Agreement in Sudan. Donor funding and the provision of aid can play 
an important role in sustaining an agreement during this initial period, but such 
funding measures are rarely prescribed by peace agreements and are not informed by 
good fiscal policy. A recipient country’s capacity to put foreign assistance to good 
use generally increases after three years, at which point donor funding should ideally 
increase.68 However, research has repeatedly shown that aid during the initial post-
conflict phase is mistimed;69 surging in when the government’s capacity to spend it 
effectively is underdeveloped, and tapering out after three to four years when the 
process is most in need of it.70 There is duly an argument to be made that peace 
agreements should elaborate on their economic aspects by regulating the provision of 
financial support by willing donors in a highly legalized manner. Theoretically, it 
would appear that this would be preferable to the rhetorical provisions in peace 
agreements at present, and the political processes that dictate the provision of 
ineffective aid. 
In the absence of effective funding strategies, negotiators and parties tend to 
over-estimate the effects of natural resources as a cure-all for economic 
underdevelopment. Agreements can guarantee an equitable share of natural resource 
ownership, but this can inadvertently enshrine economic dependence on resource 
exploitation—an inherently risky strategy. Bigombe, Sambanis and Collier have 
found that of three policy-dependent risk factors that impact the frequency of 
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recurring conflict, the most powerful factor is natural resource dependency.71 They 
maintain that the peak danger level exists where natural resource exports constitute 
25-30% GDP.72 Six years after the wealth-sharing provisions agreed under the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, oil exports constituted 98% of the Government of 
South Sudan’s operating budget.73 The fledgling nation’s subsequent descent into 
internal conflict thus affirms Bigombe et al’s research, and demonstrates how an 
abundance of natural resources cannot ensure agreement stability. Agreements would 
be better served by the provision of a coherent management strategy. This is an 
important point to consider as the Bangsamoro peace process moves forward. During 
negotiations of the 2014 CAB, both parties considered the ownership of natural 
resources to be a very important issue, but they alone cannot alleviate Mindanao’s 
economic woes. The parties will need to formulate a cohesive economic strategy for 
social reconstruction and redevelopment in Mindanao, something which has not been 
forthcoming under previous agreements in the region. 
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes are also 
intrinsically linked to the short-term viability of peace, but the peace agreements 
analysed here did not precisely prescribe those processes, nor provide for their 
funding. The $20 million shortfall in funding for disarmament and demobilisation 
processes under the Lomé Accord is worth recalling here. So too are the vague 
provisions on reintegration that characterised the agreements in Sierra Leone, which 
identified training and education as vehicles for integration, but failed to elaborate on 
how these programmes would be funded or prioritised over the needs of non-
combatants. Crucially, Bigombe et al have found that the second most important 
factor affecting the recurrence of civil conflict is a lack of alternative livelihoods, 
with education as one factor for measuring opportunity (as well as per capita income 
and per capita GDP growth).74 We can observe the consequences of neglecting 
reintegration in the wake of the Addis Ababa Agreement in Sudan, where 
unemployed Anyanya soldiers posed one of the most significant threats to the post-
agreement order. Disarmament and reintegration process had been similarly 
neglected or poorly designed in the Philippines prior to the 2014 CAB, with the 
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consequence that violence remained a viable vehicle for expressing dissatisfaction 
with both the Tripoli Accord and the Final Agreement. The case studies analysed 
here and the leading economic literature thus suggest that disarmament, 
demobilisation, and reintegration processes should be designed not only as clearly 
instructive provisions, but as economically viable programmes that can sustain 
peace. 
All of these points reiterate the suggestion that peace agreements should 
elaborate upon their economic components by adopting highly legalized measures, 
such as precise and obligatory budgetary constraints, regulatory institutions to which 
enforcement measures are delegated, and subsequent donor’s conferences where 
financial arrangements may be renegotiated and supplemented. The highly legalized 
nature of these mechanisms would involve a balancing of short-term to long-term 
goals, and a negotiation of institutional flexibility versus rigidity—as most peace 
agreement mechanisms do. Such challenges would be preferable to existing efforts, 
which have rarely influenced the economic systems that spring up around peace 
processes. This has a particularly detrimental effect in conflicts where central 
authority and institutional capacity is very weak, as evidenced by Sudan and Sierra 
Leone. The literature recognizes it as essential that donors and interested economic 
supporters, as well as national and local leaders from the recipient country, forge 
some kind of broad agreement on reconstruction plans.75 Why not incorporate that 
agreement into the peace agreement as an annexe or supplement? Indeed, Österdahl 
argues that the incorporation of national and international laws on economic 
reconstruction could be construed as a key component of a formative jus pos 
bellum.76 It is similarly submitted here that the pursuit of sustainable peace would 
benefit from an agreement’s economic aspects being subject to the same standard of 
prescription and analysis as its political and legal components. While there is a body 
of work that examines the economics of post-conflict economic policies, this analysis 
underscores the need for research that reveals how best fiscal practice can be 
accommodated within the terms of an agreement, and how it can complement its 
political and legal processes. 
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8. VII. THE LENGTHS AND LIMITS OF LEGALIZATION 
The research presented here would appear to extend Gopalan’s finding of a 
positive correlation between highly legalized interstate agreements and lasting peace 
to peace agreements between states and non-state actors. Throughout the examples 
explored herein, we can observe a move towards more highly legalized agreements 
that have had positive implications for the pursuit of peace in each country. What is 
less clear from the protracted conflicts explored here is whether these positive effects 
are the result of a move towards legalization, or a result of the conflict’s duration, 
i.e., has the conflict’s enduring negative effects focused the political will and 
attention to craft necessary to produce more sustainable agreements? Assuming this 
to be an inherent aspect of conflict resolution efforts, it appears that highly legalized 
agreements help to foster the mutual confidence, the political will, and/or the 
momentum necessary to sustain peace processes or drive them forward. This is 
clearly exemplified in the troubled contexts where implementation has not proceeded 
to the letter. In Sierra Leone, the Lomé Accord was perceived as a well-crafted 
peaceful solution worthy of the international political and military commitment 
necessary to later sustain a peace process on its terms. In Sudan, the highly legalized 
terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement generated the momentum that drove 
southern autonomy forward when the parties’ commitment to the process began to 
wane. Legalization theory thus plays a valuable role in highlighting the legal 
mechanisms that support, sustain, and contain the broader political dynamics that 
shape conflicts resolution efforts, and highly legalized agreements are more effective 
for this purpose. 
However, the myriad mechanisms that comprise highly legalized agreements 
impose technical limitations on the parties thereto, making such arrangements 
difficult in certain contexts. While highly legalized agreements play a key role in 
overcoming the security dilemma by prescribing clear instructions on how certain 
processes will proceed, parties may be initially reluctant to commit to rigid 
arrangements, particularly if the relationship is characterised by animosity. Where 
uncertainty remains high, and the anticipated benefits under the agreement are 
perceived as low, high legalization may not be enough to overcome the trust-deficit 
that divides the parties.77 The political process that informs negotiations and precedes 
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the agreement is thus central to generating the initial political will, trust, and 
commitment necessary to making such a project work:78 highly legalized agreements 
alone cannot ensure this. The Lomé Accord provides an interesting example in this 
regard. Despite its highly legalized nature, the agreement initially failed to affect a 
better outcome than the less legalized agreements that preceded it. This can be 
attributed in part to the context that informed the agreement: of all the agreements 
analysed in this thesis, the Lomé Accord was born of the shortest negotiation period 
(just 6 weeks), and concluded in a political environment that favoured peace with the 
RUF at any cost. It can hardly be said that this was an appropriate incubation period 
for the trust and confidence that would be required of an agreement as ambitious as 
the Lomé Accord, particularly when it was negotiated with as volatile an actor as the 
RUF. 
Hard legalization also imposes significant difficulties on states with limited 
institutional capacity, as demonstrated by the difficulties of funding peace processes 
in weaker states. Highly legalized agreements with expansive peacebuilding 
bureaucracies ask a lot of domestic political systems which are limited in their 
capacity to govern effectively. For example, drafting an agreement that is capable of 
transitioning from short-term certainty to long-term self-sufficiency requires a 
significant degree of institutional flexibility.79 The peacebuilding infrastructure in 
place must be capable of reacting to adverse shocks to the implementation schedule, 
so that parties may gain from cooperation without tying themselves to an agreement 
that has since become unworkable.80 However, as has been flagged in the context of 
the WTO—widely perceived as the optimal example of an international, highly 
legalized structure—such flexibility requires highly sophisticated political 
structures,81 which are often lacking in the post-conflict environment. Capacity is not 
easily or readily developed either: it requires the dedication of significant resources, 
the application of expertise, and the formation of state relationships with private 
sector stakeholders,82 who also remain weak in the post-conflict order.83 Faced with 
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weakened political structures and no guaranteed international support, parties may 
opt for agreements that are broad but substantively shallow instead of those that are 
narrow but deep.84 
While this may work in the context of multilateral treaties between states, this 
thesis affirms previous studies that found that shallow agreements are not preferable 
as internal conflict resolution instruments. Unlike multilateral treaties, systems for 
reasonably limiting self-serving behaviour in pursuit of a mutually beneficial goal are 
not optimally functional prior to a peace agreement’s implementation. Indeed, the 
very fact that there has been a violent conflict signals the collapse of these systems. 
They must duly be rehabilitated and reconstructed over time, and highly legalized 
instruments play a much more effective role in achieving this outcome. Sustained 
negotiations and mutual attention to detail foster a non-violent political culture of 
dialogue. Clear and instructive provisions guide the initial implementation of the 
agreement, allowing a ceasefire to take hold, and ideally become self-sustaining. 
Multilateral bodies for ceasefire monitoring and dispute resolution foster continued 
cooperation, and serve as valuable vehicles for transition to long-term objectives. In 
contrast, shallow agreements encourage uncertainty in the immediate term and 
broaden the scope for misunderstanding and unilateral interpretation further down 
the line. Where progress has been negligible, a lack of conflict management systems 
makes a return to violence less costly and more likely.  
We have seen the role of legal mechanisms in affecting both of these 
outcomes under the 9 agreements explored within this thesis. We have also seen the 
cost of highly legalized agreements, and the technical difficulties than an elaborate 
agreement such as the Lomé Accord placed on a weakened, post-conflict, Sierra 
Leonean state. While such agreements require the dedication of significant resources 
(both human and economic), this study would suggest that it is more sustainable to 
commit those resources to a highly legalized agreement than it is to attempt to be 
cost-effective within a weakly legalized agreement. To attempt the latter is to neglect 
the opportunity cost involved in bringing the parties to the negotiating table and 
extracting the best compromise possible from them under the circumstances; and to 
risk the parties retreating from political process and hardening their positions if the 
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agreement is unsuccessful (which research suggests it most likely will be).85 It is also 
to ignore the far greater human and economic cost involved should the agreement 
break down (again, as the data suggests a less detailed agreement is more likely to 
do): where conflict reignites after a negotiated settlement, it is 50% more deadly than 
a conflict terminated through decisive victory by one side.86 From both a cost 
analysis and sustainability perspective, the data thus favours the parties’ and the 
international communities’ commitment to highly legalized agreements. War remains 
“ex post efficient”87: it is costly in terms of lives and money, and may persuade 
parties to accept a peaceful solution rather than incur the cost of victory, or defeat.88 
The challenge thus lies not in convincing the parties of the need for highly legalized 
agreements, but in designing the agreements in such a way that uncertainty remains 
low, anticipated benefits remain high, and the process sustains this perception. 
 
8. VIII. THE CONSEQUENCES OF LEGALIZATION 
As a final comment, it is worth addressing the consequences of adopting a 
legalization framework: how this may compromise purely legal or political 
perspectives, or suggest some degree of overlap between the two. This thesis has 
rejected a positivist legal analysis as it fails to account for the influence of legal 
language and its normative power on emerging process of peace. These are exactly 
the distinct processes of legal institutionalisation that Abbott et al try to capture with 
their theory of legalization.89 Likewise, this thesis rebuts the narratives that frame 
conflict resolution and peace agreements as purely political and instrumental, as they 
fail to accurately account for the prescriptive, legislative, and interpretative process 
that comprise legal systems, and bear themselves out in peace agreements and peace 
processes. A legalization framework, in contrast, allows us to account for the 
practical role that law plays in prescribing short-term behaviour and shaping the 
transition to sustainable long-term political processes. The research presented in the 
thesis has also highlighted how political processes (such as negotiations) and 
concepts (political will, public sentiment) are crucial in laying the foundations for 
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sustainable peace, but legal mechanisms are often central to managing and 
maintaining variations in political will over the long-term. Binary divisions of law 
and politics thus appear reductive and detrimental to our understanding of how peace 
processes unfold, and the myriad factors that affect their implementation. 
Indeed, Abbott et al have previously argued that “law and politics are 
intertwined at all levels of legalization.”90 Both disciplines are arguably the driving 
forces behind the creation of the various forms of legalization,91 and we can observe 
this in action in peace processes that produce new political and legal structures. It 
may thus be argued that law and politics are not alternating methods of viewing 
conflict, but are in fact mutually constitutive of efforts to resolve it. Each imposes 
checks and balances on the over-application of the other, and both characterize the 
battle for transition through political and legal processes rather than the use of 
violence.92 The political and legal vocabularies are implicated in this struggle to such 
an extent that it is difficult to objectively identify which mechanisms best serve 
agreement sustainability with a professional neutrality that is independent of the 
conflict or political prescriptions on how best to resolve it.93 Martti Koskenniemi has 
previously flagged this judgment bias, arguing that “we all participate in politics 
from some particular, local angle or position and that even ‘international’ is only a 
name for a number of conflicting, highly idiosyncratic positions.”94 The danger of 
advocating a legalization framework is thus that we may be caught up in the 
politicization of the agreement and the legal structures it produces in the same way 
that the drafters and the parties themselves are. 
Yet, as Koskenniemi has flagged, international legal scholars already make 
certain value-judgments by virtue of the discipline. International law has often 
regarded itself as the avant-garde of liberal modernity, advocating reform of existing 
international structures and advancing the cause of universal human rights.95 
Normative perceptions of what values international law should promote and assure 
are supposed to provide an objective moral standard of behaviour that is universally 
considered ‘right.’ The idea that international law exists as a category independent of 
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international politics is only sustainable if it is understood as law in an extremely 
narrow formalist sense, and treated as such at the level of international relations.96 
Yet the more we attempt to prove the substantive effects of this body of law on state 
practice and subject behaviour, “the less we are able to demonstrate its independence 
from the power and policy of the strongest States.”97 This disparity between theory 
and practice was best exemplified at the 70th meeting of the UN General Assembly 
in September 2015, where the United States and Russia used the same legal concepts 
to criticise Russian intervention in the Crimea, and US support for Saudi intervention 
in Yemen, respectively.98 The body of international law that these concepts comprise 
remains a source of criticism for those who violate it, but it appears almost “utopian 
in its lack of closeness to the world of facts.”99 
While adopting a legalization framework may imply a constitutive 
relationship between law and politics, purely technical legal frameworks neglect the 
observable effects that political relations and dynamics have on the application of 
legal principles. Positivist legal analyses may preserve the scholarly integrity of 
international law as a discipline, but they do not assist our understanding of why 
peace agreements bearing the character of hard law—and representing genuine 
consensus between belligerents—collapse. Indeed, Dajani has argued in the context 
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that law does not provide all of the answers: it is 
just one variable in a much larger dynamic.100 The conclusions drawn in this chapter 
speak to this. The law alone cannot prescribe the transition from short-term 
commitments to long-term political processes: it may provide a roadmap and 
institutions that encourage continued engagement, but if an agreement does not 
reflect the political and contextual realities of the environment in which it is 
implemented, these provisions will fall by the wayside (as evidenced by the Lomé 
Accord). The processes and institutions precisely elaborated under an agreement are 
also subject to economic influences and practical matters of funding that are ill-
suited to legal prescription (but they should be regulated under highly legalized 
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agreements). These factors underscore the unsuitability of purely legalistic solutions 
to conflict, which is in and of itself multi-sectoral. It is thus submitted that the theory 
of legalization provides a more nuanced understanding of the many factors that 
influence the pursuit of peace, while preserving the legal character of the features 
prescribed by peace agreements. 
In considering the disparity between the body of international law and the 
social change it affects, Bell urges us to embrace our ambivalence, “and in so doing, 
refuse to accept that we must choose between pragmatic managerialism and naïve 
idealism, regulation or emancipation, politics or law”.101 Bell’s thoughtful stance is 
reflective of the current global political climate, in which the post-World War Two 
order is no longer guaranteed. And yet, highly legalized agreements continue to 
prosper: the 2016 Colombian peace deal is no less legitimate for its uncertain status 
under traditional concepts of international law. This would suggest that highly 
legalized agreements are particularly useful for combatting the challenges that face 
the current legal order. Indeed, it has been argued in the context of agreements on 
climate change and the environment that the provision of mechanisms that produce 
practical effects is far more important than formal legal status.102 The research 
advanced by this thesis supports such a claim, highlighting the significant effects that 
highly legalized provisions can produce, despite their ambiguous status. As the case 
studies presented in this thesis demonstrate, provisions that are high on precision, 
obligation, and delegation can influence party behaviour in a manner that positivist 
categories of international law have failed to. Parties appear to perceive highly 
legalized agreements as legally binding—despite the provisions of the VCLT or the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ—and in agreeing to highly legalized agreements, they 
commit to interpreting and implementing these documents through distinctly legal 
processes. This analysis thus advocates legalization theory as a more accurate 
barometer of legal obligation, and reiterates Bell’s claim that positivist law as it is 
presently perceived cannot hope to regulate the distinctly legal processes that are 
being adopted as common practices across peace processes the world over.103  
The peace processes in Northern Ireland, Mindanao, and Colombia, and the 
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degree to which these processes influenced each other, attest to this formative lex 
pacificatoria. In Chapter 5, we observed how the parties to the Bangsamoro peace 
process adopted—almost word for word—the Good Friday Agreement’s provisions 
on disarmament and security reform. The 2014 CAB utilized the Good Friday 
Agreement’s highly precise and obligatory language, and delegated authority to 
neutral third parties who would oversee and implement these mechanisms. The 
similarity of these provisions suggests they are more than just a political vehicle for 
post-conflict transition, or a sociological phenomenon. In prescribing provisions that 
are similarly high on precision, obligation and delegation, the parties to the 
Bangsamoro conflict implied a distinctly legal mechanism which would be regulated 
by the terms of an agreement that the parties also perceived as legal. The adoption of 
common provisions in such different contexts reiterates the legal influence that 
processes of legalization have on party behaviour, and affirms the possibility of a 
distinct lex pacificatoria. This thesis has grappled with the foundational elements of 
Bell’s lex pacificatoria throughout the case studies explored herein: the provisions on 
self-determination; the inclusion of both state and non-state actors; obligations that 
transition between precisely-worded short-term objectives and symbolic appeals to 
long-term ‘constitutionalization’ of the peace process; and various forms of 
delegation that comprise overlapping political forums and legal processes.104 
Moreover, this final chapter has provided a valuable socio-legal commentary on how 
variations in precision, obligation, and delegation can affect processes of 
legalization, both in terms of the legal structures they produce, and the sustainability 
of the agreements that mandate those structures. This is an important contribution – 
not just in terms of identifying an emerging body of law that can be labelled a lex 
pacificatoria, but in terms of improving best practice in the common adoption of 
successful peacebuilding mechanisms, and asserting quality control over the number 
of peace agreements that claim to be ‘legal.’ 
These foundational aspects of a lex pacificatoria are immediately applicable 
to conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, where conflict resolution efforts have been 
repeatedly impaired by a lack of precision and delegation. Various agreements in 
both contexts have failed to elaborate on truce lines, monitoring mechanisms, and 
penalties for infractions. Elaborating on these mechanisms under more highly 
legalized agreements may not guarantee more sustainable outcomes in the absence of 
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the political will to make them work. However, this thesis has forcibly demonstrated 
that attempts to sustain peace on the basis of weak agreements are at best a wasted 
opportunity, and at their worst, an aggravator of further conflict. If parties can be 
brought to the negotiating table to conclude weak instruments with little chance of 
success, then the challenge lies not in fostering their political will, but in convincing 
them of the benefits of more highly legalized agreements. The law’s contribution in 
this regard lies in convincing the parties that the risk is negligible, the benefits are 
achievable, and thus, that the pen might prove mightier than the sword.
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